¶1In 1966, the United States Congress enacted Section 2254, Title 28, United States Code, which reads in part as follows: “(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
¶2This opinion is filed in the records of this Court because the people of Missouri are entitled to know that the effect of this statute, as evidenced by the action of the Federal judiciary in this case, is to make this Court subservient to the trial courts of the Federal judicial system in cases involving violations of the criminal laws of this State.
¶3Appellant, William Prell Brizendine, was convicted of murder in the first degree in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed. State v. Brizendine, Mo.Sup., 391 S.W.2d 898.
¶4On November 12, 1966, appellant filed a motion to vacate judgment under S.Ct. Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R. An evidentiary hearing was held in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and appellant’s motion to vacate judgment was denied. On appeal, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. State v. Brizendine, Mo.Sup., 433 S.W.2d 321.
¶5Appellant then sought Federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. On August 11, 1969, over the signature of John W. Oliver, District Judge, an opinion was filed reaching conclusions contrary to those reached by this Court, and the following order was entered:
¶6“ORDER
¶7For the reasons stated, it is
¶8Ordered that petitioner be released from his present confinement in the Missouri Department of Corrections and be permanently discharged from custody at the end of ninety (90) days from the date of this order, unless within that time the affirmance of petitioner’s conviction is set aside and declared to be invalid and the state trial court is appropriately directed to grant petitioner a new trial. It is further
¶9Ordered that an appropriate order shall be entered by the state trial court within the said ninety (90) day period which shall set the date upon which an appropriate competency to stand trial hearing will be held, and if, but only if, petitioner is judicially found to be competent to stand trial at such hearing, the date upon which said trial shall commence. It is further
¶10Ordered that nothing stated in this opinion or order shall be construed as any limitation on petitioner’s right to assert any defense available to an accused in the event petitioner is judicially determined to be competent to stand trial and the case is thereafter tried on the merits. It is further
¶11Ordered that this Court retain jurisdiction of this cause pending further developments. The Office of the Attorney General shall keep this Court advised of any and all action taken by the State of Missouri in connection with this order and shall, if necessary, make appropriate application for any extension of the ninety (90) day period of time above provided before the expiration of said period. No extension will be granted except for good cause shown which shall be stated with particularity in any application filed.” 302 F.Supp. 1011.
¶12*829We continue to adhere to the views expressed by this Court in State v. Brizendine, Mo.Sup., 433 S.W.2d 321. We comply with the order of August 11, 1969, only because, if appellant is presently incompetent, he should not be permanently discharged from custody, as threatened, and permitted to endanger society.
¶13The judgment of affirmance is set aside, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for new trial.