Volume 44 — South Carolina Law Reports

<p>BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT UNION, SEPTEMBER, EXTRA TERM, 1856.</p> <p>Debt on prison bounds’ bond against tbe surety. Breach assigned — That Charles Growing, the principal, “ did not render to the Clerk of the District a schedule of his whole estate.”</p> <p>Cowing had been arrested under ccc. sa., at the suit of the plaintiffs, and gave the usual prison bounds’ bond. He made application for the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors’ Act, and his discharge was resisted. The suggestion contained, inter alia, the following specifications.</p> <p>1st. Because the defendant, Charles Cowing, has fraudulently assigned and conveyed the whole of his personal estate to his son, Bodney Cowing, without good or valid consideration, and with a fraudulent understanding and intention of securing to himself a benefit out of his estate, at the expense and to the injury of his creditors, by retaining possession,of his estate so assigned.</p> <p>2d. Because the debts and judgments preferred by the defendant to his son, Bodney Cowing, are fraudulent and false in fact and in law, and are set up under a corrupt and fraudulent understanding and combination between the father and son, to secure to the father a benefit, and to hinder and defeat the plaintiffs and others, the creditors of the said defendant, in the collection of their just claims.</p> <p>6th. Bec'ause, since the assignment by the defendant to his son Bodney Cowing, he has remained in possession, and used and enjoyed as his own, the assigned effects, contrary to law, and with the fraudulent intention of hindering the -plaintiffs and others of his creditors in the collection of their debts.</p> <p>Upon these specifications he was found guilty; and this finding was relied upon as evidence that the schedule was falste.</p> <p>A motion for a non-suit, on the ground that there was no proof of tbe breaeb of tbe condition of tbe bond, was overruled ; and under tbe instructions of bis Honor, tbe jury found for tbe plaintiffs, and included in tbe verdict tbe amount of tbe costs of the suggestion.</p> <p>Tbe defendant appealed, and now renewed bis motion for a non-suit, on tbe ground taken in tbe Court below; and, failing in that motion, moved for a new trial, on tbe ground, inter alia,</p> <p>2. Because tbe defendant was not liable for tbe costs of tbe suggestion.</p>

<p>BEFORE WHITNER J., AT ANDERSON, FALL TERM, 1856.</p> <p>Tbis was a domestic attachment against Anson Bangs, Eli Bangs, John 0. Matber, Butler H. Bixby and Ausburn Bird-sail, co-partners under tbe name and firm of Anson Bangs & Company. Tbe recital in tbe writ was, tbat plaintiff “bas just grounds to suppose and does verily believe, tbat defendants intend to remove tbeir effects.” A motion was made to set aside tbe attachment, on tbe ground tbat all tbe defendants were absent from and without tbe limits of tbis State on 23d April, 1856, when tbe attachment was issued. Tbe facts, upon which tbe motion was based, were contained in several affidavits, and sufficiently appear in tbe opinion delivered in tbe Court of Appeals. His Honor, tbe presiding Judge, refused tbe motion. Defendants appealed, and now-renewed tbeir motion in tbis Court.</p>

<p>BEFOBE G-LOVEB, J., AT KERSHAW, FALL TEEM, 1856.</p> <p>Tbe facts of tbis case are stated’in tbe opinion delivered in tbe Court of Appeals.</p>

BEFORE W ARDE AW, J., AT MARION, FALL TERM, 1856. The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “ The defendant was indicted for burning the woods, &c. “ The Act of 1789, (5 Stat. 125, § 5,) enacts that “no person shall put fire to or burn any grass, brush, or other combustible matter, so as thereby the woods, fields, lands, or marshes be set on fire; provided that no person shall be prevented from firing woods, fields, lands or marshes within his own bounds,…

BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT KERSHAW, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe defendants were indicted and convicted for destroying buildings in tbe nigbt time.

BEFORE &LOVER, J., AT SUMTER, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge is as follows: “ These actions were brought within the summary process jurisdiction of this Court, on a prison bounds bond, given by S. W. Sullivan and the defendants, as his sureties. “On the 10th of March, 1856, Sullivan was arrested on a capias ad satisfaciendum, at the suit of Perry Moses.

BEFORE WARDLAW, J., AT WILLIAMSBURG-, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Sum. pro. on note.

<p>Assumpsit by W. H. against S. M. for five hundred and ninety-one dollars, for hire of wagon, team and .driver. Before suit commenced, a creditor of W. H. had issued an attachment against him in North Carolina, and S. M., being made garnishee, was condemned to pay two hundred and forty-seven dollars and ninety-nine cents. W. H. had also drawn an order on S. M. for one hundred and seventy-two dollars, which S. M., after suit commenced, accepted in writing.</p> <p>Held, that the order and attachment were no bar to this action.</p> <p>Held, further, that the amount adjudged against 8. M., in the attachment case, should be allowed as a discount.</p>

<p>A. purchaser of land at sheriff’s sale, who had complied -with the terms of sale, but had never taken titles, devised the land for life, with remainder in fee. About twelve years after the sale, the devisee for life released to the remainder-man, and gave him an order on the sheriff to make titles to him: — Held, That the sheriff then in office, the successor of the one who sold, could make titles under the Act of 1839, sec. 61, to the remainder-man.</p> <p>In an action of trespass to try title by a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, against the party as whose property the land was sold, the defendant is estopped from showing title in a third person whose tenant he claims to be.</p>

<p>BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT CHESTER, FALL TERM, 1856.</p> <p>Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows:</p> <p>“ Tbe action was in slander, and tbe words charged and proved were, that tbe plaintiff bad a mulatto cbild. Tbe plea was tbe general issue, ,</p> <p>“After tbe plaintiff closed ber evidence, tbe defendant moved for a non-suit upon tbe grounds taken in tbe accompanying notice of appeal, to wit: that considering tbe import of tbe words, tbe plaintiff, to sbow them slanderous, should have alleged, in ber declaration, that she was a white or unmarried woman; since she might be a free negro, or married to one; in either of which cases, to have bad a mulatto cbild was, only natural, and to say so of ber would not be slanderous. I overruled tbe motion for non-suit; and tbe same, together with one in arrest of judgment, is renewed on tbe same grounds.</p> <p>“ Tbe jury found for tbe plaintiff a verdict for $3000. She proved ber character to be good, and it was conceded, or at least was unassailed by tbe defendant, who offered no evidence.”</p> <p>Tbe defendant appealed, and now moved this Court for a non-suit, and failing in that motion, then in arrest of judgment, on tbe grounds,</p> <p>1. The plaintiff should have averred in her declaration, that she was a white woman.</p> <p>2. She should have averred that she was unmarried, or married to a white man.</p> <p>3. Because the plaintiff’s declaration is not sufficient, in law, to sustain the action.</p>

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT UNION, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ At tbe close of tbe term of tbe Court, on Saturday, tbe issue docket having been some hours before closed, Mr. Thompson moved to put tbe case above stated on tbe issue docket. It bad not been on that docket at March last, nor was it on at this term.

