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44 Mo. App. 159

State v. Miller

Missouri Court of Appeals

Decided February 24, 1891

Missouri Court of Appeals · decided 1891-02-24

<p>1. Criminal Law: corrupt voluntary oath : illegal purpose op prosecution. When the manifest purpose of a criminal prosecution is to use the machinery of the criminal law to enforce the payment of a gambling debt, or to punish its non-payment, the courts will not lend their aid thereto ; nor is a voluntary oath falsely made for the purpose of influencing a stakeholder in the payment of a gambling wager, such a corrupt oath as the statute (R. S. 1S89, sec. 8668) intends to reach and punish. But, held by Biggs, J., dissenting, that the record did not disclose that such was the purpose of the prosecution in this cause.</p> <p>.2.---:-. In prosecutions for the making of a corrupt voluntary oath, there cannot be a conviction on the testimony of a single witness, unless such testimony is corroborated sufficiently to overcome the oath of the accused and the presumption of his innocence, and held, Biggs, J., dissenting, that the evidence in the case at bar was insufficient under this rule.</p> <p>8. Evidence : matter op opinion. What a witness understands or thinks is not competent evidence ; it falls within the rule which prohibits witnesses from stating their conclusions.</p>

Relies on State v. Boland

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed {and defendant discharged) · Decided 1891-02-24

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 1928

4 state decisions

201891190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1dissenting opinion.

Biggs, J.

¶2If the purpose of this prosecution was either to force the defendant to pay a gambling debt or to punish him for its non-payment, I would readily agree to his discharge. But I do not so read or understand the record. If the state’s witnesses are to be credited, the defendant made a false affidavit to get $10, the. property of the prosecuting witness. This is the offense charged and proved, when stripped of verbiage and varnish.

¶3I have always understood that in criminal cases the appellate jurisdiction of this court was exhausted, when it was determined that the act of the accused, as charged in the indictment, was an offense against the law; that the indictment was in due form, and that the conviction had been obtained according to the forms and requirements of criminal procedure.

¶4The sufficiency of the indictment in the present case is not questioned, and if we adhere to the doctrine of this court, as declared in the case of State v. Boland, 12 Mo. App. 74, the defendant certainly violated the statute and subjected himself to a criminal prosecution, if the affidavit was false, and he made it for a corrupt purpose. If it was false, it was certainly corrupt as abundantly appears from the defendant’s own admissions. He did not make the affidavit to induce the *167stakeholder to give him his own money, but he made it to get money from the stakeholder, to which he had no legal or moral right.

¶5The real question in the case is, was the falsity of the affidavit established by evidence, which, in law, is deemed sufficient to make out a case of perjury % In other words was the testimony of the prosecuting witness-corroborated by other material evidence or independent circumstances ? The majority of the court are of the opinion that the state’s evidence falls short of this requirement. The reading of the record leads me to a different conclusion. If the testimony of the witness Murphy be ignored, .that of S. J. Manes and George Hendricks is in the case. The testimony of these two witnesses was to the effect that the prosecuting witness sued the defendant before a justice of the peace for $15.35 in which was included the $10 which it was claimed that the defendant owed on the bet in 1884 ; that on the trial the defendant “claimed that the $10 was a gambling debt, and the law would not allow judgment for such a debt.” It strikes me that this was a plain and unequivocal admission that he had made the debt. If he did not in fact make it, why was it that this defense was not interposed, instead of seeking shelter under the gambling act ?

¶6I think the judgment of the circuit court ought to be affirmed.

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