amount of said goods." The "amount of said goods," it now appears, was $8,600. When the defendants, by their writing, agreed to give to the said plaintiffs vouchers to the "amount of said goods," they simply agreed to give vouchers which should express on their face that goods had been delivered to the amount of $8,600. I read the contract, therefore, as if it had said: "We do hereby agree to deliver to said Wise Arnold Gov. Robinson's vouchers by his quartermaster, within a few days after the arrival of said goods at their destination, at St. Louis, for the amount of $8,600." The writing contains all the elements of a perfect contract, as distinguished from a mere receipt. It is an acknowledgment of the purchase at specified prices, which is assented to by the *Page 340 plaintiffs in receiving the paper. It contains the agreement by implication to deliver at St. Louis and an agreement that payment shall be made in Gov. Robinson's vouchers. (Buswell v.Poineer,37 N.Y., 312; Filkins v. Whyland,24 N.Y., 338.) It is simply an agreement to purchase the goods and to pay for them in the obligations or certificates or warrants of another party. This is a valid contract, binding on the seller who enters into it, and imposing no personal liability on the buyer further than to deliver the stipulated obligations of the third party. These the seller takes and holds at his own risk. If they do not produce the full amount expected, it is the loss of the seller and not the buyer. This well settled principle of law the plaintiffs' counsel now expressly concedes. He says, however, that the debtor cannot discharge his liability by his own checks, notes or mere paper devices, unless they are good for what they profess to be, no matter how strong a receipt he persuades his creditor into giving. To this effect he cites Hill v. Beebee (3 Kern., 556); Higby v. New York (3 Bosw., 497);Hendrickson v. Beers (3 id., 639).

This qualification is not applicable to the present case. As I read the contract, there never was any liability of the defendants to be discharged, except that of procuring the vouchers. They never agreed themselves to pay for the goods. If they had I agree that their own checks, notes or paper devices, could never discharge them.

The legal effect of this contract would have been no different if it had made the sum payable upon the receipt of the personal obligations of Gov. Robinson, and had read "We agree to deliver to said Wise Arnold, the notes of Gov. Robinson (on demand or at twelve months) for the amount of said goods." The liability of the defendants would have been discharged upon procuring and delivering the genuine notes of Gov. Robinson, to the amount of the goods. The risk of payment would belong entirely to the seller. Suppose the agreement on the part of the defendants had been to deliver the bonds of the State of Kansas or of the United *Page 341 States to the amount of the goods, would there have been a pretence that the defendants would be liable for their ultimate payment? Yet the genuine voucher of Gov. Robinson's quartermaster, free from fraud in the manner of its being obtained, is in law and in fact, as complete an obligation against these governments (whichever he represented) as their formal bond. He and his quartermaster were the recognized agents of the government to receive the military stores needed by them, and to issue certificates of indebtedness to the parties furnishing them. True there is no mode of compelling payment, if the government refuse to make it or insist upon a deduction; nor is there in any case where the government gives its direct obligation. It is a simple transaction of faith and confidence between the government and its citizens.

The finding of the referee that the vouchers were not delivered in payment of the plaintiff's demand, is in direct contradiction to all the testimony, including that of the plaintiff Wise. Neither is there testimony on which it can reasonably be found that the defendants on their own account received the proceeds of the vouchers from the government and paid them over to the plaintiffs. The vouchers were never claimed by either party to belong to the defendants after the delivery to the plaintiffs. The former were evidently desirous to render all the aid in their power to enable the plaintiffs to realize all their money. This is all the testimony shows.

I do not think it important to allude to the proposition, that, if this writing be not a binding contract, then the defendants were at liberty to show by parol, as they offered to do, what the actual agreement was.

I prefer to place my judgment upon the precise point that the writing constituted a contract between the parties; that the defendants performed it on their part by procuring and delivering the vouchers as agreed, and that there is not the slightest evidence of fraud on the part of the defendants or the military authorities. This relieves the defendants from *Page 342 further liability and the securities received are at the risk of the plaintiffs.

Judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.

The contract was to purchase a certain quantity of merchandise at fixed prices and deliver to the plaintiffs certain vouchers for the amount within a few days after the merchandise arrived at St. Louis. The vouchers were the receipts of a military officer of the government for goods which had been delivered previous to the giving of the receipt, for the use of the government, and constituted the evidence upon which payment of the value of the goods, for which the receipts had been given, might be obtained from the war department. They represented property and were of intrinsic value. The contract imports the giving of the vouchers for the merchandise, and nothing is to be implied in respect to any other or different mode of payment. The vouchers were delivered by the defendants and accepted by the plaintiffs. There was an implied guaranty that they were genuine and free from any taint of fraud which would impair the facility, or the eventual right of obtaining payment from the department upon which they were drawn. There was no guaranty, however, as to the immediate or future payment by the government. The vouchers were not punctually paid by the government, but we are not distinctly informed by evidence that any just grounds existed for the neglect or refusal to pay them. A letter of the defendants states that there were political differences between certain high officials of the government, which had delayed their payment. Something is also said in the letter about the reinspection of the goods by a military board appointed for that purpose, and of a report by the board, according to which payment would be made. But no evidence is given whether this board possessed any judicial authority or took any evidence, or had any jurisdiction to make any binding report. It is to be inferred that, acting on the report, the validity of the vouchers was recognized by the government to the extent of about seventy-five *Page 343 per cent only of their face. It may be that the quartermaster, signing the voucher, fraudulently receipted for more than the value of the merchandise, and that the plaintiffs have a just claim to recover of the defendants for that reason. But, as the case stands, it appears that they surrendered their vouchers to the government on receiving a sum which the officers arbitrarily chose or consented to pay, when in fact there was no improper valuation of the merchandise, and no just reason why less than the face should be paid. Government officials are not always immaculate, nor are contractors, and we can assume nothing on such a foundation. The endorsement of the government draft by the defendants to the plaintiffs for the amount reported by the military board does not prove that the defendants assumed any liability for the loss sustained by the plaintiffs on their vouchers. Prima facie, the delivery of the vouchers was all that the defendants contracted to do for the delivery of the plaintiffs' merchandise at St. Louis. The fact that they realized only seventy-five per cent on the vouchers does not of itself afford the plaintiffs any right of action against the defendants. There is nothing more in the plaintiffs' case. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

All for reversal. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.

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