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449 F.2d 1301

Docket No. 18179.

Redding v. Walsh

Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted under 3d Cir. Rule 12(6) Sept. 23, 1971.

Decided Oct. 6, 1971.

Third Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1971-10-06

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently January 1983

3 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Dyhouse v. Baylor

Relies on Pierson v. Ray · Bradley v. Fisher · Pargoud v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1971-10-06

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*1302Joseph V. Cygan, Norristown, Pa., for appellant.

¶2Gilbert I. Yaros, Kremer, Krimsky & Luterman, Philadelphia, Pa. (I. Raymond Kremer, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

¶3Before VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

¶4OPINION OF THE COURT

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6 This appeal from an order dismissing a civil rights action against one of two co-defendants without “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and … an express determination for the entry of judgment” under F.R.Civ.P. 54(b) is not within the jurisdiction of this court and must be dismissed. Shipley Corp. v. Leonard Marcus Co., 214 F.2d 493, 495 (3d Cir. 1954); see United Bonding Insurance Company v. Stein, 410 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1969); 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.), § 54.34(2), pp. 245-46. It is also noted that the co-defendant in whose favor the above order was entered was a state judicial officer and, hence, is immune from suit under the Civil Rights Acts. See Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966).1

¶7The appeal will be dismissed.

“Pew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it ‘is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’ (Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 349, note, at 350.) It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.
“We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable ‘every person’ who color of law · Case Law">under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights.”
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