Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1989
Citation profile
14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently June 2018
14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Brown v. Allen · Michel v. State of Louisiana Poret · Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. · Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson · Liegl v. Webb
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The thrust of appellant's argument is that postconviction relief, when utilized as a substitute remedy for habeas corpus, may not be limited by a statute of limitations without violating the prohibition against suspending the writ. We do not agree. [T]he legislature may impose reasonable restriction upon the exercise of a constitutional right. Emberton v. County of San Diego, 186 Cal. App.3d 268, 271 , 230 Cal. Rptr. 572, 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 , 107 S.Ct. 1975 , 95 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987); People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345, 450 (Colo. 1983). In State v. Berg, 237 Iowa 356 , 21 N.W.2d 777 (1946), we stated: Legislatures may pass laws regulating, within reasonable limits, the mode in which rights secured to the subject by bills of right and constitutions shall be enjoyed, and if the subject neglects to comply with these regulations he thereby waives this constitutional privileges. Id. at 361 , 21 N.W.2d at 780 . Such reasonable regulations are proper so long as no constitutional right is materially impaired. Schloemer v. Uhlenhopp, 237 Iowa 279, 282 , 21 N.W.2d 457, 458 (1946). This restriction involves the time period to commence the action. It is a well-settled principle that a state may attach reasonable time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional rights. United States v. Randolph, 262 F.2d 10, 12 (7th Cir.1958), Cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1004 , 79 S.Ct. 1143 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1959) ( citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 , 73 S.Ct. 397, 422 , 97 L”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The very idea of due process includes a meaningful opportunity for a criminally accused to challenge assertedly unconstitutional evidence before it may be used against him to prove guilt or enhance punishment in a pending prosecution. Section 14-4-502, however, creates what is virtually an unconditional time bar to the vindication of constitutional claims even when the failure to assert an earlier claim was the result of circumstance other than culpable neglect. We are satisfied that due process protections of the United States and Colorado Constitutions prevent the state from employing a system of forfeiture with respect to constitutional claims solely on the basis of a time bar, without affording an accused meaningful opportunity to establish that the failure to make a timely challenge was the result of circumstance amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Cole v. State“must be filed within three years from .the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.