<p>BEFORE MUNRO, J., AT DARLINGTON, STRING TERM, 1856.</p> <p>The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows : “The action was a case to recover damages for killing the plaintiff’s dog. Sometime, either in January or February last, on a Sunday forenoon, the body of the dog was found dead upon the track of the road, by several persons who were returning from church. It was shortly after the passenger train had passed along the road. No one heard the whistle blow. The dog was proved to have been about ten months old,' and was in a course of training for a yard dog, and his-value was variously estimated by the witnesses at from ten dollars to seventy-five dollars.</p> <p>“ It appears that the road runs through the plaintiff’s plantation, and crosses a mill road near to the plaintiff’s residence, which is distant from the railroad about two hundred yards, and is surrounded by an inclosúre ; and that his negro houses are about thirty yards distant from the road, around which there is no inclosure.</p> <p>“I stated to the jury the degree of negligence necessary to make out a ‘prima facie case against a railroad, in reference to killing stock while pasturing in the forest, as laid down in Danner's case; and at the same time expressed a doubt as to the application of the rule in reference to the killing of dogs.</p> <p>“ Tbe jury found for tbe plaintiff thirteen dollars damages.”</p> <p>Tbe defendants appealed, and now moved tbis Court for a new trial, on tbe ground:</p> <p>Because bis Honor should have instructed tbe jury that tbe plaintiff was bound to prove that tbe yard dog was killed by tbe negligence of tbe defendants, and that tbe presumption of negligence wbicb arises from tbe killing of cattle or bogs would not be raised without further proof.</p>

<p>After publication for a year and a day of the usual rule to plead in cases of attachment, plaintiff obtained, on the 21st November, 1855, an interlocutory order for judgment. On the 22d January, 1856, defendant appeared before the clerk, and put in special bail to the action, and at - the call of the case on the inquiry docket at the next term, moved to dissolve the attachment, and for leave to plead: — Held, that he was entitled to his motion.</p> <p>A defendant in foreign attachment, against whom, at the expiration of the usual rule to appear and plead, an interlocutory order for judgment has been entered, may, nevertheless, by putting in special bail to the action before the next term after the order was entered, entitle himself to an order to have the attachment dissolved, and for leave to plead to the action.</p>

BEFORE GLOVER, J„ AT RICHLAND^ FALL TERM, 1856. The report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ At a sale of tbe real and personal estate of tbe late Jacob A. Wolfe, on tbe 9tb, lOtb, lltb, and 12tb of January, 1854, tbe defendant purchased personal property — chiefly slaves— to tbe amount of ten thousand nine hundred and ninety-six dollars; and, not complying with tbe conditions of sale, as is alleged, tbe property was re-sold at bis risk, on tbe 31st of…

BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT EDGEFIELD, FALL TEEM, 1856. Trespass to try title to a tract of land containing seventy-five acres.

BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT SUMTER, FALL TERM, 1856. The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “ This was an action of trover to recover damages for the conversion of a slave named Flander. Edwin D. Pringle, who had before been jointly interested in Flander, became the sole owner in February, 1850, and on the 15th March, 1853, transferred him, by bill of sale, to the plaintiff.

<p>BEFORE GLOYER, J., AT SUMTER, FALL TERM, 1856.</p> <p>Under ca. sas. issued bj tbe plaintiffs respectively, tbe defendant bad been arrested and given bond for tbe prison rules. He applied for tbe benefit of tbe insolvent debtor’s Act. At Spring Term, 1856, bis application was beard, and upon suggestion filed by tbe plaintiffs, be was convicted of fraud; be appealed, and at May Term of tbe Court of Appeals, abandoned bis appeal. At tbis term tbe plaintiffs moved for an order, as follows: “It appearing to tbe Court tbat Tbomas Garrett, defendant in tbe cases stated, was convicted of fraud under tbe insolvent debtors’ Acts, at tbe last term of tbis Court, and tbat bis appeal from said conviction was abandoned at tbe May Term of tbe Court of Appeals. On motion of Bichardson and Haynswortb, plaintiffs’ attorneys, it is adjudged and declared, tbat tbe said Tbomas Garrett is no longer entitled to tbe benefit of tbe prison rules; and it is ordered, tbat tbe sheriff of Sumter District do take bim into custody forthwith, and bold bim, as upon tbe original arrest, until the debt, interest and costs, in eacb of the cases stated, be fully paid and satisfied.”</p> <p>This motion was refused by his Honor.</p> <p>The plaintiffs appealed, and now moved this Court to grant the order moved for on the circuit, with modifications, if deemed proper.</p>

<p>Where a commission, merchant sold goods for his principal, -without disclosing his agency, and being indebted to the purchaser, gave him his due bill for the amount of his indebtedness: — Held, in an action by the owner for the price of the goods, that the purchaser could not set-off, or claim as payment the amount of the due bill.</p>

<p>BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT BARNWELL, FALL TERM, 1856.</p> <p>The report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “This was an action of-debt on a prison bounds’ bond. The defendant pleaded performance — the plaintiff replied, setting out inter alia, that the prisoner, Miles A. Riley, was ordered to be discharged upon the condition that he should, within a time specified, deliver the contents of his schedule to his assignee, Thomas Youmans, and that he did not so deliver; and for further breach, that the said Miles departed from the bounds (the limits of the Judicial District.) The defendant rejoined that the said Miles was ready and willing to deliver, and did place the contents at a place agreed upon by and between the said assignee and Miles, for the said assignee to receive; and to the further breach, that Ms (the said Miles’) goods were in Beaufort District, and that he was compelled to leave the bounds to deliver the same. To the first part of the rejoinder, the plaintiff surrejoined by traversing, and issue was taken; to the second part he demurred, and the defendant joined in demurrer.</p> <p>“ The case was tried upon the issue of fact. It appeared that Miles A. Riley, for whom this defendant was surety, in his schedule set down three beds and furniture, his wearing apparel and sundry accounts. All these were assigned without reservation: and the said Miles was ordered to be discharged, upon the condition that he delivered the same to his said assignee within a time limited.</p> <p>“ Miles A. Riley proved that he told his said assignee, on the day of his discharge, that he would leave for him at Mr. Trowell’s, the accounts mentioned in his schedule; that the assignee said nothing; that he according left, within the time limited, the accounts at Mr. Trowell’s; that he wrote to the said assignee that he had so left them. The assignee did not take them away; that he, Miles A. Riley, afterwards collected twenty-nine dollars upon them, and paid it to the defendant. His three beds, he said, were all which he had; that they were at Mr. Fife’s, in Beaufort District; that he had not at all interfered with them since his assignment.</p> <p>“ It appeared that the assignee did receive the letter spoken of by Miles A. Riley. It also appeared that the defendant in this action, after suit brought, offered to pay him the whole amount of Miles A. Riley’s schedule, interest and costs, which he refused.</p> <p>“I thought the plaintiff was plainly entitled to recover. The jury thought otherwise, and found for the defendant.</p> <p>“ After the rendition of the verdict, the plaintiff moved for judgment on the demurrer. It was plain that the defendant’s surrejoinder was a departure in pleading, but I thought, after a verdict for the defendant, I could not award judgment for the plaintiff.”</p> <p>The plaintiff appealed, and now moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground, that his Honor should have sustained the general demurrer of the plaintiff.</p> <p>Failing in that, he then moved for a new trial, on the ground, that the verdict is not only entirely unsupported by the testimony of the defendant’s witness, (the only witness examined in the case,) but is directly contrary to that testimony, and contrary to tbe charge of Ms Honor, and should have been for the plaintiff.</p>

<p>BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT CHESTER, FALL TERM, 1856.</p> <p>Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows:</p> <p>“ Tbe action was a case for damage to tbe land of tbe intestate, in bis life time, by obstructing tbe natural and accustomed flow of a stream, by tbe defendant’s mill-dam below, and unlawfully throwing bade water on tbe mill and land of tbe intestate aboye, and thereby injuring bim, in bis life time, in botb respects. Tbe defendant demurred generally. Tbe question was, whether such a cause of action survived to tbe administrators. I held and adjudged that it did not, and therefore sustained tbe demurrer. Afterwards a motion was made on tbe part of these plaintiffs for leave to add to their declaration counts in assumpsit. I refused tbe motion, as not proper to be granted after judgment on general demurrer— besides tbe further consideration, that tbe amendment looked ■to the joinder of different forms of action.”</p> <p>Tbe plaintiffs appealed on tbe grounds;</p> <p>1. Because bis Honor should have overruled tbe demurrer.</p> <p>2. Because tbe plaintiffs, according to tbe law in this State and tbe decisions in the'English courts, were entitled to sustain their action in this case, and so his Honor should have ruled and ordered.</p> <p>8. Because tbe order, made by'bis Honor, is contrary to law and tbe justice and equity of tbe case.</p>

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT FAIRFIELD, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “This action was in assumpsit, upon tbe subjoined bill qf exchange, addressed to Messrs. Flint & Bingbam, New York, and by tbem accepted, to wit: 11 Ninety days after date, pay to tbe order of E. C. Leitner, at tbe Corn Exchange Bank, New York, twelve thousand five hundred dollars, and charge tbe same to account of E. C. LEITNEB, Agt.

