443 Pa. Super. 331 - Henery v. Shadle’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

75 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he threshold task of the trial judge ... is to determine whether the evidence is relevant. Once the trial judge determines the evidence is relevant, the further task of the judge is to balance the probative value of evidence against any prejudicial effect of that evidence. Since such balancing is a particular specialty of the trial judge, rulings upon admissibility are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and those rulings will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Clinton v. Giles · Thomas v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

2. “Appellants initially argue that the concession, during cross-examination of the expert medical witness presented by ap-pellee, that appellant Charles Henery may very well have suffered some soft tissue injury, necessitates the award of at least nominal damages to appellant. We disagree. This Court, in Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469 , 478 A.2d 885 (1984), rejected a similar claim, noting that: The issues as to whether [appellant] was really suffering any pain and whether any such pain was caused by [appellee’s] conduct [were] for the jury. The jury was not required to award [appellant] any amount as it obviously believed that any injury [appellant] suffered in the accident was insignificant. Holland v. Zelnick, supra at 475, 478 A.2d at 888 . Accord: Gigliotti v. Machuca, 409 Pa.Super. 50, 58 , 597 A.2d 655, 659 (1991). Evidence is not proof until it is believed and accepted by a trier of fact. Persons may indeed suffer pain that they attribute to a cause, but at law the cause they assert must be accepted as the cause of their pain. Their belief, however well founded in their minds, is not the cause until it finds acceptance in the minds of the fact triers. Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 168 , 542 A.2d 516, 519 (1988). Appellant Charles Henery testified that he suffered pain in his neck and back as a result of the accident. This testimony was supported by that of his family physician, Francis X. Brescia, D.O., who testified that he believed that the neck and back p”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2000 Pa. Super. 272 - Bezerra v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.

3. “We are of the mind that Picea is not applicable to the instant case since, in Pic-ea, the jury was given specific interrogatories containing overly broad language about which Picea could have made an objection before they went to the jury. Further, since the Picea verdict revealed that the jury there misinterpreted an interrogatory, counsel should have attempted to have any confusion resolved by further deliberation. In the present ease, however, there were no specific interrogatories for the jury to answer in rendering its verdict, and the trial court gave a clear, concise jury charge outlining the applicable law of the case. * * * * * # Thus, it seems that application of the Picea waiver rule is more prudently restricted to verdicts of obvious inconsistency and clear, certain irrationality.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. King v. Pulaski