Lucille C. Place v. Mrs. Mary C. Shepherd’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

94 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 139 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(S)ome particularized facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation are needed to sustain a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Smith v. Rose · Warmus v. Hank

2. ““The language [of the statute] requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” (Emphasis in original).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 627 F. Supp. 1458 - Davey v. Tomlinson · 495 F. Supp. 822 - German v. Killeen

3. ““It is thus evident that all indicators— text, companion provisions, and legislative history — point unwaveringly to § 1985(3)’s coverage of private conspiracies. That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, however, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others. For, though the supporters of the legislation insisted on coverage of private conspiracies, they were equally emphatic that they did not believe, in the words of Representative Cook, ‘that Congress has a right to punish an assault and battery when committed by two or more persons within a State.’ Id. at 485. The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose — by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. See the remarks of Representatives Willard and Shellabarger, quoted supra, at 1797. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.” (Emphasis supplied.) (Footnotes omitted.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 412 F. Supp. 1264 - Keddie v. Pennsylvania State University