¶1Opinion by
¶2This was an action of trover, to recover damages for the conversion of certain sheep, begun in the district court of Harvey county on the 18th day of Feb*544ruary, 1886. The right of the plaintiff below to recover was based on certain chattel mortgages which had become absolute, and an unsuccessful demand for the possession of the sheep. The defendants answered: First, a general denial; second, superior claims in themselves and third parties, whom they ask to have made parties; third, claim an agister’s lien; to which plaintiff’s reply was a general denial. On the 14th day of May, 1887, the case was tried by the court and a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,922.60. A motion for a new trial followed, which was overruled; to which ruling the defendants excepted, and file their case-made in this court, asking a reversal of the judgment of the district court.
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“The respondent, as mortgagee after condition broken, *546had the legal title to the property, and the right to the possession thereof, against everybody; and his right to recover against every person unlawfully converting the same in hostility to his rights as mortgagee was just as perfect as if he had been the absolute owner thereof; the only difference being that, as against persons claiming under the mortgagor, or his assignees, his right to damages would be limited to the amount due upon his mortgage.”
¶4In Corbin v. Kincaid, 33 Kas. 649, 652, Mr. Justice Valentine says:
“The defendant below had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s mortgage and of his rights, and took possession of the property with such knowledge, claiming to havé the prior right thereto, in violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and all this transpired within less than one year after the execution of the plaintiff ’s mortgage, and at a time when no one would claim, or even pretend, that any renewal affidavit was necessary. A cause of action in replevin, or for conversion, then arose in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and that cause of action was not satisfied, annulled or barred by any failure on the part of the plaintiff to afterward file a renewal affidavit.”
“A second mortgagee of a chattel who takes the same from the possession of the mortgagor and sells it and receives the full consideration of the sale, without regard to the rights of the senior mortgagee, is liable to the latter in an action for the conversion of the chattel.”
¶5See also Lowe v. Wing, 56 Wis. 31; Bailey v. Godfrey, 54 Ill. 507; 12 Wis. 245; 11 id. 375; 70 Ill. 302; 20 Wend. 19; 73 Mo. 672; 42 Mich. 12; 2 Speers, 181.
¶6Reeder owned a lot of sheep, and gave the Bank of Burr-ton a mortgage on sheep and other personal property for $1,622.10 to secure so much alleged indebtedness. Afterward he gave a mortgage to J. E. Howard on 3,000 sheep to secure an alleged indebtedness of $3,000. Afterward Reeder purchased 1,500 sheep of Burns, and gave Burns a mortgage thereon to secure the purchase-money, $3,000. The mortgages to the Bank of Burrton and to J. E. Howard were given in January, 1885 — the former on the 2d and the latter on the 19th. The mortgage to Burns was given on the 13th *547of February, 1885. Of course the mortgages to the Burrton bank and J. E. Howard could not be a lien on the sheep contained in the Burns mortgage, because they did not cover the Burns sheep. Reeder did not have the Burns sheep at the time he made the mortgages to the Burrton bank and Howard. The mortgage to the First National Bank of Newton was made by Reeder July 10, 1885, but it recites that the sheep covered by it were the same sheep mortgaged by Reeder to Gorman October 28, 1884. So the mortgage to the Newton bank did not cover any of the Burns sheep, and therefore could not be a lien thereon, no matter when recorded. So far then as these mortgages were concerned, only the Burns mortgage was a lien on the Burns sheep. It is admitted that the defendants took all the sheep Reeder had on September 8, 1885, into their possession.
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¶8We have examined the alleged errors growing out of the admission of evidence, and do not think any material error was therein committed. Burns only testified as to the value of fat sheep. He said he had noticed the quotations of such sheep in the Kansas City market, and then stated what the market price of fat sheep was in Kansas City. In view of the fact that it was proved there was no market value for such sheep at home, his evidence as to the market prices at Kansas City was probably admissible. But as it seems to be conceded that there were no fat sheep, the evidence of Burns thus given was not material. And the same may be said of Reeder’s statement as to what he was told about the value at Kansas City. The claim that Burns’s mortgage was void because not immediately filed in Harvey county, is not good. (33 Kas. 649; 20 Ohio, 161.) And besides, defendants had actual knowledge of plaintiff’s mortgage all the while. This brings us to the last question: Was the verdict so excessive that it must have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice, and therefore ought it to be set aside ? íhe plaintiff went to the county of the defendants to bring his suit, and there it was tried. Burns says there were seven or eight hundred of his sheep when taken by defendants. Rodgers says there were 500 in February, 1886. Defendants assert many of the .sheep had died before that. Just how many of Burns’s sheep were taken by Howard and the bank, and what they were worth, we do not know. But the jury having considered all the evidence on this subject, and their finding thereon having been approved by the trial court, and there being some evidence upon which to base their finding, this court will not set it aside.
¶9*549We have examined the instructions, and fail to find.any error therein. And we also believe they are sufficiently full, and cover all the questions involved in the case. We therefore recommend that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
¶10By the Court: It is so ordered.