<p>BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT CHESTER, FALL TERM, 1856.</p> <p>The report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:</p> <p>“ The relators moved for a prohibition against the defendants, to restrain them from collecting the sum of $300, assessed upon the capital stock of the Bank, by way of taxation, by the village corporation, within whose limits the Bank transacts its business.</p> <p>“ I granted the prohibition; and an appeal is taken from the judgment.</p> <p>“ The legislation, upon which the question arises, is to the following effect:</p> <p>“ In December, 1852, it was enacted that the capital stock of the Bank of Chester, (among others,) “ should be liable to taxation in the same manner as the capital stock and.property of individuals and other corporations; provided, that no municipal corporation shall tax the capital stock or profits of said Banks, without authority first had and obtained from the Legislature.”</p> <p>“ In December, 1858, the Town Council of Chester, by an amendatory Act, was empowered to tax a multitude of subjects, touching the present question, in the words following:</p> <p>‘ The Town Council of Chester shall have power to impose an annual tax on all real estate, all stocks in trade, all stocks of every kind, (railroad- and plank-road stocks excepted,) all moneys- loaned at interest, all negroes, all carriages, wagons, borses and mules, kept for private use, and on all gold and silver watches, kept for private use, within the corporate limits of the said town.’ The Act then provides for a maximum rate of such tax, and the ascertainment of the basis of the rate of collection by three assessors, &c. Further, ‘ And the said Town Council shall have power to enforce the payment of all taxes and assessments levied by the said Council against the property and persons of defaulters, to the same extent and in the. same manner as is provided by law for the collection of the general State taxes.’</p> <p>“I was led by these considerations:</p> <p>1. “The exemption of the stocks of the banking corporation is express, and founded on a reason that affects a grave and general policy of the State, to wit, the abandonment of the policy of receiving a bonus for banking privileges and the release of such corporate property from annual taxation; and the substitution therefor of periodical general taxation as in the case of other property taxed; and I thought this consideration aided the view, that.the power of a village corporation to tax it, against the proviso of the charter, should be express, and not inferential from general words.</p> <p>2. “ That people, by the exercise of the power claimed, who did not reside in Chester, but in various and distant parts of the earth, none could tell where, would be made tributary to a mere local interest, in exoneration, pro tanto, of those who sought and enjoyed the corporate franchises; and such a purpose should not be attributed to the Legislature, unless expressly declared.</p> <p>3. “ That on general principle, a franchise once granted by the sovereign, in terms express and unambiguous, should be revoked, annulled, or enervated, only by terms equally express and unambiguous.</p> <p>4. “That it was doubtful whether the stock, held by various persons in the capital of the Bank of Chester, could be considered as within the corporate limits of the village, merely because they had a house and agent there dealing upon its credit; and hardships might occur upon a stockholder in such Bank who resided in Yorkville, where (if that village had a charter like that of Chester,) his stock might be assessed there, and also in Chester, as well as by the State of South Carolina.</p> <p>11 Such considerations, operating bn the instant, induced the granting of the prohibition.”</p> <p>The defendants appealed, on the ground that the defendants, under their amended charter of 1858, have the power to assess the capital stock of the Bank of Chester.</p>

BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT GREENVILLE, FALL TERM, 1856. Held: that plaintiffs were not entitled to sue on the notes, and granted in each case a motion for a non-suit. The plaintiffs appealed, and now moved this Court to set aside the non-suits.

BEFORE WHITNER J., AT EDGEFIELD, SPRING TERM, 1856. Held: and a recommendation made that the damaged cotton should be sold in Augusta fox the benefit of all concerned. This was assented to within a few days by the parties, plaintiff, defendants and the Columbia Insurance Company, without prejudice to any.

BEFORE GLOYER, J., AT SUMTER, FALL TERM, 1856. Under tbe plaintiff’s fi. fa. tbe sheriff, Tbomas D. Frierson, levied on and sold as a whole, tbe interest of tbe defendant in tbe store of Byrd & 'Louis. Tbe purchaser was Louis, tbe co-partner of defendant.

BEFORE GLOVER, J„ AT NEWBERRY, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe action was assumpsit on a promissory note drawn by tbe defendants in favor of tbe plaintiff, as executor of tbe will of William Welch, for three hundred and forty dollars, and dated the 6th February, 1854.

<p>To charge one with the intemperate use of spirituous liquors, is not actionable, per se.</p> <p>It will not be presumed from the title, which alone has been preserved, of the Act of 1682, for the suppression of drunkenness, that the Act is of force, and that offenders under it are liable to indictment and punishment.</p> <p>The Act of 1691, (2 Stat. 68) “for the better observance of the Lord’s Day, commonly called Sunday,” which provides amongst other things, for the punishment of drunkenness, is not of force.</p> <p>Act of the Legislature declared obsolete and inoperative, from non-user.</p> <p>To charge one with having burnt, destroyed and suppressed a will, is not actionable, per se.</p> <p>To burn, destroy or suppress a will, is not an indictable offence.</p>

BEFORE-GLOVER, J., AT RICHLAND, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ At $ sale made by tbe Commissioner in Equity on tbe 1st October, 1855, to foreclose a mortgage, a bouse and lot, tben occupied by tbe mortgagor, P. H. Hammerskold, were sold and purchased by tbe plaintiff.

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT CHESTER, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Ten writs in covenant have been issued in tbe first case stated; five in tbe other. Tbe motion was to consolidate tbe writs, in tbe respective cases, because tbey were between tbe same parties.

