448 So. 2d 246 - State v. Norman’s Empirical Analysis
1984
Citation profile
30
cited by 30 later decisions
2
states following
June 2007
most recently cited
30 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Tibbs v. Florida · State v. Sepulvado · 448 So. 2d 676 - State v. Captville · 425 So. 2d 1251 - State v. Telsee
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In State v. Mathews, 375 So.2d 1165 (La.1979), a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the United States Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) required that the standard of review when considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard for the appellate review of facts in criminal cases has been made statutory. La.C. Cr.P. art. 821; State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984); State v. Korman, 439 So.2d 1099 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends on a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, this is a matter of the weight of the evid'ence, not its sufficiency. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); State v. Kent, 434 So.2d 1258 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 440 So.2d 727 (La.1983). A determination of the weight of the evidence is a question of fact. State v. Norman, 448 So.2d 246 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984); Korman, 439 So.2d at 1101 . This court has no appellate jurisdiction to review questions of fact in criminal cases. La. Const. of 1974, art. V, § 10(B). This court is constitutionally precluded from acting on an appeal as a “thirteenth juror” in ”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“A. Manufacture; distribution. Except as authorized by this part, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II; (2) To create, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute, a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. B. Penalties for violation of Subsection A. Except as provided in Subsections E and F hereof, any person who violates Subsection A with respect to: (1) A substance classified in Schedule II which is a narcotic drug, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars; (2) Any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not more than ten years; and, in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars. C. Possession. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner or provided in R.S. 40:978, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Raheem
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.