135 Nev., Advance Opinion 50
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
VERNON NEWSON, JR., No. 75932
Appellant,
vs. FILELI
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. OCT 1 0 201S,
RA/
Emir(
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, two counts of
child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Douglas W. Herndon, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Darin F. Imlay, Public Defender, and William M. Waters, Deputy Public
Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
Attorney, and Alexander Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,
for Respondent.
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BEFORE HARDESTY, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, SILVER, J.:
Vernon Newson and Anshanette McNeil were driving in a
rented SUV on a freeway on-ramp when Newson turned and shot
Anshanette, who was seated in the backseat next to the couple's infant son
and Anshanettes toddler. Newson pulled the vehicle over to the side of the
road, and Anshanette either fled or was pulled from the vehicle. Newson
shot her additional times before driving off, leaving her behind. Newson
drove the children to Anshanettes friend, reportedly telling her that
Anshanette had "pushed me too far to where I can't take it no more."
Newson fled to California, where he was apprehended. The State charged
Newson with open murder. Although Newson did not testify at trial,
defense counsel conceded in closing argument that Newson shot
Anshanette, arguing Newson did so in a sudden heat of passion and that
the killing was not premeditated. The district court declined to instruct the
jury on voluntary manslaughter, concluding the evidence did not establish
that offense. The jury convicted Newson of first-degree murder, two counts
of child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person.
In this appeal, we primarily consider whether the district court
abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter. We conclude it did, as the circumstantial evidence strongly
suggested the killing occurred in a sudden heat of passion upon provocation.
We reiterate that district courts must instruct juries on the defendant's
theory of the case where there is any evidence, no matter how weak, to
support it. We therefore reverse the first-degree murder conviction and
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remand for a new trial on that charge. We reject Newson's remaining
assertions of error and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction as to the
other charges.
I.
Late one night, witnesses driving in Las Vegas on Lamb
Boulevard near the 1-15 heard rapid gunfire coming from a nearby freeway
on-ramp. Looking in the direction of the gunfire, they observed an SUV on
the on-ramp and thought they heard more than one car door slam before
the SUV sped off. Persons who arrived at the scene shortly thereafter saw
a badly injured woman lying on the road. She had been shot seven times:
through her cheek and neck, chin and neck, chest, forearm, upper arm, and
twice in the back. At least one of the shots—the one that entered through
the victim's right cheek, exited her right neck, and reentered her right
upper chest—was fired at a close range of six inches to two feet. Three of
the shots were independently fatal, and the woman passed away shortly
after the shooting. The victim had no shoes, and a cell phone. damaged by
a gunshot was on the ground a few feet away. Responding officers recovered
six spent cartridges from the area, and the pavement showed evidence of
fresh dents from bullet strikes. The toxicology report later showed that the
victim had methamphetamine and its metabolite amphetamine, and
hydrocodone and its metabolites in her system at the time of death.
Meanwhile, Zarharia Marshall was waiting at her residence
for Anshanette McNeil to drop off Anshanettes infant son. Zarharia
and Anshanette were close friends, and Zarharia often babysat for
Anshanette. But Anshanette never arrived. Instead, Vernon Newson,
Anshanette's boyfriend of three years and the infant's father, arrived
in Anshanettes rental SW to drop off the infant and, to Zarharia's
surprise, Anshanette's two-year-old son.
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As Newson exited the vehicle, bullets fell from his lap. Newson
was acting frantic, irritated, and nervous. He struggled to extricate the
infant's car seat from the SUV and, according to Zarharia, ordered the
crying child "to shut up." Newson handed the car seat with the infant inside
to Zarharia before retrieving a baby swing and diaper bag from the trunk.
Newson went around the SW to let the two-year-old out. The toddler
looked frightened, and when Zarharia asked him whether he was staying
with her and whether he was going to cry, the toddler looked at her without
answering and then ran into the house. Newson followed Zarharia and the
children inside and kissed his infant son before asking to speak with
Zarharia. Zarharia followed Newson outside and watched him pick up a
bullet from the driveway and place it in a gun magazine. Zarharia also
noticed Anshanette's shoes and purse in the back seat of the SUV. Zarharia
testified that Newson retrieved the purse from the SUV, handed it to her,
and asked her to tell his son that he always loved him. Zarharia asked
Newson what had happened, and she testified that he responded, "you
know, just know that mother fucker's pushed me too far to where I can't
take it no more." Newson drove off.
Zarharia retrieved several of the bullets that had fallen onto
her driveway and tried to call Anshanette, who did not answer. Zarharia
took the infant out of his car seat to change his diaper and realized he had
blood on his pants and that there was blood in the car seat as well. She
called Anshanette's mother, who in turn called the police. Based on her
description, detectives identified Anshanette as the shooting victim.
