Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Other cities’ ordinances similarly directed at the homeless provide ways to avoid criminalizing the status of homelessness by making an element of the crime some conduct in combination with sitting, lying, or sleeping in a state of homelessness. For example, Las Vegas prohibits standing or lying in a public way only when it obstructs pedestrian or vehicular traffic. See, e.g., Las Vegas, Nev., Mun. Code § 10.47.020 (2005) (“It is unlawful to intentionally obstruct pedestrian or vehicular traffic....”). Others, such as Portland, prohibit ‘camping’ in or upon any public property or public right of way. See, e.g., Portland, Or., Mun. Code §§ 14A.50.020, .030 (2006) (prohibiting obstruction of public sidewalks in a designated area or camping on public property). Still others contain safe harbor provisions such as limiting the hours of enforcement. See, e.g., Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 15.48.040 (2005) (“No person shall sit or lie down upon a public sidewalk ... during the hours between seven (7:00) a.m. and nine (9:00) p.m. in the following zones.... ”); Tucson, Ariz., Mun. Code § ll-36.2(a) (2005) (same, except prohibition extended to 10:00 p.m.); Houston, Tex., Mun. Code § 40-352(a) (2006) (same, except prohibition extended to 11:00 p.m.). Other cities include as a required element sitting, lying, or sleeping in clearly defined and limited zones. See, e.g., Philadelphia, Pa., Mun. Code § 10-611(l)(b)-(e), (2)(g)-(h) (2005) (prohibiting sitting or lying in certain designated zo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bell v. City of Boise

2. “Notwithstanding [the] differences, five Justices in Powell understood Robinson to stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status of being. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 548 , 550 n. 2, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Id., at 567, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see also Robert L. Misner, The New Attempt Laws: Unsuspected Threat to the Fourth Amendment, 33 Stan. L.Rev. 201, 219 (1981) (“[T]he consensus [of White and the dissenters apparently] was that an involuntary act does not suffice for criminal liability.”). Although this principle did not determine the outcome in Powell , it garnered the considered support of a majority of the court. Because the conclusion that certain involuntary acts could not be criminalized was not dicta, see United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915, 914-16 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (narrowly defining dicta as “a statement [that] is made casually and without analysis, ... uttered in passing without due consideration of the alternatives, or ... merely a prelude to another legal issue that commands” the court’s full attention), we adopt this interpretation of Robinson and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as persuasive authority. We also note that in the absence of any agreement between Justice White and the plurality on the meaning of Robinson and the commands of the Cr”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Lehr v. City of Sacramento

3. “[W]e in no way dictate to the City that it must provide sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the streets ... at any time and at any place.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Shipp v. Schaaf