Universal Commodities, Inc. v. Weed’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The court properly denied appellants any recovery for the loss of future profits. Universal and its three corporate stockholders and officers were attempt ing to start a new business. The general rule is that the loss of anticipated profits from a new business is too speculative and conjectural to support a recovery of damages. Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423 , 115 S.W.2d 1097 (1938); Barbier v. Barry, 345 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1961, no writ). It is true that lost profits will not be denied merely because a business is new if factual data is available to furnish a sound basis for computation of probable losses. Pace Corporation v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179 , 284 S.W.2d 340, 348 (1955), which involved a new business actually established and operated for a while. But in the case now before us the undisputed evidence shows that there was no basis for the recovery of damages for loss of anticipated profits.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Harper Building Systems, Inc. v. Upjohn Co. · Autotrol Corporation v. Continental Water Systems Corporation

2. ““The ‘no evidence’ rule is applicable before the court may properly instruct a verdict, or render a judgment non ob-stante veredicto, or disregard a jury’s answers to certain issues. But the ‘no evidence’ rule does not mean exactly what its name might suggest. The real meaning of the rule is tersely stated by our Supreme Court in the landmark case of Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574 , 44 S.W. 1059 (1898), as follows: “ ‘From a careful examination of the cases, it appears (1) that it is the duty of the court to instruct a verdict, though there be slight testimony, if its probative force be so weak that it only raises a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of the fact sought to be established, such testimony, in legal contemplation, falling short of being “any evidence" \ and (2) that it is the duty of the court to determine whether the testimony has more than that degree of probative force.’ ” (Emphasis by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Portwood v. Buckalew