State v. Manso’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband ... will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a”

   23 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Scull · State v. Dickerson

2. “Constitutional provisions insure a person from an unreasonable search and seizure of his house, papers and effects. No such search or seizure shall be made except upon a warrant issued upon probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const.Amend. IV; La. Const. art. 1, § 5. Comformably, our Code of Criminal Procedure in art. 162 provides in pertinent part: A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of the judge, by the affidavit of a credible person, reciting facts establishing the cause for issuance of the warrant. We have held that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. The judicial officer must be supplied with enough information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant. State v. Hughes, 433 So.2d 88 (La.1983); State v. Mena, 399 So.2d 149 (La.1981). Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), courts mechanically followed the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Richmond · 831 So. 2d 962 - State v. Green

3. “| sHere, the officer received a tip from an anonymous citizen that the defendant was selling marijuana from his residence. The tip described the door from which the marijuana was sold and also described the seller. The basis of the informant’s tip was his/her observation of drug sales within twenty-four hours of the tip. The officer conducted a surveillance of the residence during which he observed three suspected drug transactions involving the exchange of money for small plastic bags. In the first two instances, the defendant disappeared into the interior of the residence and came back with the plastic bag he exchanged for the money, and in the third instance he had the plastic bag in his possession when he answered the door to the residence. Given these circumstances, it was more probable than not that the residence contained contraband. Thus, there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 804 So. 2d 802 - State v. Powell