In Re Prigge’s Empirical Analysis

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1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First, neither the statute itself nor the Seafort decision offers any mechanism by which the fixed amount withheld as of the petition date is converted into a monthly rate of contribution that the debtor may continue postpetition. Second, and more important, Seafort does not take into account the use of the words “except that” at the beginning of the statutory language excluding retirement contributions from disposable income .... Use of the term “except that” suggests that the purpose of the language is merely to counteract any suggestion that the exclusion of such contributions from property of the estate constitutes postpetition income to the debtor. If Congress had intended to exclude prepetition contributions from the calculation of disposable income more generally, it would have been much more natural for Congress to provide that such contributions are excluded from property of the estate “and” in the calculation' of disposable income. Prigge’s more limited interpretation is reinforced by the fact that Congress used much more direct language in excluding retirement loan repayments from disposable income. Section 1322(f) was placed within the confines of chapter 13 itself, and states explicitly “any amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute ‘disposable income’ under section 1325.” Congress’s use of the words “except that” is entirely consistent with the Prigge decision, which held that the purpose of the statute was merely to clarify that the exclusion of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Seafort v. Burden

2. “(A)(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a domestic support obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is filed; and (ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of “charitable contribution” under section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions are made; and (B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Seafort v. Burden