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441 So. 2d 1035

Hamilton v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama

Decided August 30, 1983

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama · decided 1983-08-30

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"(c) At any time during the period of probation or suspension of execution of sentence, the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence. "(d) Except as provided in chapter 15 of Title 12 of this Code, any probation officer, police officer or other officer with power of arrest, upon the request of the probation officer, may arrest a probationer without a warrant. In case of an arrest without a warrant, the arresting officer shall have a written statement by said probation officer setting forth that the probationer has, in his judgment, violated the conditions of probation, and said statement shall be sufficient warrant for the detention of said probationer in the county jail or other appropriate place of detention until such probationer shall be brought before the court. Such probation officer shall forthwith report such arrest and detention to the court and submit in writing a report showing in what manner the probationer has violated probation. Thereupon, the court, after a hearing, may revoke the probation or suspension of execution of sentence and shall proceed to deal with the case as if there had been no probation or suspension of execution of sentence."”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Sherer v. State, 552 So. 2d 879 - Young v. State

““We begin by noting that a probationary period does not end until: (1) the probationer satisfactorily fulfills all the conditions of probation and the actual probationary term ordered by the court expires, see § 15-22-54(a), Ala.Code 1975 (“When the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence are fulfilled, the court shall, by order duly entered on its minutes, discharge the defendant.’), and Rule 27.3(c), Ala. R.Crim. P. (‘Probation automatically terminates upon successful completion of the term of probation set by the court’); (2) if the probationer has not satisfactorily fulfilled all the conditions of probation, the maximum period of probation allowed by law expires, see § 15-22-54(a), Ala. Code 1975 (‘in no case shall ... the maximum probation period of a defendant guilty of a felony exceed five years’); or (3) the probationer is formally discharged from probation by the court, see § 15-22-54(b), Ala.Code 1975 (‘The court granting probation may, upon the recommendation of the officer supervising the probationer, terminate all authority and supervision over the probationer prior to the declared date of completion of probation upon showing a continued satisfactory compliance with the conditions of probation over a sufficient portion of the period of probation.’), and Rule 27.3(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. (‘At any time during a term of probation, the sentencing court may terminate probation and discharge the probationer absolutely, after notice to the prosecutor. Early termin”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Jones v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-08-30

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently August 2016

12 state decisions

501983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1

¶2On October 30, 1981, the appellant was convicted of burglary in the third degree and theft of property in the second degree. The trial judge then sentenced the appellant to one year and one day, suspended sentence. The appellant was placed on probation and the conditions of that probation were as follows: (1) that the appellant serve 60 days in the county jail; (2) that the appellant pay restitution in the amount of $300.00 to Roper's Jewelry; (3) that the appellant enter an alcohol abuse program and (4) that the appellant not engage in injurious habits. *1036

I
The appellant claims that his period of probation had expired prior to the time the State filed its motion to revoke probation on April 13, 1983.

¶3However, it seems clear that the appellant's probation period had not expired under State law. Section 15-22-54 (a) and (b) provides:

¶4 (a) The period of probation or suspension of execution of sentence shall be determined by the court, and such period may be continued, extended or terminated; provided, that in no case shall the maximum probation period of a defendant guilty of a misdemeanor exceed two years, nor shall the maximum probation period of a defendant guilty of a felony exceed five years. Upon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence, the court shall by order duly entered on its minutes, discharge the defendant.

¶5 (b) The court granting probation may, upon the recommendation of the officer supervising the probationer, terminate all authority and supervision over said probationer prior to the declared date of completion of probation upon a showing of continued satisfactory compliance with the conditions of probation over a sufficient portion of the period of said probation. (Emphasis added).

¶6The appellant did not satisfactorily fulfill the conditions of his probation nor was there ever a formal discharge of theappellant from probation by order of the court under the above Code section.

¶7Furthermore, there was not a showing of continued satisfactory compliance with the conditions of his probation over a period of time.

¶8The only condition of probation that the appellant fulfilled was that he did attend an alcohol abuse program.

¶9However, he did not serve his sixty (60) days in the county jail (he served only five [5] days), and he did not make restitution in the amount of $300.00 (he only paid $40.00). Further, at the hearing to revoke his probation the record below establishes that appellant engaged in these injurious habits: (1) Appellant was charged with DUI and arson in Autauga County, Alabama. (2) Appellant was charged in U.S. District Court (Middle District Alabama) with kidnapping. (3) Appellant also has a pending capital murder charge in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama.

¶10In view of the matters outlined above, the appellant has been accorded full due process at the probation revocation hearing in circuit court.

¶11This cause is therefore affirmed.

¶12AFFIRMED.

¶13All the Judges concur.

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