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45 Cal. 86

Clarke v. Scott

California Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1872

California Supreme Court · decided 1872-07-01

S. W. Scott purchased a tract of land from the plaintiffs on the 27th of September, 1865, for four thousand dollars, and executed his three promissory notes to them for one thousand three hundred and thirty-three dollars each. One of these notes was payable in one year, another in two years, and the third in three years. Defendants J. M. Scott and Miles Scott signed, as sureties, the note payable in one year.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1872-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently February 1915

3 state decisions

1018721880189019001910decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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By the Court:

¶1The question as to whether the defendant S. W. Scott, at the times at which he made the several payments to the plaintiffs, did elect to apply them, or any of them, to either of the three notes of his which were held by the plaintiff's, is a question of fact. Under the general rule he, being a debtor, had the right to direct the manner in which the payments, or either of them, should be applied. Had he given a distinct verbal direction at the time of making any one of the payments, there could be no doubt that it would be a payment only upon the particular note designated by him. If it be a fact that at the time the defendants, J. M. Scott & Co., as sureties of the other defendant, S. W. Scott, signed the note in suit, it was then agreed or understood between all the parties that such payment as the defendant S. W. Scott might thereafter make should be applied toward the satisfaction of that particular note, it would be a circumstance tending, in some degree at least, to establish by presumption that the payments, when they were subsequently actually made by the defendant S. W. Scott, without any intermediate change of his first intention, were to be so applied; and in this view we think that the proffered evidence ought to have been admitted.

¶2Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

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