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447 So. 2d 328

Docket No. 83-722.

Mobley v. State

George W. MOBLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided February 24, 1984.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1984.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1984-02-24

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Ex post facto application of the retention statute is not fundamental error and objection must be made at the trial level to preserve the issue for appellate review.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cofield v. State

Relies on 414 So. 2d 509 - Williams v. State · 428 So. 2d 369 - N.U., Inc. v. T & R Seafood, Inc. · 443 So. 2d 484 - Springfield v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1984-02-24

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently March 2002

4 state decisions

20198419902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Jerry Hill, Public Defender, Bartow, and Douglas S. Connor, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Katherine V. Blanco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Appellant, George W. Mobley, is challenging the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over one-half of his sentence on the grounds that section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981) was amended to provide an increase from one-third to one-half of the sentence after the date of commission of the offense. We affirm.

¶5On May 14, 1981, appellant was charged by information with robbery with a firearm. On August 17, 1981, the information was amended to charge robbery with a deadly weapon. On August 19, 1981, appellant was charged by a second information with another incident of robbery with a firearm. On November 2, 1981, this information was amended to charge robbery with a deadly weapon. Appellant pled guilty to both informations and was placed on ten years probation on each charge to run concurrently.

¶6On January 28, 1983, appellant was charged with violating Conditions V and VI of his probation. Condition V required appellant to remain at liberty without violating any law, while Condition VI required him not to use intoxicants to excess. At the probation revocation hearing, appellant pled guilty to driving an automobile with a suspended license and driving under the influence of alcohol. However, appellant pled not guilty to the charge of robbery.

¶7Appellant was adjudicated guilty of robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of ninety-nine years each and retained jurisdiction over one-half of each sentence. Appellant's argument that the court's retention of jurisdiction constitutes an ex post facto law is without merit. Appellant imposed no objection to the retention *329 of jurisdiction at the revocation of probation hearing or at conviction and sentencing. In Fredricks v. State,440 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the court held that ex post facto application of the retention statute is not fundamental error, and an objection must be made at the trial level to preserve the issue for appellate review. Williams v. State,414 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1982); Brown v. State,428 So.2d 369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court based on Springfield v. State,443 So.2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and Fredricks v. State.

¶8GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.

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