Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 448 SO2D 554 - Dixon v. Feaster

Dixon v. Feaster’s Empirical Analysis

1984

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
3
states following
February 2008
most recently cited

11 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently February 2008

11 state decisions

60198419902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 436 So. 2d 937 - Crigger v. Florida Power Corp. · 188 So. 2d 806 - Exchange National Bank of Tampa v. Hospital & Welfare Board · 161 So. 2d 893 - Walkup v. Becker · 180 So. 2d 682 - Redman v. Kidwell · Anderson v. Garber

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Common-Law and Statutory Easements Defined and Determined.— (1) IMPLIED GRANT OF WAY OF NECESSITY. — The common-law rule of an implied grant of a way of necessity is hereby recognized, specifically adopted, and clarified. Such an implied grant exists where a person has heretofore granted or hereafter grants lands to which there is no accessible right-of-way except over his land, or has heretofore retained or hereafter retains land which is inaccessible except over the land which he conveys. In such instances a right-of-way is presumed to have been granted or reserved. Such an implied grant or easement in lands or estates exists where there is no other reasonable and practicable way of egress, or ingress and same is reasonably necessary for the beneficial use or enjoyment of the part granted or reserved. An implied grant arises only where a unity of title exists from a common source other than the original grant from the state or United States; provided, however, that where there is a common source of title subsequent to the original grant from the state or United States, the right of the dominant tenement shall not be terminated if title of either the dominant or servient tenement has been or should be transferred for nonpayment of taxes either by foreclosure, reversion, or otherwise.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “A way of necessity was implied by the common law based on the reasonable presumption that the original parties intended the grantor to convey to the grantee whatever easement over lands retained by the grantor as was necessary for access for the grantee to use the property conveyed or that the parties intended the grantor to retain whatever easement over lands conveyed as was necessary to retain access for the grantor to continue to use lands retained. Section 704.01(1), Florida Statutes, purports to recognize, adopt and clarify this common law rule of an implied grant of a way of necessity.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.