44 Wash. 2d 837 - Tiffin v. Hendricks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

46 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “answers, demurs, makes any application for an order therein, or gives the plaintiff written notice of his appearance.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Matia Inv. Fund, Inc. v. City of Tacoma · 63 Wash. App. 266 - Seek Systems, Inc. v. Lincoln Moving/Global Van Lines, Inc.

2. “[W]here the court has no authority to enter a default judgment because the defendant is not in default, the court has no discretion to exercise on the question of whether the judgment should be set aside. In the latter instance, the defendant may have such a default judgment set aside as a matter of right”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 55 Wash. App. 157 - Gage v. Boeing Company · 66 Wash. App. 728 - Shreve v. Chamberlin

3. ““The remaining question is whether the appellants were entitled to a vacation of the order and judgment without the showing of a meritorious defense to the action. Reasoning from the provisions of the Practice Act, it would seem that the question would hardly admit of any other than an affirmative answer. By the terms of the act a defendant in an action has a full 20 days after the service of summons upon him in which to appear therein before it can be legally claimed that he is in default. * * * He may appear in any one of several ways; that is to say, he may answer, demur, make an application for an order therein, or give the plaintiff written notice, after which time he is entitled to notice of all subsequent proceedings. * * *. This being his absolute right, it would seem to follow that he can do so without let or hindrance. * * * When, therefore, the plaintiff takes a judgment against a defendant before the time has expired in which the defendant has the right to appear, whether by intent or by inadvertence it is a wrong against the defendant. It is also the wrong of the plaintiff; and it is a maxim of the law, as old as the law itself, that no one may reap an advantage by his own wrong, and to permit a plaintiff to deprive a defendant of his right freely to appear by a premature entry of a judgment would be to permit him to reap an advantage by his own wrong.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lucky Friday Silver-Lead Mines Co. v. Atlas Mining Co.