<p>Indictment for hog stealing charged, that the offence was committed in January, 1851. General issue pleaded, and evidence offered, that the offence was committed in January, 1856: — Held, that such evidence was receivable; that it was not necessary to prove the time, as laid, and that the prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations.</p>

<p>BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT UNION, FALL TERM, 1856.</p> <p>GÍhe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ This was an action of debt, on a single bill, payable to plaintiffs, for eigbty-two dollars and eighteen cents, at one day, bearing date 1st January, 1855, executed in tbe name of A. L. & M. West. Tbe defendants were partners, doing business at West’s Springs, in Union District. Tbe first named member of tbe firm principally conducting tbe business; tbe other member residing in one of the lower Districts, but occasionally at tbe Springs, and employed in tbe partnership affairs. This was a sealed instrument executed by A. L. West, tbe consideration of which I think I may say was satisfactorily shown to be for groceries purchased for tbe firm. Notwithstanding tbe objection of counsel, I admitted tbe following testimony in reference to tbe course of dealing of these partners: that in tbe liquidation of their accounts, notes under seal bad been frequently giren.; on one executed by A. L. West, suit bad been brought — a recovery bad, no defence being_set up, and payment of tbe judgment by M. West; another .nofeTsLljike kind bad^been executed by A. L. West, and bad1 been ■ paid off, esfcli-of tbs* partners making payments without objection to tbe form of tbe obligation. Another note under seal, executed by tbe same party bad been paid in part by tbe other member without any objection made to tbe character of the instrument. Other notes were in existence, but in no instance was it in proof that any had been executed by M. West in person, or by his express authority.</p> <p>“In submitting the case to the jury they were instructed that one partner could not bind his co-partner by an obliga-ligation under seal, without authority from such partner. That unless the proof satisfied them such authority had been given, covering this transaction, the defendant, M. West was not answerable, at least in the present action. That in the absence of direct proof of authority it might be inferred in some instances from the course of dealings, and the conduct of the partners themselves, and to this end, in this particular case committed to the jury the proof adduced.</p> <p>“ They returned a verdict for plaintiffs.”</p> <p>The defendant, Moses West, appealed and now renewed his motion for a non-suit, in this Court on the grounds:</p> <p>1. Because his Honor should have granted the motion for a non-suit, which was made on the circuit in this case.</p> <p>2. Because the note sued on was null and void in law.</p> <p>And failing in that motion then he moved for a new trial, on the ground:</p> <p>Because his Honor admitted illegal and incompetent evidence in the case, that is evidence to show what was the consideration of the note sued on, when from the state of the pleadings in the case, such evidence was not admissible, the action being on the sealed note, and no allegations whatever in the declaration as to the consideration of the note or the account for which the note had been given.</p>

BEFORE GLOWER, J., AT RICHLAND, FALL TERM, 1856. The report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “ The defendant was indicted for perjury under the Act of 1833, (6 Stat. 485,) which provides, “ If any person shall wil-fully and knowingly swear falsely, in taking any oath now, or at any time hereafter, required by law and administered by any person directed or permitted by law to administer such oath, he shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and on conviction, incur…

BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT SUMTER, FALL TERM, 1856. The report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “ The plaintiffs declared in dower, demanding that Martha •Floyd, late Martha Allbrook and relict of the late Willis Allbrook, be endowed of a tract of land, of which the said Willis Allbrook was seized during the coverture. “ The land was sold by the sheriff, as the property of Willis Allbrook, and purchased by the defendant, who, in bar of demandant’s right of dower,…

BEFORE GLOVER J., AT KERSHAW, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbis was an action of debt on tbe penalty of an injunction bond. Defendants set out tbe condition on oyer, and pleaded, non damnificatus.

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT FAIRFIELD, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe defendant.was tried for and convicted of perjury.

BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT ANDERSON, FALL TERM, 1856. Every thing necessary to a full understanding of this case, is contained in the opinion of his Honor, Judge Glover, delivered in the Court of Appeals.

BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT SUMTER, FALL TERM, 1856. The report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “ These were actions of debt, brought on the official bond ■of James Bell, Marshal, Clerk and Treasurer of the Council, against the defendants, his sureties, and were tried together. “ The breach assigned was the defalcation of Bell, in not accounting for various sums, alleged to have been received by bim in bis official capacity.

<p>J. O. was first endorser of á note in bank drawn by M., and W. L. and W. B. were second and third endorsers. The note in bank was taken up, and a note drawn by J. 0., and endorsed by "W. L. and W. B. substituted in its place. The bank, afterwards, recovered judgments against J. 0., W. L., and W. B., on the note, and by arrangement among them, each paid a certain amount, and satisfaction was entered by the sheriff on they?, fa.: — Held, that W. B. was not entitled to have the entry of satisfaction in the case against J. 0. vacated, as made by mistake, and they?./», enforced for his benefit.</p>

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT EDGEFIELD, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of Ms Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ McDonald, tbe plaintiff, was surety of one Sullivan, on a bond, to Burt, treasurer. Sullivan bad executed as collateral security, to tbe treasurer, a mortgage upon a lot of land in Hamburg. Simpson bad bought tbe lot of land from Sullivan, subject to tbe mortgage. When sold under execution against Simpson, Bauskett and Carroll bought, or Bauskett did.

BEFORE O’NEALL, «L, AT BARNWELL, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Elijah Willis (having neither wife nor legitimate child,) in 1846 made a will, of which, Panning and Phillips, two of his bfothers-in-law, were executors.

BEFORE WARDLAW, J., AT MARLBOROUGH, FALL TERM, 1856. Held: that there was nothing in the policy which prohibited the keeping and vending of small quantities of powder, if powder usually formed a part of such a stock as was insured; that in reference to this and to all articles, the insured was bound to use care proportioned to the dangerous nature of the article, and if at any time, there…

BEFORE GLOYER, J., AT .SUMTER, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbis was an indictment for tbe murder of tbe prisoner’s wife.

<p>Where in debt on bond, tbe jury, in finding for tbe plaintiff on tbe general issue, assess tbe damages, as under our practice is proper, and allow the plaintiff only tbe principal sum due, but not-the interest, to which he is also entitled, his only remedy is by appeal. Judgment for the interest non obstante veredicto, will not be allowed, nor can he collect it by marking it for collection on the fi.ja.</p> <p>Where, by not giving notice in time, a plaintiff has lost the right of appeal from the verdict, he cannot on his appeal from the dicision of a Judge refusing a motion for leave to enter up judgment non ob-stante veredicto, move for a new trial.</p>

