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44 Ohio St. 2d 53

State v. Withers

Ohio Supreme Court

Decided November 19, 1975

Ohio Supreme Court · decided 1975-11-19

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“unless it clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby * * *.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Ramey v. Quality Mold, Unpublished Decision (5-6-2005)

Relies on Chapman v. State of California · Coleman v. Alabama · Ohio v. Hymore

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1975-11-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently May 2018 · most notably Krischbaum v. Dillon (1991), 10 Ohio App. 3d 44 - Dipietro v. Dipietro (1983)

31 state decisions

12019751980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Per Curiam.

¶1Appellant contends, in his first of four propositions of law, that “he was effectively denied the assistance of counsel” at the preliminary hearing, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

¶2Based on the record before us, we agree with the courts below that nothing occurred at appellant’s preliminary hearing which was prejudicial to his rights. See State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St. 2d 56; Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U. S. 18; Coleman v. Alabama (1970), 399 U. S. 1.

¶3In his second and third propositions of law, appellant *55argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting in evidence the pocket knife found in appellant’s possession, and by refusing to admit in evidence the transcript of the preliminary hearing.

¶4In State v. Hymore (1967), 9 Ohio St. 2d 122, 128, it is stated that, “the trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and unless it clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby, this court should be slow to interfere.”

¶5After a review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court herein with respect to the admissibility of the evidence.

¶6Lastly, appellant contends that his mandatory sentence to' the reformatory by the trial court amounted to a denial of equal protection of the laws.

¶7The record clearly shows that appellant was arrested January 19,1973, indicted on March 9th, and sentenced July 3, 1973. During that entire period, armed robbery was a non-probationary offense.2 Hence, appellant was treated no differently than other persons convicted of armed robbery at that time, with respect to eligibility for probation. Appellant’s claim is, therefore, without merit.

¶8For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

¶9Judgment affirmed.

O’Neill, C. J., Herbert, CorrigaN, SterN, Celebrezze, W. BrowN and P. Browr, JJ., concur.

¶10From September 5, 1972, until its repeal, effective January 1, 1974, R. C. 2901.13 provided:

“No person, while armed with a pistol, knife, or other dangerous weapon, by force or violation, or by putting in fear, shall steal from the person of another anything of value.
“Whoever violates this section is guilty of armed robbery and he shall not have the benefit of probation.”
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