United States v. MacEwan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

36 federal appellate · 7 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 105 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he applicable Guidelines range here is not rendered unreasonable simply because § 2L1.2 establishes a base offense level for a nonviolent offense that is equal to or greater than that of certain violent offenses. Congress ‘has the power to define a crime and set its punishments’”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Evans · 458 F. App'x 182 - United States v. Freddy Guevara-Zelaya

2. “When evaluating proportionality challenges to sentences under the Eighth Amendment, courts must examine three factors: (1) “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty”; (2) “the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction”; and (3) “the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Solem [v. Helm], 463 U.S. [277] at 290-292, 103 S.Ct. 3001 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ]. When conducting this analysis, this Court has recognized that we “‘should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.’” Rosenberg, 806 F.2d at 1175 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 ). This principle of substantial deference therefore “restrains us from an extended analysis of proportionality save in rare cases.” Id. (quoting Solem, 468 U.S. at 290 n. 16, 108 S.Ct. 3001 ). Consequently, in assessing such a challenge, the first proportionality factor acts as a gateway or threshold. If the defendant fails to show a gross imbalance between the crime and the sentence, our analysis is at an end. We, therefore, must focus upon whether MacEwan’s is “the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Ewing [v. California], 538 U.S. [11] at 30, 123 S.Ct. 1179 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) ] (quoting Harmelin [v. Michigan], 501 U.S. [957] at 1005, 111”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Government of Virgin Islands v. Garcia

3. “As the Third Circuit noted in MacEwan : “The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers ... [and is comparable] to both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850-58 , 117 S.Ct. 2829 , 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997). Moreover, as is evident from the trial testimony of the government’s expert, unless monitored by specific equipment, it is almost impossible to know the exact route taken by an Internet user’s website connection request, such as [defendant’s] requests to connect with various child pornography websites. Because of fluctuations in the volume of Internet traffic and determinations by the systems as to what line constitutes the “Shortest Path First,” a website connection request can travel entirely intrastate or partially interstate. Regardless of the route taken, however, we conclude that because of the very interstate nature of the Internet, once a user submits a connection request to a website server or an image is transmitted from the website server back to user, the data has traveled in interstate commerce. Here, once the images of child pornography left the website server and entered the complex global data transmission system that is the Internet, the images were being transmitted in interstate commerce.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. John Mellies