Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar’s Empirical Analysis
1975
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 74 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 77 later decisions — most recently April 2022 · most notably Shover v. Cordis Corp. (1991), 81 Ohio App. 3d 591 - Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen Oil Services, Inc. (1992)
3 federal appellate · 74 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 143 Ohio St. 312 - Sears v. Weimer · Provident Bank v. Wood · 16 Ohio St. 2d 16 - Henry v. Central National Bank · Accountant's Computer Services, Inc. v. Kosydar · Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 77 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Strict construction of taxing statutes is required, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the citizen upon whom or the property upon which the burden is sought to be imposed. (Paragraph one of the syllabus in Davis v. Willoughby, 173 Ohio St. 338 , approved and followed.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 208 , 73 O.O. 2d 507, 339 N.E. 2d 820 , paragraph one of the syllabus.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“[i]t is the duty of the courts, if the language of a statute fairly permits or unless restrained by the clear language thereof, so to construe the statute as to avoid [an unreasonable or absurd] result.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““In Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St. 2d 101, 105 , we stated that ‘it is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See, e.g., Katz v. Department of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229 . If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the interpretative effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly. Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312 .’ “In State, ex rel. Francis, v. Sours (1944), 143 Ohio St. 120, 124 , it was stated that ‘the polestar of construction and interpretation of statutory language is legislative intention. In determining that intention courts look to language employed and to the purpose to be accomplished.’ Accord, Henry v. Central National Bank (1968), 16 Ohio St. 2d 16, 20 . “The above principle of construction was stated negatively in Carmelite Sisters, St. Rita’s Home, v. Bd. of Review (1969), 18 Ohio St. 2d 41, 46 , as follows: ‘the legislative intent may be inquired into only if the enactment is ambiguous upon its face.’ ””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.