¶1ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
¶2We remain convinced that this appeal was properly disposed of on original submission.
¶3We do note that the confrontation in the case at bar occurred on February 28, 1967, prior to the effective date (June 12, 1967) of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 and Gilbert v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199.
¶4Appellant’s claim that the confrontation resulted in such unfairness that it infringed his right to due process of law is independent of the exclusionary rules announced in Wade and Gilbert.
¶5A claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances *919surrounding it. Stovall v. Denno, supra; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402; Crume v. Beto, 5 Cir., 383 F.2d 36; Graham v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 922; Cobbins v. State, (concurring opinion) Tex.Cr.App., 423 S.W.2d 589; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 835; Evans v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 641.
¶6This test is to be distinguished from the test set forth in Gilbert and Wade for determining whether the in-court identification is of an independent origin or source. See Martinez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 842; Evans v. State, supra.
¶7Applying this test of the “totality of the circumstances” to the confrontation or showup in the case at bar, we are unable to conclude that there was a violation of due process of law.
¶8Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.