State v. Wolf’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 2 district · 71 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The thrust of the second sentence of section 5.2(a) is that while the court need not grant every request received from the jury, its discretion to deny jury review of evidence is strictly limited. The justification for this approach is well expressed in State v. Wolf, 44 N.J. 176, 185, 207 A.2d 670, 675 (1965): "'When a jury retires to consider their verdict, their discussion may produce disagreement or doubt or failure of definite recollection as to what a particular witness said in the course of his testimony. If they request enlightenment on the subject through the reading of his testimony, . . . the request should be granted. The true administration of justice calls for such action. When there is a doubt in the minds of jurors as to what a witness said, it cannot be prejudicial to anyone to have that doubt removed by a rehearing of his testimony. There is no need to be chary for fear of giving undue prominence to the testimony of the witness. If . . . a jury is to be considered intelligent enough to be entrusted with powers of decision, it must be assumed they have sense enough to ask to have their memories stimulated or refreshed only as to those portions of the testimony about which they are in doubt or disagreement.”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ripley v. State · Bangs v. State

2. “No hard and fast rule for the guidance of [the judge’s! discretion can be laid down. Obviously at that late stage of the proceedings [i.e., once deliberations began] [reopening the record] should not be taken lightly. It seems sufficient to say that when a citizen’s life is at stake a trial in a court of justice is not a game and the judge is more than an umpire. And so, when the ends of justice will be served by a reopening, it ought to be done. [Id. at 191, 207 A.2d 670 .]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 428 N.J. Super. 107 - State v. Cullen

3. “Suppose while the jury was deliberating, the prosecutor returned to court with a third person who had just confessed to the shooting, and with some reputable eye witness to the killing who identified such person as the perpetrator, could it be said the court was powerless to reopen the defense and permit the jury to hear the new testimony?”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dyson v. State