<p>BEEOEE O’NEALL, J., AT CHAELESTON, SEEING TEEM, 1856.</p> <p>The report of bis Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:</p> <p>“ This was an action brought to recover damage and loss on cotton, (say seven thousand one hundred and eighty-six pounds,) received per the defendant’s road, in Charleston. The action sought to charge the defendant as a joint contractor with the Western and Atlantic Eailroad and the Georgia Eailroad.</p> <p>“ On the 22d October 1849, an advertisement was published by the South Carolina Eailroad Company, that .cotton would be received at Chattanooga, and transported over the Western and Atlantic Eailroad, the Georgia Eailroad, and the South Carolina Eailroad, on a through ticket for sixty-five cents per one hundred pounds.</p> <p>“ On the 1st October, 1852, the South Carolina Eailroad Company published another notice, “ that from and after the date the company will receive at the Georgia Eailroad depot, in Augusta, all cotton, produce or merchandise, brought down by the Georgia and other railroads, and intended for the South Carolina Railroad,” “the freight and charges on which they will pay up to that point, and collect the whole freight and charges as agreed above, on delivery in Charleston.” “Duplicate receipts,” the advertisement stated, “would be given by the agent of the company, on the receipt of such cotton, produce or merchandise, at the Georgia Railroad depot, one of which will be given to the Georgia Railroad Company, and the other will be forwarded to the consignee in Charleston, and for all loss or damage that may occur to such cotton, produce or merchandise after it came into their possession, the South Garolina Railroad Company will he responsible, and will promptly pay, but no further.”</p> <p>“ The cotton, in this case, was delivered the 23d and 26th November, 1852, to the Western and Atlantic Railroad at Chattanooga, and receipts signed by the agent there, which stated that the cotton “ was consigned to the railroad agent at Augusta,” for the plaintiffs in. Charleston. Expenses to be collected at destination, one hundred and forty-two dollars and sixty-two cents. The receipt also stated, “to be transported, in turn, over the Western and Atlantic Railroad to Atlanta, and delivered to the agent of the Georgia Railroad under the following stipulations, viz: — Roads liable for such injuries only, as shall be established to have occurred while in their possession. Liability of roads, either for damages or loss, not to attach until the cotton is laden on the cars, and to cease on the unloading of the same at its destination.</p> <p>“ Parcels of the cotton were marked on each receipt, as in bad order.</p> <p>“ The cotton, when it reached Charleston was found to be damaged; the bales injured appeared to have been under water; the bales were coated with mud. The damage was ascertained by a survey to amount to, I think, seven hundred dollars and fifty-three cents.</p> <p>“The term ‘bad order,’ the witness said, applied to the outward condition of the bales, and was used capriciously, the cotton so marked being often found to be in good order.</p> <p>“Where the damage to the cotton occurred did not appear 5 neither did it appear that the South Carolina Bailroad, at Augusta gave duplicate receipts, as pointed out in their advertisement.</p> <p>“The defendant, on the closing of the plaintiffs’ case, moved for a non-suit, on the ground, that there was no joint contract proved. I thought it was best, that the case should go to the jury, so that the whole controversy might be ended by the decision of the Court of Appeals.</p> <p>“I thought then, and still think, there was not the slightest evidence of a joint contract. Indeed the receipts given at Chattanooga showed, without resorting to the defendant’s second advertisement, which came out in the defence, that the contract was several and not joint. .</p> <p>“The jury found for the plaintiffs the whole damages claimed, making no deduction for the cotton marked in the receipts, in ‘ bad order.' ”</p> <p>'The defendants appealed and now renewed their motion for a non suit, on the ground, that there was no proof of a joint contract; and failing in that motion, then for a new trial, on the grounds—</p> <p>1-. That there was no proof of a joint contract.</p> <p>"" 2. That the notice published by the defendants (1st October, 1852,) the alteration in the language, and legal effect of the receipts given at Chattanooga — the limitation by notice of the responsibility of each road to its own limits — the interposition of an intermediate consignee at Augusta — and the absence of all proof of a “through ticket,” or “freight in solido,” clearly established the contract to be several and not joint, and the jury should so have found.</p> <p>3. That the damages are excessive, no allowance being made for cotton found to have been damaged at the time of its shipment.</p> <p>4. That the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.</p>

IN THE CITY COURT OF CHARLESTON, OCTOBER TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe Becorder, is' as follows: 11 Tbis was an action on tbe case for tbe value of a borse, killed by tbe cars of tbe defendants. Tbe testimony was all by commission. “ Tbe plaintiff lent bis borse to E. C. Magill, wbo rode bim to meeting on tbe opposite side of tbe Eailroad track and bitcbed bim.

BEFORE DAVID RAMSAY, ESQ., COMMISSIONER OF’ SPECIAL BAIL. Tbe defendant, J. P. Garrison, a citizen of Florida, was arrested and committed to jail in March, 1856, in Charleston district, under mesne process, at the suit of the plaintiffs, McKenzie, Cadow & Co. On the same day and while in jail, he executed an assignment as follows : THE STATE OP SOUTH CAROLINA: Know all men by these presents, That whereas I, Josinah P. Garrison, am indebted to Thomas C. Kettles in the sum of…

BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT CHAMBERS, APRIL, 1855. Tbe judgment of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge is as follows: “This is an application for tbe writ of prohibition, to prevent tbe enforcement of executions issued by tbe city council against tbe relators, to collect a tax of ten dollars per bead for tbe slaves in tbeir respective possession.for sale, and brought from other States. “ Tbe Eelators are brokers, residing and doing business in Charleston.

<p>Tbe first section of the. Act of 1852, directs in certain contingencies, two subscriptions, of five hundred thousand dollars each, to the Blue Eidge Bailroad Company; and the fifth section directs that the whole subscription shall be paid in bonds, to be countersigned by the comptroller general, “which shall be payable in five instalments of two hundred thousand dollars each.” But one subscription of five hundred thousand dollars was taken, and the two first instalments of that were paid in bonds of two hundred thousand dollars each, but the last instalment of one hundred thousand dollars, the comptroller general refused to pay because he construed the Act to be imperative and to require each instalment to be for two hundred thousand dollars: — Held, that the comptroller general was wrong in his construction of the Act, and that the last instalment, though only for one hundred thousand dollars, should be paid.</p>

BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT' COLLETON, FALL TERM, 1856. Tbe report of Ms Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe prisoners, with four other persons, viz: Nathaniel Bowman, William Murray, James Miller and Richard Wil- • liams, were indicted for the murder of a slave, named James,' the property of Col. Lewis Morris. “ The indictment was-found on Wednesday; on Thursday, the prisoners were put to the bar, and arraigned.

<p>B. was indebted to S. his factor by book account, and S. was indebted in the same way, but in a smaller sum, to A. A., through B. her agent, directed S. to transfer the amount due her to B.’s credit, to which S, assented, but neglected to make the transfer on his books: — Held, that a transfer on the books was not necessary to the completeness of the transaction — that, by the agreement and assent of the parties, the indebtedness of S. to A. was ipso facto extinguished, and, pro tanto, the indebtedness of B. to S.</p>

<p>BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT CHARLESTON, SPRING TERM, 1856.</p> <p>Tbe report of Ms Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbis was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover tbe instalments on ten shares in tbe capital stock of the N. E. Railroad Company, alleged to have been subscribed by tbe defendant.</p> <p>“ It appeared, that tbe shares were fifty dollars each, and were called for at 60 days; one dollar on each share was paid at subscription.</p> <p>“ Tbe proof was, that there was great difficulty in making up stock enough to secure tbe charter. Ward committees were appointed to solicit subscriptions. Tbe beading of tbe subscription, in each Committee’s bands, was drawn by tbe Mayor, General Scbnierlie. It simply was an agreement (not under seal) to take as many shares in tbe N. E. Railroad Company as were set down opposite to eacb name. Col. Blum, for tbe Company proved, tbat. be was one of tbe Ward committee .(No. 4,) wbo waited on tbe defendant. He assured tbe defendant be might forfeit bis subscription after be bad subscribed and paid one dollar on eacb share. This was as be understood tbe direction of tbe Mayor. In conse-' quence of this understanding, tbe defendant subscribed and paid one dollar per share. Tbe Commissioners appointed .under tbe charter, gave tbe receipts for tbe payment on tbe subscriptions.</p> <p>“ These facts were also proved by Horlbeck and Bancroft, tbe other members of tbe Committee from Ward No. 4.</p> <p>• “ Mr. Middleton tbe Secretary of tbe Company, proved tbe calls for tbe payment of tbe instalments, according to tbe terms of tbe charter. Tbat tbe defendant, as a subscriber for ten shares, having paid one dollar per share at subscribing, was entered upon tbe subscription books by tbe Commissioners under tbe charter: tbe books were regularly opened and closed.</p> <p>“ Mr. Solomons, in tbe defence, proved, tbat tbe defendant was persuaded to subscribe by being told be could forfeit. He said be would give ten dollars — he did not want tbe stock.</p> <p>In reply. — Qenl. Schnierlie, Ex-Mayor, proved, tbat be was tbe Mayor, and wrote tbe beading of tbe subscription for tbe W ard committees. He referred to tbe clause of tbe charter providing for a forfeiture. His opinion was, tbat tbe Company would allow a forfeiture, and tbat opinion be gave to tbe Committee-men of tbe Wards.</p> <p>“Tbe case was submitted to tbe jury on tbe question, whether tbe defendant was induced by misrepresentation to subscribe? If so, they should find for him — otherwise, for tbe Company.</p> <p>“They found for tbe plaintiffs. Tbe defendant appeals: Tbe grounds I have not in my possession: they were annexed to tbe report made out and delivered to tbe defendant’s attorney many months ago. He tells me be bas lost tbe report — and at bis instance, from my notes, I bave made up tbis report. Tbe original subscription, tbe charter, and books of tbe N. E. Railroad Company, ought to be produced.”</p> <p>Tbe defendant appealed and now renewed bis motion for a non-suit; and failing in that, then for a new trial on tbe grounds:</p> <p>1. Because, tbe plaintiff failed to prove a subscription by tbe defendant in conformity with tbe terms of tbe charter of tbe North Eastern Railroad Company.</p> <p>2. Because, tbe testimony produced by plaintiff, clearly showed that tbe subscription made by defendant was made upon tbe distinct understanding and condition, that be should bave tbe privilege of forfeiting bis shares.</p> <p>3. Because, there being no testimony that tbe parties who procured defendant’s signature, were acting under tbe authority of tbe Commissioners of tbe N. E. Railroad Company, tbe said Company in subsequently recognising, and availing themselves of tbe benefit of tbe acts of these parties were bound by tbe representation, upon tbe faith of which it was clearly proved, tbe subscription bad been made.</p> <p>4. Because, by tbe plaintiff’s own showing, tbe inducement held out, and by which alone tbe subscription could bave been procured, was an express understanding that tbe forfeiture would be allowed by tbe said Company, and tbe party discharged from further liability; and to suffer tbe said Company to violate that understanding is to enable them to profit by a fraud committed on tbe defendant.</p> <p>5. Because, by the terms of the charter of the N. E. Railroad Company, the defendant was at liberty to forfeit his shares.</p> <p>6. Because, as the subscription was secured under a mistaken view of the law, caused by the erroneous representations of those who procured it, the said Company should have been required in accepting such subscription to act in conformity with those representations.</p>

