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44 Cal. 100

Hellman v. Howard

California Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1872

California Supreme Court · decided 1872-07-01

Suit on the following promissory note: “ Los Angeles, December 3d, 1868. “ On the fifteenth day of April, A. D. 1869, we promise to pay to Maria Merced W. de Carrillo or order, for value received, the sum [of] three thousand six hundred dollars, gold coin, without interest. “ C. V. HOWARD, [Two-dollar stamp, canceled.] “JOHY Gf.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1872-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently October 1930

6 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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By the Court, Rhodes, J.:

¶1It is admitted by the pleadings, that the promissory note in suit was assigned by the payee to the plaintiffs. That fact not being in issue, no question arises as to whether the assignment was made in such form as to pass the interest of a married woman.

¶2*104Hpon the issue, as to whether the plaintiffs took the note with notice of the facts relating to its delivery to the payee, the evidence was conflicting, and the verdict therefore will not he disturbed on the ground, that on that issue it is contrary to the evidence.

¶3The agreement executed by Sainsevaine and José C. Carrillo to the purchasers of the rancho, acknowledges the receipt of thirteen thousand dollars, gold coin, “for and on account of the sale of the rancho,” and does not mention a promissory note; but if it can be construed as referring to the note in suit, because it was proven that the note constituted a portion of the purchase money for the rancho, still the verdict must be sustained. That, the term “ deed ” will in its largest sense include a mortgage there can be no doubt; but it is manifest from the context, that the term was used in that instrument in a more limited sense. The deed referred to, as of even date with the instrument, was executed to the purchasers of the rancho, and is mentioned “ as the deed conveying said rancho to said parties;” and a deed against which said purchasers desired to protect themselves, is described as “another deed conveying the interest” of the same grantor in the rancho. A proper construction of the instrument renders it clear that the parties used the term “deed” in both instances, as meaning an instrument in writing which purported to convey the title of Maria Merced Williams de Carrillo to the rancho. It was not shown that another deed of conveyance had been executed by her prior to that which bore even date with that instrument; nor was it shown that the deed, to the purchasers mentioned in that instrument, failed to convey to them the title to the rancho.

¶4• Judgment and order affirmed with ten per cent damages.

¶5Neither Mr. Chief Justice Wallace nor Mr. Justice Crockett expressed an opinion.

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