State v. Sanford’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The particular principle involved here is that an utterance made impulsively and under the strain and immediate influence of an exciting or terrifying occurrence may be so inherently truthful that the ordinary sanctions and tests may be dispensed with. It is a sound doctrine, and one easily grasped. The difficulty is in its application. What are the tests of spontaneity? Wig-more, after examination of the judicial expositions, admits but three legitimate limitations to the doctrine. They are: “First. ‘There must be some shock, startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting/ “Second. ‘The utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and and misrepresent, i. e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance/ “Third. ‘The utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding it/ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Beal

2. “The determination of whether or not the particular testimony is admissible must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Declarations which are spontaneously and instinctively made are considered by the courts as part of the res gestae. We find no such spontaneous situation here. Mrs. Sanford, under the ministrations of Dr. Doyne, was relaxed and dozing. She did not as at first sight of a close friend following her tragic experience give impulsive utterance to the questioned declaration. Her utterances were not spontaneous exclamations forming a part of and interwoven with the criminal act. They were not made under the immediate strain and influence of an exciting or terrifying occurrence. We cannot sustain the admission of such hearsay testimony under the conditions disclosed by the record in this case without stretching the res gestae rule beyond recognition. [ 44 N.M. at 74 , 97 P.2d at 919 .]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Maestas