Police located and arrested Newson more than a week later in
California. Newson's watch had Anshanette's blood on it, and he was
carrying bullets of the same caliber and make as those used in the shooting.
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Police did not recover the murder weapon but did recover the SUV, which
had been abandoned and still contained bloody clothing, a pair of fiip-flops,
a car seat, spent cartridges, and other items. Anshanette's blood was on the
driver's side rear seat, seatbelt, door, and door handle, as well as on the
steering wheel. Detectives also recovered six spent cartridges and one
unfired round from the SUV, and those cartridges matched the cartridges
recovered at the crime scene. The SUV had three bullet holes in the back
seat, and there were bullet fragments in the vehicle.
The State charged Newson with murder with use of a deadly
weapon, two counts of child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership
or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. At trial, the State's theory
of the case was that Newson was driving the SUV when he pulled the
vehicle over to the side of the road, turned around, and shot Anshanette,
who bled on the infant. Newson then exited the SUV, pulled Anshanette
from the vehicle and threw her onto the road, stood over her, and shot her
several additional times before climbing back into the SUV and driving off.
Newson did not testify at trial. However, Newson's counsel
conceded that the evidence showed Newson shot Anshanette, but argued
that the States evidence fell short of proving first-degree murder. Newson's
counsel contended that the circumstantial evidence showed that Newson
became angry while driving and shot Anshanette while his passions were
inflamed. Newson's counsel further argued the evidence did not show that
Newson ever exited the SUV. In support, Newson's counsel pointed to
evidence surrounding the shooting and testimony that the couple argued
constantly, including while driving. He also pointed to evidence that
Anshanette had high levels of methamphetamine in her system at the time
5
'
of the shooting, which an expert witness at trial agreed may have caused
her to become unreasonable or threatening.
Pertinent here, Newson wished to have the jury instructed on
voluntary manslaughter and his counsel proffered instructions to that end.
The State argued that the instructions were not warranted because there
was no evidence of any particular provocation that incited the killing.
Newson's counsel countered that circumstantial evidence justified the
instructions and that the State's provocation threshold would force Newson
to testify and waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The district court agreed with the State that the evidence did not establish
sufficient context to warrant the instructions. The court thereafter
instructed the jury only as to first- and second-degree murder.
The jury convicted Newson of first-degree murder with use of a
deadly weapon and the remaining charges. The district court sentenced
him to an aggregate sentence of life with parole eligibility after 384 months.
Newson appeals.
Newson alleges error only as to the convictions for first-degree
murder and child abuse, neglect and endangerment. We first consider
whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the
jury on voluntary manslaughter. We thereafter examine whether the State
"Newson also contends the district court erred by declining to give his
proffered instruction on two reasonable interpretations of the evidence and
that the district court gave an inaccurate flight instruction. The district
court was not required to give the proffered two reasonable interpretations
of the evidence instruction because the jury was properly instructed on
reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 96-98,
545 P.2d 1155,
1155-56 (1976). We do not address the flight instruction, as Newson did not
raise his appellate arguments below. See Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 120,
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failed to adequately inform Newson of the child abuse, neglect or
endangerment charges or prove the necessary elements of those charges.
A.
Newson first contends the district court erred by refusing to
instruct the jury on his defense theory of voluntary manslaughter,2 where
that theory was supported by Newson's statement to Zarharia and by the
circumstances of the crime. The State counters that the district court
properly refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter because
the evidence did not establish a provocation.
"The district court has broad discretion to settle jury
instructions, and this court reviews the district court's decision for an abuse
of that discretion or judicial error." Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748,
121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). The failure to instruct the jury on a defendant's
theory of the case that is supported by the evidence warrants reversal
unless the error was harmless. See Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1023-
25, 195 P.3d 315, 322-23 (2008) (discussing when instructional error may
be reviewed for harmlessness).
Existing case law treats voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 531,
665 P.2d
260, 261 (1983); see Collins v. State,
133 Nev. 717, 727 & n.1,
405 P.3d 657,
178 P.3d 154, 161 (2008) (holding that the defendant must object at trial to
the same grounds he or she asserts on appeal); Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600,
606,
817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991) (holding that this court need not consider
arguments raised on appeal that were not presented to the district court in
the first instance), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State, 120 Nev.
1001,
103 P.3d 25 (2004).
2Because the parties did not brief the issue of whether the proffered
voluntary manslaughter instructions were correct statements of law, we do
not address it.
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666 & n.1 (2017). Voluntary manslaughter involves "a serious and highly
provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an
irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an attempt by the person
killed to commit a serious personal injury on the person killing." NRS
200.050(1). Moreover, the killing must result from a sudden, violent,
irresistible passion that was "caused by a provocation apparently sufficient
to make the passion irresistible." NRS 200.040(2); see also NRS 200.060.
