441 So. 2d 707 - State v. Flowers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 111 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 115 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) whether the intrusion was an arrest or a stop; (b) whether the stop was of the type which is reasonable in view of the public interest served and the degree of invasion entailed; and (c) whether the particular stop was warranted by a reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts.”

   14 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lee · State v. Chark

2. “there was torture or the pitiless infliction of unnecessary pain on the victim,”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 464 So. 2d 262 - State v. Busby · 851 So. 2d 921 - State v. Tate

3. “Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief_ Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person, Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. [1] at 16, 88 S.Ct. [1868] at 1877 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)], and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be ‘reasonable.’ Thus, there are at least three inquiries involved in determining whether a seizure was a valid investigatory stop: (a) whether the intrusion was an arrest or a stop; (b) whether the stop was of a type which is reasonable in view of the public interest served and the degree of invasion entailed; and (c) whether the particular stop was warranted by a reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts.... The distinction between an arrest and a stop is crucial in many cases, for an arrest can be made only on probable cause, while a stop is proper under the more relaxed ‘reasonable suspicion’ standards of Terry. It is possible only to sketch some of the main features that demarcate the two types of intrusions. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), the high court found a stop for questioning indistinguishable from a traditional arrest because the suspect was not questioned briefly where he was, was transported to the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Walters