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448 So. 2d 397

Taylor v. State

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

Decided April 4, 1984

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama · decided 1984-04-04

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“There is a rule of law applicable in this instance that `where two courts have equal and concurrent jurisdiction, the court that first commences the exercise of its jurisdiction in the matter has the preference and is not to be obstructed in the legitimate exercise of its powers by a court of coordinate jurisdiction.'”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 630 So. 2d 447 - Ex Parte JRW

Relies on Wise v. Watson · Roberson v. McAliley · 373 So. 2d 1105 - Rush v. Simpson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1984-04-04

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently March 2007

8 state decisions

30198419902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1

¶2This is an appeal from a termination of custody of two minor children.

¶3The Juvenile Court of Pike County awarded custody of two minor children to the Department of Pensions and Security of Pike County. The mother through able counsel appeals.

¶4The dispositive issue as presented by the mother is whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction in this matter. We hold that the juvenile court did have jurisdiction, and thus, this case is due to be affirmed.

¶5The relevant facts are as follows:

¶6On November 2, 1983, the Pike County Department of Pensions and Security filed a petition with the juvenile court alleging the dependency of the mother's two minor children. On November 3, 1983, the father filed for divorce in the Circuit Court of Pike County. On November 8, 1983, the circuit court awarded custody of the children to the mother pursuant to an agreement between the parents that was incorporated into the divorce decree.

¶7The petition alleging dependency did not indicate that the immediate well-being and safety of the children was involved. The juvenile court also determined that an emergency situation did not exist. On November 28, 1983, the juvenile court awarded custody to the Department.

¶8Although the general law is that once the circuit court has obtained jurisdiction over the custody of the child, that jurisdiction continues during the infancy of the child, Wise v.Watson, 286 Ala. 22, 236 So.2d 681 (1970), there are exceptions. One exception is where there exists an emergency as to the immediate welfare of the child. Roberson v. McAliley,387 So.2d 840 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980). However, that exception does not apply here.

¶9There is a rule of law applicable in this instance that "where two courts have equal and concurrent jurisdiction, the court that first commences the exercise of its jurisdiction in a matter has the preference and is not to be obstructed in the legitimate exercise of its powers by a court of coordinate jurisdiction." Rush v. Simpson, 373 So.2d 1105, 1108 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979). The juvenile court has equitable powers in the area of child custody which are equal to the equitable powers of the circuit court in custody matters in divorce proceedings. Ala. Code § 12-15-2 (f) (1975). Therefore, in this instance and under these facts, since the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction first on November 2, 1983, it had jurisdiction to determine dependency and award custody. We particularly note that the circuit court's custody determination was based upon an agreement between the mother and father, and furthermore, there appears to be no question of the children's dependency.

¶10This case is due to be and is affirmed.

¶11AFFIRMED.

¶12WRIGHT, P.J., and BRADLEY, J., concur.

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