Bannister v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
446 F.2d 1250 · 1971
Citation profile
22 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 26 U.S.C. § 4401 · 26 U.S.C. § 4411 · 26 U.S.C. § 5851 (§ 201 of the Gun Control Act of 1968) · 26 U.S.C. § 7237 · 26 U.S.C. § 7302
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Katz v. United States · Boykin v. Alabama · Johnson v. Zerbst · Gideon v. Wainwright
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) 26 U.S.C. § Jf742(a), which prohibits the transfer of marihuana except pursuant to a written order of the transferee on a form issued in blank for that purpose by the Government; (2) 26 U.S.C. § 4744 (a) (2), which prohibits transferees required to pay the tax on § 4742(a) transfers from transporting or concealing marihuana acquired or obtained without payment of the tax, and which provides that possession combined with failure to produce the order form required by § 4742 shall be presumptive evidence of guilt under this subsection ; (3) 26 U.S.C. § 4704 (a), which prohibits the purchase and sale of narcotic drugs (in this case, heroin, and cocaine) except in the original stamped package, and which provides that the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subsection; (4) 26 U.S.C. § 4705 (a), which prohibits the sale or exchange of narcotic drugs (in this case, heroin and cocaine) except pursuant to a written order of the transferee on a form issued in blank for that purpose by the Government. The eight counts of the indictment are set out below:”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“I think it is inadequate knowledge and comprehension of the situation at the time of pleading, and that alone, that now permits a guilty plea to he attacked collaterally. In the Brady opinion, the Supreme Court rationalized its decision by saying that “a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the ihen applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” 397 U.S. at 757, 90 S.Ct. at 1473 (italics added). That language, used in a case where a plea was entered without anticipation of a future constitutional holding that would have removed the impelling reason for the plea, seems to cover the circumstances of the present case. I think we are bound by it, though we may wisli that the rule were otherwise. 446 F.2d at 1266 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Smith v. Yeager“We do not quarrel with the proposition that every change in the procedural law governing the criminal justice system cannot be the means for casting wholesale doubt upon the vast bulk of criminal judgments which result from guilty pleas. But the Brady, McMann and Parker cases involved changes in the law which were essentially procedural. They did not involve petitioners confined as a result of a guilty plea to an offense under a statute later held to be unconstitutional as applied to them and their conduct.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Smith v. Yeager
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.