BEFORE Q’NEALL, J., AT CHARLESTON, SPRING TERM, 1856. The report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbis was an action to recover for two boxes of tobacco, alleged to bave been received by tbe Company for transportation and not delivered at the place to wbicb they were consigned. “ Tbe receipts of tbe Company signed by two of its agents were given in evidence, dated tbe first, 6tb December, 1853, for fourteen boxes; tbe second, 7th December, 1853, for seven…

<p>BEFORE MACBETH, R., IN THE CITY COURT, OCTOBER TERM, 1856,</p> <p>Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe Recorder, is as follows:</p> <p>“ Tbis was an action of trover, brought to try tbe title to several boxes containing ‘Ayer’s Cberry Pectoral,’ wbicb were in tbe possession of tbe defendant. Prom tbe evidence, wbicb was principally by commission, it appeared that tbe plaintiff, wbo resided in Massachusetts, bad, sometime in September, 1854, sent to tbe firm of P. M. Cohen & Co., Druggists, of Charleston, five gross of Cberry Pectoral, to be sold by them, for bis account, on commission. About tbe 10th of March, 1855, P. M. Cohen & Go. failed in their business, and were utterly insolvent. At tbe time of their failure they were largely indebted to tbe firm of Hopkins, Hudson & Co. John J. Cohen, a brother of P. M Cohen,' was a member of tbe last named firm. With tbe view of settling their debt to Hopkins, Hudson & Co., P. M. Cohen & Co. transferred to them their store and their whole stock of drugs, etc., and, amongst other things, the boxes of ‘Ayer’s Cherry Pectoral,’ which are the subject of this suit. ^</p> <p>“About two months after, Hopkins, Hudson & Co. sold and transferred the said store and stock to the defendant, Mordecai, and with the store and stock the said boxes of Cherry Pectoral.</p> <p>“ On the 9th of May, 1855, P. M. Cohen and one Philip Wineman advertised that they would conduct the business. heretofore carried on by P. M. Cohen & Co., as the agents of B. Mordecai, (the defendant) at the store No. 29 Hayne street.</p> <p>“The value of the goods and the conversion were proved, and the plaintiff closed. The defendant offered no evidence in reply.</p> <p>■ “I instructed the jury that P. M. Cohen & Co. had no right, after their known insolvency, to transfer the plaintiff’s boxes of Cherry Pectoral, in payment of their debts, to Hopkins, Hudson & Co. 1 Bay. 295. And, that as Hopkins, Hudson & Co. took nothing by the transfer, they could confer no title on the defendant, in the.ir sale to him, of the said boxes. ,.</p> <p>“The jury found for the plaintiff.”</p> <p>The defendant appealed and now moved this Court for a new trial on the grounds: ■</p> <p>1. Because his Honor erred in charging the jury, that the plaintiff had a right to recover his goods from the defendant, although a third party, and a Iona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, if the same were consigned on commission; that the said goods so consigned on commission, may be recovered, although they may have legitimately passed, by sale, through any number of hands.</p> <p>2. Because there was no evidence to prove that P. M. Cohen & Co. were factors.</p> <p>■ 8. Because there was no evidence of the fact that Hopkins, Hudson and Co., or tbe defendant, B. Mordeeai, bad any notice tbat said merchandize, in question, was consigned to ■ P. M. Coben & Co., to be sold on Commission.</p> <p>1st ground. Was tbe sale, by P. M. Coben & Co., to Hop- . kins, Hudson & Co. valid, if so tbe defendant, B. Mordeeai, bad a good title?</p> <p>It is not disputed tbat tbe sale by P. M. Coben & Co., to Hopkins, Hudson & Co., was bona fide; but tbe question is made, wbetber tbe sale by P. M. Coben & Co. to Hopkins, Hudson & Co., and Coben & Co’s, acceptance of tbeir debt to H. H. & Co., in settlement, was obligatory upon tbe plaintiff.</p> <p>Conceding tbat a factor bas no right to pledge goods of bis principal as security for bis own debt; this was a sale, and •not a pledge, .and there is a material distinction between a pledge and sale. By a pledge is understood a thing that not only may be redeemed., but generally one tbat is intended to be redeemed. Bowie & Sons vs. Napier, 1 McCord, 1; 2 Kent Com. 626.</p> <p>Tbe position of defendant, B. Mordeeai, is tbat of a bona fide purchaser, for valuable consideration; and tbe law favors him, even though be bad purchased from a fraudulent vendee. Though a fraudulent vendee may be sued in trover by tbe vendor, yet tbe right of action does not exist against every person into whose bands tbe property may have passed subsequently. Sheppmxl vs. Shoolbred, 41 Eng. Com. L. E. 39; Buffington vs. Garish, 15 Mass. E. 156</p> <p>In Mowry vs. Walsh, tbe principle is maintained, tbat if one obtains goods by a fraudulent purchase, void as to himself, yet if be afterwards sell them to a bona fide purchaser, without notice of tbe fraud, tbe property passes to tbe latter. 8 Cowen, E. 238.</p> <p>2nd ground. There was no evidence to prove tbat P. M. Coben & Co. were factors; on tbe contrary, they were druggists, and beld themselves out to tbe world as owners. Tbe question is not whether a party can transfer that to another which he does not in reality own; but whether, where a party is ostensibly clothed with the ownership of property by the real owner, and thus has an apparent power to sell, should not a sale by him, to a Iona fide purchaser, be good. Root vs. French, 18 Wend. 571.</p> <p>It is a clear rule, at Common Law, that-if a principal permits his factor to assume the apparent ownership of goods, and to sell them in his, the factor’s own name, the vendee who bought them, in ignorance that the factor acted merely , as agent, may, to an action by the principal for the price, set off a debt due to him from the agent. 1 Chit. PI. 570.</p> <p>cited Story on Ag. § 113; 2 Kent, Com. 626; 1 Hill, 16; 11 Howard, U. S. E. 209.</p>

