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444 So. 2d 464

McPhee v. Fairweather

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided December 30, 1983

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1983-12-30

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee. The part of the decedent's estate to which the murderer would otherwise be entitled shall pass to the persons entitled to it as though the murderer had died during the lifetime of the decedent." § 732.802, Fla.Stat. (1981).”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Zielinski v. Henke, 275 Ill. App. 3d 128 - In Re Estate of Mueller

“"[T]he statute itself is clear. The decedent's estate `shall pass as though the murdered [the second wife] had died during the lifetime of [the] decedent.' Id. Appellees are entitled to the entire estate under the will." Fairweather, 444 So.2d at 465 .”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Zielinski v. Henke, 275 Ill. App. 3d 128 - In Re Estate of Mueller

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-12-30

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently July 2015

4 state decisions

201983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

OTT, Chief Judge.

¶1The decedent’s will devised his entire estate to his second wife and in the event she predeceased him to appellees, the children of the decedent and his second wife.1 The decedent died from a gunshot wound inflicted by his second wife. She pled guilty to second degree murder. The trial court found that by operation of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1981), the decedent’s entire estate would pass to appellees. Appellants, a half brother, brother, and children of the decedent and his first wife, argue that the decedent’s property should be dis*465tributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.2 We affirm.

¶2Section 732.8023 provides:

Murderer
A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee. The part of the decedent’s estate to which the murderer would otherwise be entitled shall pass to the persons entitled to it as though the murderer had died during the lifetime of the decedent.

¶3Appellants argue that a condition precedent to the bequest to appellees has not occurred, that being the natural death of the second wife. Appellants argue that the “statutory” death of the decedent’s second wife does not fulfill the condition precedent, therefore, the conditional bequest to appellees must fail.

¶4Although we find no case wherein this argument is discussed, the statute itself is clear. The decedent’s estate “shall pass as though the murderer [the second wife] had died during the lifetime of [the] decedent.” Id. Appellees are entitled to the entire estate under the will. The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

HOBSON and SCHEB, JJ., concur.

¶5. Appellee Jay B. Fairweather was the natural child of the decedent and his second wife. The remaining appellees were children of the second wife adopted by the decedent.

¶6. See § 732.1Ó1, et seq., Fla.Stat. (1981).

¶7. This statute was amended by chapter 82-71, section 1, Laws of Florida, effective April 2, 1982. The decedent died prior to the effective date of the amendment.

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