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← 449 F.2d 245 - Dietemann v. Time, Inc.

Dietemann v. Time, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

449 F.2d 245 · 1971

Citation profile

93
cited by 93 later decisions
16
states following
July 2023
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 5 district · 38 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 93 later decisions — most recently July 2023 · most notably 40 Cal. 4th 683 - Taus v. Loftus (2007), 18 Cal. 4th 200 - Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998)

25 federal appellate · 5 district · 38 state decisions — followed in 16 states

260197119801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Katz v. United States · New York Times Co. v. Sullivan · Mapp v. Ohio · Hoffa v. United States · Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 93 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"As we previously observed, publication is not an essential element of plaintiff's cause of action. Moreover, it is not the foundation for the invocation of a privilege. Privilege concepts developed in defamation cases and to some extent in privacy actions in which publication is an essential component are not relevant in determining liability for intrusive conduct antedating publication...." (pp. 249, 250.)”
    12 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “In jurisdictions other than California in which a common law tort for invasion of privacy is recognized, it has been consistently held that surreptitious electronic recording of a plaintiff's conversation causing him emotional distress is actionable. Despite some variations in the description and the labels applied to the tort, there is agreement that publication is not a necessary element of the tort, that the existence of a technical trespass is immaterial, and that proof of special damages is not required. ( E.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp. (1970) 25 N.Y.2d 560 , 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 , 255 N.E.2d 765 (applying District of Columbia law); Hamberger v. Eastman (1964) 106 N.H. 107 , 206 A.2d 239 ; Roach v. Harper (1958) 143 W. Va. 869 , 105 S.E.2d 564 ; McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1939) 60 Ga. App. 92 , 2 S.E.2d 810 ; cf. Pearson v. Dodd, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 279 , 410 F.2d 701 , cert. denied (1969) 395 U.S. 947 , 89 S.Ct. 2021 , 23 L.Ed.2d 465 ). [32]”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"The appeal presents three ultimate issues: (1) Under California law, is a cause of action for invasion of privacy established upon proof that defendant's employees, by subterfuge, gained entrance to the office portion of plaintiff's home wherein they photographed him and electronically recorded and transmitted to third persons his conversation without his consent as a result of which he suffered emotional distress? (2) Does the First Amendment insulate defendant from liability for invasion of privacy because defendant's employees did those acts for the purpose of gathering material for a magazine story and a story was thereafter published utilizing some of the material thus gathered? (3) Were the defendant's employees acting as special agents of the police and, if so, did their acts violate the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, thereby subjecting defendant to liability under the Civil Rights Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 )? Because we hold that plaintiff proved a cause of action under California law and that the First Amendment does not insulate the defendant from liability, we do not reach the third issue. (449 F.2d at page 247) * * * * * * "In jurisdictions other than California in which a common law tort for invasion of privacy is recognized, it has been consistently held that surreptitious electronic recording of a plaintiff's conversation causing him emotional distress is actionable. Despite some variations in the description and the labels ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.