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← 45 F.2d 103 - Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee &. Co.

Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee &. Co.’s Empirical Analysis

45 F.2d 103 · 1930

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
June 1985
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 4 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 1985 · most notably Poe v. Ullman (1961), Underwater Devices Incorporated v. Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc. v. Lester A. Haug, Don W. Schmid and Herman Gunther (1983)

9 federal appellate · 4 district · 4 state decisions

70193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 81 · 18 U.S.C. § 334

Relies on Norton v. Larney · Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co. · Sarah Boone v. William Chiles · United States Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co. · Tracy v. . Talmage

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Taken literally, this language would seem to forbid the transportation by mail or common carriage of anything ‘adapted,’ in the sense of being suitable or fitted, for preventing conception or for any indecent or immoral purpose, even though the article might also be capable of legitimate uses and the sender in good faith supposed that it would be used only legitimately. Such a construction would prevent mailing to or by a physician of any drug or mechanical device ‘adapted’ for contraceptive or abortifaeient uses, although the physician desired to use or to prescribe it for proper medical purposes. The intention to prevent a proper medical use of drugs or other articles merely because they are capable of illegal uses is not lightly to be ascribed to Congress. Section 334 forbids also the mailing of obscene books and writings; yet it has never been thought to bar from the mails medical writings sent to or by physicians for proper purposes, though of a character which would render them highly indecent if sent broadcast to all classes of persons. See United States v. Chesman, C.C.E.D.Mo., 19 F. 497, 498 ; United States v. Clarke, D.C.E.D.Mo., 38 F. 500, 502 ; United States v. Smith, D.C.E.D.Wis., 45 F. 476, 478 ; United States v. Dennett, 2 Cir., 39 F.2d 564, 568 , 76 A.L.R. 1092 . It would seem reasonable to give the word ‘adapted’ a more limited meaning than that above suggested and to construe the whole phrase ‘designed, adapted or intended’ as requiring an intent on the par”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.