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44 Colo. App. 42

607 P.2d 399

Nix v. Tice

Colorado Court of Appeals

Decided January 31, 1980

Colorado Court of Appeals · decided 1980-01-31

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ ‘Retroactive’ or ‘retrospective’ laws are generally defined, from a legal viewpoint, as those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” But it has been held specifically that a “statute is not retrospective because it merely relates to prior facts or transactions but does not change their legal effect, or because some of the requisites for its action are drawn from a time antecedent to its passage, or because it fixes the status of a person for the purpose of its operation.” It is said to be retroactive “only when it is applied to rights acquired prior to its enactment.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Carpenter v. Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles

“[T]he essential inquiry is whether `the act which triggers application of the amended statute occurs after the effective date of the amended statute.'”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Travelers Insurance v. Carpenter

Relies on 40 Colo. App. 330 - McCartney v. WEST ADAMS CTY. FIRE PROTECTION

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1980-01-31

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently December 2002

3 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

80198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

BERMAN, Judge.

¶1 Plaintiff, David Nix, appeals from a judgment sustaining a twelve month revocation of his driver’s license by the Department of Revenue. We affirm.

¶2 The record reflects that plaintiff’s driver’s license was revoked on September 7, 1976, for six months, pursuant to § 42-4-1202(3)(e), C.R.S.1973, after he had refused to take an implied consent chemical test. At the time, the statute provided for a single six month revocation for each refusal to take the test.

¶3 This statute was amended in 1977 to provide, in pertinent part:

“[T]he department shall forthwith revoke . his privilege to operate a motor vehicle within this state for a period of three months for the first such revocation and for a period of twelve months for the second and each subsequent revocation or denial within any five-year period . . .” Section 42-4-1202(3)(e), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Cum.Supp.) (emphasis supplied).

¶4 On August i, 1978, ■ the plaintiff was again arrested, and requested to take the implied consent test, which he refused to do. Based upon the 1976 revocation, the hearing officer ruled that the 1978 violation constituted a second refusal, and revoked plaintiff’s license for twelve months.

¶5 On appeal, plaintiff’s sole contention is that the hearing officer’s consideration of the 1976 revocation which occurred before the 1977 amendment to the statute was an unconstitutional retroactive application of a statute. Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 11. Plaintiff maintains that this retroactive application impaired his vested right in his driver’s license, created a new obligation, imposed a different duty, or attached a different duty in respect to transactions or considerations already past. We reject this contention.

¶6 Contrary to plaintiff’s position, an amended statute which is applied to a factual situation which occurred prior to the enactment of the amendment is not viewed as retroactive in application, where, as here, the act which triggers application of the amended statute occurs after the effective date of the amended statute. McCartney v. West Adams County Fire Protection District, 40 Colo.App. 330, 574 P.2d 516 (1978). Accordingly, we hold that the hearing officer correctly considered the 1976 revocation in his decision revoking the plaintiff’s license for twelve months under § 42-4-1202(3)(e), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Cum.Supp.).

¶7 Judgment affirmed.

PIERCE and RULAND, JJ., concur.
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