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446 F.2d 884

Docket No. 71-1218.

Saiz v. Eyman

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Aug. 13, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1971.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1971-08-13

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The general allegation that . . . potential witnesses . . . were unavailable as a result of the delay is too vague to establish that 'there is a reasonable possibility that the jury could have reached a different result by considering the asserted evidence foreclosed by delay.'”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Favors v. Eyman

“delay was the result of purposeful or oppressive Government conduct.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Favors v. Eyman

Relies on United States v. Ewell · Perry v. United States · United States v. Walton

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1971-08-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently July 2004

5 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

601971198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Daniel R. Salcito, of Tupper & Rapp, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellant.

¶2Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., William P. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee.

¶3Before CHAMBERS, HAMLEY and MERRILL, Circuit Judges.

¶4*885PER CURIAM:

¶5Abedon Saiz, an Arizona state prisoner, has taken this appeal from a District Court order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus without an eviden-tiary hearing.

¶6We are not persuaded, in the circumstances of this case, that there was such inordinate delay between the time of the commission of the offense and the time of filing of a formal criminal complaint as to deny due process or the right to speedy trial. Cf. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966); United States v. Penland, 429 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1970); York v. United States, 389 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1968); Moser v. United States, 381 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 1054, 88 S.Ct. 802, 19 L.Ed.2d 850 (1968). The complaint was filed within the period of the statute of limitations, and the present record fails to show that Saiz was prejudiced by the delay in filing formal charges. Saiz’s bare allegation that delay dimmed his memory of events does not show actual prejudice. See United States v. Bray, 442 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Penland, 429 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1970). The general allegation that three potential witnesses and the robbery victim were unavailable as a result of the delay is too vague to establish that “there is a reasonable possibility that the jury could have reached a different result by considering the asserted evidence foreclosed by delay.” Estrella v. United States, 429 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1970). See United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283, 288 (9th Cir. 1969). Moreover, there has been no showing in this case that the delay was the result of purposeful or oppressive Government conduct.

¶7Based as it is on the insufficiency of the allegations of the petition, our decision in this case should not be read to preclude District Court consideration of a future petition containing allegations of prejudice that do meet the standards of Estrella, supra,and Walton, supra.

¶8Affirmed.

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