439 So. 2d 1331 - Beech v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
11 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently March 2019
11 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Barker v. Wingo · 396 So. 2d 645 - Beck v. State · 438 So. 2d 336 - Coulter v. State · 435 So. 2d 1338 - Dobard v. State · 440 So. 2d 1116 - Cofer v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"Under these circumstances, especially in light of appellant's own verification of the voluntariness and accuracy of the statement, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the transcription, and the trial court will not be held in error for admitting it. Compare, Fleming v. State, 57 Ala.App. 556 , 329 So.2d 616 (1976); Beckham v. State, 389 So.2d 573 (Ala.Cr.App.1980); and Swann v. State, 412 So.2d 1253 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (other properly predicated evidence of an accused's incriminating statements was admissible, even though a tape recording might have been more accurate). "Moreover, although it possibly created some doubts in the minds of the jury as to the credibility of certain portions of appellant's trial testimony (which was the prosecution's motive for presenting it), appellant's pre-trial statement was exculpatory in nature and consistent with his trial testimony emphatically denying any participation in the murders. "We are convinced that the jury's verdict would have been the same had the tape recording been admitted into evidence instead of, or in addition to, the written transcription of that recording. See, A.R.A.P. 45."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“"Due to the nature of the state's case against the appellant, which was based primarily upon circumstantial evidence, and in comparing this 14 month delay to the delays in Byrd v. State , 421 So.2d 1344 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), Cofer v. State , 440 So.2d 1116 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), and Minnifield v. State , 439 So.2d 753 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), we have concluded that the delay in this instances *Page 803 was not 'presumptively prejudicial,' and that the appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial. See, Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and the standards adequately discussed therein. "Furthermore, the appellant was on parole for grand larceny at the time of his arrest for public drunkenness on the morning of the murders. A revocation of his parole would have, undoubtedly, justified his incarceration for part, if not all, of the period between July 27, 1980, and the day of the trial. Appellant's trial delay complaints were grounded upon the alleged hardships of incarceration, but he made no specific claims and presented no evidence of any actual prejudice caused by the delay. See, Scaloni v. State , 383 So.2d 586 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980)."”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Ingram v. State“did not challenge the accuracy of any specific parts of the statement”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Kennedy v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.