<p>Where, in trover against the Sheriff for levying, under foreign attachments, a steam boat claimed by the plaintiffs as assignees of the absent debtor, the question was, whether the attaching creditors had notice of the assignment, held, that notice to their agent was notice to them, and that the agent’s declarations at the time of levying the attachments were admissible as evidence to show notice.</p>

<p>The Commissioners of Roads ordered a road, which was in part new, and in part an old road to the use of which the public were entitled by prescription, to be opened and worked upon. The only landowner who objected was R. over whose land the old road ran : — Held, that R. had no right to object; and that R. and 0. were properly fined by the Board, each in a sum over twenty dollars, for refusing to work on the road.</p> <p>Where Commissioners of the Roads order a road to be opened and worked upon, and impose a fine, even over twenty dollars, for not working on the road, their action is conclusive. The party fined cannot object to their want of jurisdiction when an action is brought to • recover the fine. The objection should be made at an earlier stage of the proceeding. Semble.</p>

BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT CHARLESTON, SPRING TERM, 1856. The report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge is as follows: “This was stated to me as an action on the case.

BEFORE MUNRO, J., AT CHARLESTON, OCTOBER, 1856. Tbe report of Ms Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbis was a summary process for work, labor, and materials. Tbe plaintiff proved bis demand.

BEAUFORT, SPRING TERM, 1856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbis was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover for goods sold and delivered to E. B. Baker, on a guaranty of defendant’s testator, as contained in a letter of wbicb tbe following is a copy; “Brighton, S. C., Eeby. 6th, 1851.— Messrs.

<p>In charging the jury, in reference to a voluntary homicide, effected by a deadly weapon, the Judge defined manslaughter to be, “ homicide committed in sudden heat and passion and on sufficient legal provocation,” and again he said, “It is not every killing in passion that the law mitigates down to manslaughetr; it must be passion justly excited by legal provocation." The jury found the prisoner guilty of manslaughter, and on appeal, held, that the terms used to characterise manslaughter were suitable and proper.</p> <p>The inadvertent omission by the 'Judge to say any thing about the prisoner’s character, which was proved to be good, and relied upon in the defence, is no ground for a new trial.</p> <p>Discrepancies between the testimony of witnesses for the State, as given on the trial, and their testimony, as carefully taken in writing by the coroner at the inquest and signed, by them, were relied on to discredit the witnesses : — Held, tobe no ground for a new trial, that the Judge, in adverting to this matter, said to the jury, that “evidence was often loosely taken, and perhaps no very great weight should be given to these discrepancies.”</p>

BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT UNION, SPRING TERM, 1857. The report of his Hon'or, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “ This was an indictment for the murder of Joseph Hughes, 24th July, 1853. A mis-trial was had Pall- term, 1853, in consequence of tbe illness of a juror, and tbe defendant escaped from jail shortly before tbe succeeding term of tbe Court.

BEFORE GrLOYER, J., AT MARION, EXTRA TERM, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe action was assumpsit on a miller’s account for meal furnished between tbe 5tb of May and 16tb of December, 1854. Tbe plaintiff was permitted to prove bis account, wbicb amounted to two hundred and forty-eight dollars and ninety-three cents. Tbe meal was charged to Jonathan Davis and William Barnes. One Eegister first came, and said tbe defendant bad sent him.

BEFORE G-LOYER, J., AT CHESTEBEIELD, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbis case was beard in tbe Court of Appeals upon a brief, wbicb being commended by tbe Court to tbe bar for imitation, is bere printed in full, and is as follows. IN THE SESSIONS — At SPRING TERM, 1857. Tried before Glover, J. — At Chesterfield. The State, ) vs. v ■ Neil Crawford. ) Beport.

BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT FAIRFIELD, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbe plaintiff declared in trespass quare clausum fregit. Tbe defendant pleaded tbe general issue, justification by reason of a “private path,” and justification by reason of a private way.

<p>BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT CHESTER, SPRING TERM, 1857.</p> <p>Tbe defendant was convicted of peddling upon an indictment which charged, as follows:</p> <p>“ That Andrew Powell, on the first day of May, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six at Chester Court house in the district and State aforesaid, did sell and expose to sale divers goods, wares, and merchandise, the said Andrew Powell then and there being a pedler, and not having obtained a lawful license for that purpose, according to. the provisions of the Act of the General Assembly of this State, in such case made and provided, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the same State aforesaid.”</p> <p>He appealed, on the grounds, inter alia.</p> <p>1. Because the indictment was defective in neither specifying any person to whom the goods were sold or offered for ' sale, nor setting forth any other identifying circumstance.</p> <p>cited, State vs. Steedman, 8 Bich. 312; Arch. Crim. PL 39; 3 Green. Ev. § 10; State vs. Foster, 3 McO., 444; State vs. Schroder, Biley, L. C., 70; State vs. Anderson, 3 Bich. 174.</p>

BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT WILLIAMSBURG, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe plaintiff’s writ in tbis case was lodged on tbe 29tb day of November, 1856. Writ served and tbe defendant arrested on tbe 13th day of December, 1856. Tbe return term was tbe third Monday after tbe fourth Monday in March next thereafter. “ Tbe Court sat' at Eingstree on tbe second after tbe fourth Monday in March.

<p>The Laurens Railroad Company gave receipts for cotton “ to he delivered on presentation of this receipt at Charleston.” The cotton reached the terminus of the Laurens Railroad in safety, and, there, without bulk being broken, was delivered in the same ears to the Green-ville and Columbia Railroad to be carried on. It was afterwards lost:— Held, that the Laurens’ Railroad Company were liable — their undertaking beiDg special, to carry to Charleston.</p> <p>Where cotton is lost by a common carrier, interest upon its value may be assessed by the jury as part of the damages, in an action against the carrier for the loss.</p> <p>In estimating the damages in an action against a carrier for the loss of cotton which he undertook to deliver to plaintiffs’ factors in Charleston, the amount of factor’s commissions upon the value should not be allowed the defendant, in abatement.</p>

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT LEXINGTON, SPRING TERM, 1857. The report of Ms Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows: “ This was a summary process, to recover compensation from the defendant for passing his rafts through the plaintiff’s mill-dam and slope.

BEFORE O’NEALL, j., AT LAURENS, SPRING TERM, 1857. Action on a promissory note payable to plaintiff’s intestate or bearer. Tbe plaintiff’s letters of administration were granted in Georgia. Tbe plea was ne unques administrator. His Honor beld that tbe plaintiff could not recover. Tbe plaintiff appealed on tbe grounds: 1.

BEFORE GLOVER, J„ AT MARION, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe action was trespass to try tbe titles to a tract of land levied upon and sold by Elly Grodbold, Sheriff of Marion district, on tbe 5tb of March, 1855, as tbe property of defendant and bought by tbe plaintiff for three hundred and thirty dollars.

BEFORE GLOYER, J., AT CHESTERFIELD, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbis was an action of trover for tbe alleged conversion of fifteen negroes. Tbe plaintiff was tbe father of Henry M. Tomlinson, deceased, tbe intestate of tbe defendants. In 1833, Henry M. Tomlinson married tbe defendant Martba, and during that year tbe negroes were allowed by tbe plaintiff to go into bis possession in North Carolina, where father and son both resided.