We have frequently addressed the circumstances in which a
trial judge should give voluntary manslaughter instructions at the request
of a defendant charged with murder. See, e.g., Collins, 133 Nev. at 727-28,
405 P.3d at 666-67; Williams, 99 Nev. at 531,
665 P.2d at 261. In the
seminal case of Williams v. State, the defendant claimed the killing
happened in a heat of passion after he and the victim engaged in a fistfight
and the victim threw the defendant to the floor, but the trial court refused
to give the defendant's proffered voluntary manslaughter instruction.
99
Nev. at 531-32,
665 P.2d at 261-62. In concluding that the district court
erred, we reiterated that a criminal defendant "is entitled, upon request, to
a jury instruction on his or her theory of the case, so long as there is some
evidence, no matter how weak or incredible, to support it."
Id. at 531,
665
P.2d at 261. Applying that rule, we explained that the defendant's theory
of the altercation that led to the killing could support a voluntary
manslaughter conviction because the victim's actions during the fight could
be viewed as an attempt to seriously injure the defendant, providing
sufficient provocation under NRS 200.050.
Id. at 532,
665 P.2d at 261-62.
Conversely, in Collins v. State, we upheld the district court's
decision not to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction where no
evidence supported that charge. 133 Nev. at 728-29, 405 P.3d at 666. In
8
that case, circumstantial evidence linked the defendant to the killing,
including the defendant's and the victim's prior history and cell phone
records on the day the victim disappeared, the defendant's possession of the
victim's jewelry, the victim's blood and acrylic nail in the defendant's home,
and the victim's blood in the trunk of an abandoned car. Id. at 718-19, 405
P.3d at 660-61. The defendant requested a voluntary manslaughter
instruction based upon his remark to a third party that the defendant
thought he should delete text messages between himself and the victim for
fear that the police might use those messages to link him to the victim's
disappearance. Id. at 728, 405 P.3d at 667. We concluded that "[t]he cryptic
reference to a text-message exchange in no way "suggest[ed] the irresistible
heat of passion or extreme provocation required for voluntary
manslaughter," warning that to give a lesser-included offense instruction
where no facts supported the lesser offense could lead a jury to return a
compromise verdict unsupported by the evidence. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Newson killed Anshanette. The sole
question is whether the evidence warranted a voluntary manslaughter
instruction where there was no direct evidence of the events immediately
preceding the killing and the defendant chose to invoke Ms constitutional
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. In declining to instruct the jury
on voluntary manslaughter, the district court specifically concluded that
Newson's statement, according to Zarharia—that Anshanette had "pushed
[him] too far to where [he] can't take it no more"—demonstrated neither a
sudden passion nor sufficient provocation for voluntary manslaughter
because the statement lacked context as to when Newson was
"pushed . . . too far." We disagree that this statement lacked adequate
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context under these circumstances and further disagree that the evidence
taken as a whole does not support a voluntary manslaughter charge.
The State was not prohibited from arguing circumstantial
evidence as a whole showed first-degree murder. Yet, Newson's counsel was
prohibited from arguing Newson's theory regarding what crime the
evidence showed. The record here shows abundant circumstantial evidence
suggesting the killing was not planned and instead occurred in a sudden
heat of passion. The circumstances of the killing itself suggest a sudden
heat of passion. The shooting occurred in a rented SUV on a freeway on-ramp in a busy location, and witnesses heard rapid gunfire and at least one
car door slam. Because Newson was in the driver's seat when he began
shooting, he would have had to point the gun directly behind him—quite
possibly while still driving the SUV—in order to fire those first few shots at
Anshanette. Moreover, two young children were present in the car, and the
one next to Anshanette was Newson's own baby. Either child could have
easily been hit by a stray bullet or casing, to say nothing of the danger
presented by two adults fighting in a moving vehicle. Meanwhile,
Anshanettes friend, Zarharia, was expecting Anshanette to arrive at any
moment to drop off the infant and would be sure to miss Anshanette when
she did not arrive with Newson. All told, it is difficult to imagine a more
unlikely setting for a deliberate, planned killing.
Newson's behavior and demeanor immediately after the killing
further suggest that it may have happened in the heat of passion. Notably,
Zarharia testified that Newson was very agitated when he arrived at her
residence to drop off the children. Bullets fell from his lap as he stepped
out of the SUV. Anshanettes purse and shoes were still in the back seat,
and yet Newson made no attempt to hide these from Zarharia, and in fact
10
handed Zarharia Anshanettes purse. He also handed Zarharia the bloodstained baby carrier and proceeded to retrieve and load a bullet into the gun
magazine while Zarharia looked on. He also openly blamed Anshanette for
whatever had happened. These circumstantial facts suggest that Newson
was still overwrought when he reached Zarharia's and that he was not
taking any measures to conceal the evidence of the killing, such that a juror
could infer that Newson had reacted in the heat of the moment when he
killed Anshanette and had not planned to kill her.
