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← 445 F.2d 1313 - United States v. Pompey

United States v. Pompey’s Empirical Analysis

445 F.2d 1313 · 1971

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
1
states following
October 1976
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 50 U.S.C. § 3806 · 50 U.S.C. § 3811 · 50 U.S.C. § 3814

Relies on Glidden Company v. Zdanok Et Al. · Dickinson v. United States · Cox v. United States · Mulloy v. United States · Scott v. Commanding Officer

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The defendant argues, however, that every submission of new facts ‘carries an implicit request to reopen.’ We would agree that a registrant, untutored in the intricacies of Selective Service procedures, should not be required to quote the language of the regulations in order to be afforded all the procedural rights to which he is entitled. See United States v. Thompson, 431 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. Turner, 421 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir. 1970). But we do think it essential that he indicate in some way that he is dissatisfied with his classification, wishes to have it changed, and is submitting new information for this reason and not merely to comply with his duty to keep the board informed of his current status, physical condition, or address, as required by 32 C.F.R. § 1641.7 . To hold otherwise, we believe, would impose an extraordinary administrative burden on the Selective Service System by requiring it to treat every “change of status” letter as an implied request for a reopening regardless of whether the registrant himself has expressed a desire to be reclassified.” 445 F.2d at 1320-1321 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““It is settled that merely because a registrant belongs to a Jehovah’s Witnesses, all of whose members claim to be ministers, he does not thereby become automatically entitled to the ministerial exemption under the statute and regulations. Each registrant ‘bears the burden of clearly establishing’ that he has satisfied all the criteria for the exemption and is thus a minister in the statutory sense.” 445 F.2d at 1317 . 3”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““ . . . in order to qualify for a ministerial exemption, the registrant must satisfy the following tripartite test: (1) he must show a regularity of religious preaching and teaching; (2) the ministry must be his main and primary calling, his vocation rather than his avocation; and (3) his standing in the congregation must be recognized as that of a minister or leader of a group of lesser numbers.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.