White v. Nicholls’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

88 federal appellate · 28 district · 75 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 245 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The investigation has conducted us 1o the following conclusions, which we propound as the law applicable thereto: (1) That every publication, either by writing, printing or pictures, which charges upon or imputes to any person that which renders him liable to punishment, or which is calculated to make him infamous or odious or ridiculous, is prima facie a libel; and implies malice in the author or publisher towards the person to whom such publication is made. IJroof of malice, therefore, in the cases just described, can never be required of the party complaining, beyond the proof of the publication itself. Justification, excuse, or extenuation, if either can be shown, must proceed from the defendant. (2) That the description of cases recognized as privileged communications must be understood as exceptions to this rule, and as being founded upon some apparently recognized obligation or motive, legal, moral, or social, which may fairly be presumed to have led to the publication, and therefore prima facie relieves it from that just implication from which the general rule of the law is deduced. The rule of evidence as to such cases is accordingly so far changed as to impose it on the plaintiff to remove those presumptions ‘flowing from'the seeming obligations and situations of the parties, and to require him to bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Beyond this extent no presumption can be permitted to operate, much less be made to”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Briscoe v. W · Masterson v. Brown

2. “But the term 'exceptions,' as applied to cases like those just enumerated, could never be interpreted to mean that there is a class of actors or transactions placed above the cognisance of the law, absolved from the commands of justice. It is difficult to conceive how, in society where rights and duties are relative and mutual, there can be tolerated those who are privileged to do injury legibus soluti; and still more difficult to imagine, how such a privilege could be instituted or tolerated upon the principles of social good. The privilege spoken of in the books should, in our opinion, be taken with strong and well-defined qualifications. It properly signifies this, and nothing more. That the excepted instances shall so far change the ordinary rule with respect to slanderous or libellous matter, as to remove the regular and usual presumption of malice, and to make it incumbent on the party complaining to show malice, either by the construction of the spoken or written matter, or by the facts and circumstances connected with that matter, or with the situation of the parties, adequate to authorize the conclusion.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Briscoe v. W · Patton v. Cox

3. ““A privileged communication means nothing more than that the occasion of making it rebuts the prima facie inference of malice arising from the publication of matter prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, and throws upon him the onus of proving malice in fact, but not of proving it by extrinsic evidence only. He has still a right to require that the alleged libel itself shall be submitted to the jury, that they may judge whether there is evidence of malice on the face of it.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. National Cash Register Co. v. Salling · Massee v. Williams