BEFORE WITHERS, J„ AT KERSHAW, SPRING TERM, 1857. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of Charles Thomas Evans. To the organization of the jury under the recent rule of Court, objection was made and overruled. A party of four, the deceased being one, on their way home from Camden, on the evening of the 14th January, 1857, stopped at the residence of Mary Bowen, with whom the prisoner resided.

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT LEXINGTON, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “Tbe action was slander: and tbe verdict was for tbe plaintiff for one thousand dollars.

BEFORE GLOYER, J., AT MARION, EXTRA TERM, APRIL, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe action was brought to trj tbe title to a tract of land wbicb tbe plaintiff claimed under a deed from Charles J. Fladger, dated 17th January, 1853.

<p>BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT CHESTER, SPRING TERM, 1857.</p> <p>Scire facias to revive a judgment obtained by Troy Lumpldn, plaintiff’s testator, against tbe defendant, Robert Eerguson.</p> <p>The original cause of action was a sealed note, payable to Adam Wylie, dated the 1st of January, 1840, due the 1st of October in the same year, with interest from date, and signed by the defendant as principal, and one Greorge Grill, as surety.</p> <p>At Eall Term, 1847, suit was brought by Troy Lumpkin, executor of Adam Wylie, against Robert Eerguson, and also against J. G. B. Grill and John McEadden, administrators of Greorge Gill. No defence was made by Eerguson, and judgment was obtained against him by default, at Spring Term, 1848, for three hundred and fifteen dollars and seventy-five cents, with interest from 1st of October, 1840. The administrators of Gill pleaded usury in defence of the action against them, and judgment was obtained against them at the same term for two hundred and eighty-three dollars, this being the amount of the principal of the note, after deducting payments which had been previously made. This sum of two hundred and eighty-three dollars was paid by the administrators of Gill, the 7th April, 1848, and received by Troy Lumpkin.</p> <p>It was contended on the trial, by the defendant’s counsel, that a satisfaction by the administrators of Gill of the judgment against them, and an acceptance by Troy Lumpkin of the money paid thereon, operated a satisfaction also of the judgment against Ferguson. His Honor was of opinion, that the satisfaction of the judgment against the administrators of George Gill, only operated as a payment pro tanto of the judgment against Ferguson, and the facts being -admitted, he directed the jury to find for the plaintiff.</p> <p>The defendant appealed and now moved this Court for a new trial.</p> <p>Because his Honor, the presiding Judge, erred in puling that the payment and satisfaction of the judgment against the surety, did not operate a satisfaction in law of the judgment recovered against the principal; recovered on the same joint and several obligation by the same plaintiff.</p> <p>cited Burge on Suretyship, 120; 1 Both, on Ob., Art. 8, Sec. 3, p. 133 ; Noonan vs. Executors of Gray, 1 Bail. 437; Bank of the State vs. Mosely, 1 Strob. 414.</p>

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT UNION, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ This was an action of debt founded on a bond taken by tbe Commissioner, preliminary to a writ of injunction granted against tbis plaintiff j 1 to restrain bim from removing a certain slave without tbe jurisdiction of tbe Court’ of Equity, and 1 to compel bim tó enter into bond with surety, not to’ remove tbe slave without tbe jurisdiction, and to have tbe slave…

<p>Where in trespass to try title the defence is, that S., an entire stranger, had acquired title by adverse possession, the fact that S. had, many years before the trial, abandoned the possession, and that neither he nor any one claiming under him, had since ever claimed the land, is entitled to consideration upon the question as to the character of S.’s possession, whether it was adverse or not.</p> <p>Where such a defence is set up, the extent of the claim and the limits of the possession must be shown.</p>

BEFORE MAOBETÉT, R., IN THE CITY COURT OF CHARLESTON. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe Recorder, is as follows: “ This was a suit by way of Summary Process, for twenty dollars, for an alleged breach of 22d Sec. of an Ordinance of tbe City Council of Charleston, ratified 29th November, 1886, entitled, “An Ordinance regulating retailers of spirituous liquors, &c.” When tbe case was called for trial, tbe defendant’s counsel demanded a jury, which I refused.

BEEOBE O’NEALL, J., AT ABBEYILLE, SPBING- TEBM, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbis was an action of debt on tbe bond of tbe defendants, as tbe sureties of E. W. Sellick, deceased, late Ordinary of Abbeville, to recover for Mourning Roberts tbe sum of two thousand five hundred and sixty-two dollars and twenty-five cents. “ It appeared by tbe will of Benjamin Beall, (deceased,) that after tbe bequest of bis negroes to Lucinda Gray, be…

BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT FAIRFIELD, SPRING TERM, 1857. Held: that no breach of defendant’s bond bad been shown, resulting in injury to Thomas Lumpkin. The defendant appealed, and now moved this Court for a non-suit. 1. Because the plaintiffs, as administrators, were not entitled to maintain the action; and 2.

BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT SUMTER, SPRING TERM, 1857. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ Tbe plaintiff sued in assumpsit, upon demands set forth in tbe 1 bill of particulars.’ Tbe defence was founded on a mistake of tbe plaintiff’s particulars of demand generally, and upon discount. I was very soon led to tbe opinion tbat a court of law was not tbe best forum for tbe adjustment of sucb mutual accounts and liabilities as existed between tbe parties.

BEFORE GLOYER, J., AT CHARLESTON, FALL TERM, 1855. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: Tbe action was trover to recover damages for tbe conversion of eleven slaves, Eve and ber eight children and two grandchildren. Tbe intestate, in bis lifetime, and at bis death, was in possession of these slaves. The defendant claimed them by virtue of a deed from the intestate, executed on the 12th May, 1852, and a few days before his death.

<p>An Act of 1854, imposed a tax on “ tlie amount of sales of goods, wares, and merchandise,” &e.: Held, that where the sales were of goods brought from other States and sold by the importer in the original packages, they were nevertheless liable to the tax — not being exempt from State taxation by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>So long as Congress forbears to exercise the constitutional power to regulate commerce among the several States, each State may, for itself, and within its own limits, regulate such commerce.</p> <p>In the clause of the Constitution prohibiting a State from laying duties on imports, the term imports embraces only articles from foreign nations subject to the payment of duties to the United States, and not merchandise carried from one State to another.</p> <p>Imports are exempt from State taxation only so long as they remain the property of the importer in his warehouse, in the forms or packages in which imported. When the packages are sold, or. broken up, and the goods mixed with the general mass of State property, they are not protected from State taxation. So also, it seems, a tax upon the importer, estimated by the amount of his sales, is not unconstitutional, even though his sales embrace imported articles.</p>

BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT ORANGEBURG, NOVEMBER, 1856. Motion for a rule to show cause why an information in the nature of a quo warrcmto should not be exhibited. The motion was founded upon an affidavit of the relator, James Copes, and a certificate of the clerk of the City Council of Charleston.

John B. Bull, late of Abbeville, on tbe 8tb April, 1843, executed an instrument, purporting and declared to be, bis last will &nd testament. Held: that a general verdict for or against the will, could only be rendered upon the pleadings presented. 8.

BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT BEAUFORT, SPRING TERM, 1855. On. tbe 29th. March, 1854, Edmund H. Martin issued a writ in foreign attachment against Samuel Solomons, an absent debtor. On the 30th March, 1854, a copy was served on John G. Solomons; and on the 31st March, 1854, one was served on 'William P. Solomons, as garnishees.

BEFORE WHITNER, J., AT ORANGEBURG-, SPRING TERM, L856. Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: “ This was an action of assumpsit on tbe following letter of guaranty: To the President and Directors of the Dante of the State of South Carolina: Tbe subscribers hereby guaranty, jointly and severally, tbe payment of all drafts or notes made, or to be made, by Messrs.