Circumstantial evidence also suggests sufficient provocation.
According to Zarharia, when she asked Newson what had happened, he
responded that Anshanette had "pushed [him] too far to where [he] can't
take it no more." This statement, viewed in light of the other evidence,
supports an inference that Anshanette may have provoked Newson while
they were driving to Zarharia's. The testimony that the couple fought
frequently while driving, and the evidence that Anshanette was under the
influence of methamphetamine that may have caused her to act
unreasonably or even threateningly, further suggests the couple may have
been fighting when Newson shot Anshanette. The physical evidence could
provide some additional support for that view. At least one bullet—the shot
that entered through Anshanettes right cheek, exited her right neck, and
reentered her right upper chest—was fired at a very close range, possibly
as close as six inches, which could suggest that Anshanette had moved out
of her seat and had her upper body near Newson when he fired that shot.
Newson's demeanor when he arrived at Zarharia's suggests that he had
recently been enraged. Finally, Newson's statement came in response to
Zarharia's question of "what happened," which implies Newson meant he
11
was "pushed . . . too far" and simultaneously could not "take [Anshanettes
pushing] no more while driving to Zarharia's.
While this evidence is all circumstantial, likewise, so is the
States theory of how the killing occurred. We remind district courts "that
a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on his theoiy of the case, so long
as there is evidence to support it, regardless of whether the evidence is weak,
inconsistent, believable, or incredible." Hoagland v. State, 126 Nev. 381,
386,
240 P.3d 1043, 1047 (2010) (emphasis added). We conclude that the
evidence could support a voluntary manslaughter verdict and the district
court was therefore required to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter. Moreover, the States case for first-degree murder was not
strong, and we therefore are not convinced that the failure to instruct the
jury on Newson's theory of the case was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction on first-degree
murder and remand for a new trial on the murder charge. In light of our
decision, we need not address Newson's remaining assertions of error as to
that charge.
B.
Newson next contends the State violated his Sixth Amendment
rights by failing to inform him of the specific child abuse or neglect charges
against him and failed to prove abuse or neglect at trial. Newson did not
raise the first argment below, so we need not address• it.3 See Davis v.
3The record belies Newson's first argument. The complaint and
information charged Newson with child abuse, neglect or endangerment
under NRS 200.508(1) by placing each of the two children "in a situation
where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result
of abuse or neglect" by shooting their mother, Anshanette, in close proximity
to them.
12
State, 107 Nev. 600, 606,
817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991) (holding that this court
need not consider arguments raised on appeal that were not presented to
the district court in the first instance), overruled on other grounds by Means
v. State,
120 Nev. 1001,
103 P.3d 25 (2004). We therefore only consider
whether the evidence supported the jury's verdict finding Newson guilty of
two counts of child abuse, neglect or endangerment.
Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict if "any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 1, 11,
222 P.3d 648, 654 (2010)
(internal quotations omitted). Under NRS 200.508(1), (4)(a), and (4)(d), the
State could satisfy its burden of proof by showing that Newson placed the
children in a situation where they may have suffered a physical injury. See
Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
129 Nev. 445, 451-52,
305 P.3d 898,
902-03 (2013) (explaining that the State may prove its case by
demonstrating the defendant caused the child "to be placed in a situation
where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering"). Based on
the evidence presented, a rational juror could reasonably conclude that
Newson exposed the children to physical danger by discharging a firearm
several times in a vehicle with the children present and, in the infant's case,
seated immediately adjacent to the victim. Accordingly, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports this verdict.4
4We disagree with Newson's argument that cumulative error
warrants reversal. See United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir.
2000) ("One error is not cumulative error."); see also Valdez v. State, 124
Nev. 1172, 1195,
196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008) (addressing the test for
cumulative error).
13
A district court must instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter when requested by the defense so long as it is supported by
some evidence, even if that evidence is circumstantial. We conclude the
district court erred by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter here, where Newson's statement to the victim's friend,
viewed in light of the other evidence adduced at trial, suggests the shooting
occurred in a heat of passion after Newson was provoked, and the error was
not harmless. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction as to the
murder charge, affirm the judgment of conviction as to the remaining
charges, and remand for a new trial on the murder charge.
J.
Silver
We concur:
J.
Hardesty
A44(14.0 J.
Stiglich
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