dissent">MILLER, Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with Justice Sabers’ recitation of the facts and his ultimate result, I would vote to affirm for a different reason.

The issue of admission of prior acts under SDCL 19-12-5 viewed in the context of prior, unprosecuted, bad acts has previously been resolved and decided by this court in State v. Wedemann, 339 N.W.2d 112 (S.D.1983) (a case in which Justice Morgan concurred.)

In Wedemann, the defendant had been convicted of arson. He and his wife had been going through a divorce. She had been awarded temporary possession of their jointly owned mobile home but allowed defendant to stay in it while she lived with her parents. During this period of time, the couple had an argument which resulted in Mrs. Wedemann advising the defendant to vacate the home. In the next two to three hours, the local fire department responded to a fire at the mobile home. Defendant had been observed near the mobile home approximately one hour before the fire department arrived at the scene.

At trial, the court permitted the State to introduce evidence of three prior fires to other property belonging to the defendant, to-wit:

1. A fire in a residential building owned by the defendant and his wife on a lot adjacent to their mobile home in Mellette, South Dakota;

2. A fire in a mobile home owned by defendant in South Sioux City, Nebraska, which was also in the process of being repossessed; and

3. A fire in the Same residence as the first fire.

The Mellette Fire Department concluded that the first and third fires had been intentionally set. The cause of the second fire was not officially determined, although it, too, had an arson motive.

In Wedemann, we held that although defendant was not prosecuted for the previous fires, they were relevant to the issues at trial, ie., defendant collected insurance on two of the fires and avoided repossession on the other. We noted that these mysterious, beneficial fires involving defendant’s property suggest identity, motive, knowledge, intent and plan, stating: “[A]ny fact that tends to connect an accused with the commission of a crime is relevant and has probative value.” Wedemann, at 115.

The present case is on point, factually and legally, with Wedemann. Itzen has been convicted of intentional damage to property. Prior to his conviction, Itzen was the plaintiff in a civil personal injury jury trial in which the Davenport Law Firm represented the defendant. Itzen had sued the Davenport client for a substantial sum of money. The trial resulted in an award of damages to Itzen, however, it was considerably less than the amount he had sought. Within the next two days, the Davenport Law Firm had reported five incidents of window breakage to their office building. As in Wedemann, Itzen was observed at the scene of one of those incidents. As in Wedemann, Itzen had a motive for the crime, namely, revenge. As in Wedemann, he was not prosecuted for the other bad acts. As in Wedemann, there is evidence which indicates that the first two incidents were intentional, i.e., a concrete block was intentionally hurled through the windows.

In summary, I note the following factual similarities of the two cases:

1. Evidence of motive exists in both cases.

2. Evidence of an intentional act exists in both cases.

3. Both defendants were observed at the scene of the crime for which they were charged.

4. Other bad acts went unprosecuted, which acts were identical to the one subsequently charged.

This case is Wedemannrevisited. Thus I would conclude that Wedemannis con*672trolling here, both legally and factually. As we held in Wedemann, these mysterious window breakings are relevant under SDCL 19-12-5 to the issues of identity, motive, knowledge, intent and plan. Evidence of these other bad acts is therefore admissible.

This addresses the issue of motive under SDCL 19-12-5.

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