Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 58 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he legislative body is presumed to have inserted every provision for some useful purpose and construction, and when different terms are used in various parts of a statute it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between the terms was intended.” Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). For the same reason, it is unreasonable to broadly read the”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Evans v. State · Shawe v. Elting

2. “Whenever a corporation shall be insolvent, the Court of Chancery, on the application of any creditor or stockholder thereof, may, at any time, appoint 1 or more persons to be receivers of and for the corporation, to take charge of its assets, estate, effects, business and affairs, and to collect the outstanding debts, claims, and property due and belonging to the corporation, with power to prosecute and defend, in the name of the corporation or otherwise, all claims or suits, to appoint an agent or agents under them, and to do all other acts which might be done by the corporation and which may be necessary or proper. The powers of the receivers shall be such and shall continue so long as the Court shall deem necessary.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shawe v. Elting

3. “It is fundamental that the Courts ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly as clearly expressed in the language of a statute. A & P Stores v. Hannigan, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 641 (1976); Keys v. State, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 18 (1975). There is judicial discretion to construe a statute when its language is obscure and ambiguous, Balma v. Tidewater Oil Co., Del.Supr., 214 A.2d 560 (1965); but when no ambiguity exists, and the intent is clear from the language of the statute, there is no room for statutory interpretation or construction.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Moses v. Board of Education of the New Castle County Vocational Technical School District