Volume 45 — Florida Reports

This case was decided by the Court En Banc. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Citrus County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Columbia 'County. The facts in the case are stated in tne opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Washington County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Walton County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court;

This case was .decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Jackson County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the coxirt.

This case was decided .by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Santa Eosa county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of error to the Criminal Court for Hillsborough County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Jackson County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This cape was d'ecided by Division B. Writ of error fo the Circuit Court for Walton County. The facts in the case are stated-in the opinion of thé Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of erroir to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division 33. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county. • The facts in the case are stated in the .opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Washington County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Tl.iis ¿ase was'4edded,.hy. ,DÍY¿sion',;;-A.-».;':' .Writ 'of err.or to the Circuit Court 'for- Alachua County.-' The'facts,iu?fhe.:case/areStated incthe opiniontof ;the : Court. . a _ ;.f . .' , . :■ ,.

This' case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Columbia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by División A. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by División A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Jackson County. The' facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Columbia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Walton County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Washingto* County. Tbe facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court. ’

This case tvas decided by Division A. Writ of Errod to the Circuit Court for Escambia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the

This case 'was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Dade County.. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — APPOINTMENTS BY GOVERNOR TO FILL VACANCIES.</p> <p>Under the provisions of Section 7, Article IV of the Constitution, in conjunction with Section 217 Revised Statutes, where a vacancy occurs in the office of Circuit Judge or in that of Judge of a Criminal Court of Record during a recess of the Senate, the Governor properly fills such vacancy by apointment to hold not longer thaA the end of the next ensuing session of the Senate, and when such next ensuing session of the Senate convenes it is the duty of the Governor to submit apointees to fill such vacancies to the Senate for confirmation for. the unexpired term.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>1. In the trial of an action at law brought by a creditor of the assignor, attaching an assignment for the benefit of creditors, declarations and statements made by the assignor within six months before the date of the deed of assignment tending to show that he had a much larger amount of property than he turned over to his assignee, it appearing that he had suffered, no material losses between the'date of his declarations and statements and the date of his assignment, are competent evidence upon the questions whether he did turn over all his property to his assignee, and whether the assignment was fraudulent and void, and the exclusion of such evidence was erroneous.</p> <p>2. A deed of assignment which requires the assignee to sell the assigned property with all reasonable dispatch does not necessarily impose upon the assignee the duty of proceeding in any manner contrary to the statutory directions, and is not for that reason void.</p> <p>3. A deed of assignment which conveys a part of the assigned property “subject to homestead exemption” is not void because the assignee is therepy charged with a trust in favor of the assignor, when it is followed by a general conveyance of all the assignor’s property, “except such property as is exempt by law from levy and sale under execution and laws of Florida,” and it appears from the whole deed that the assignor did not intend to waive his exemption, ■ but did intend to claim it.</p> <p>4. A deed of assignment is not void because of a provision ' which authorizes the assignee, out of the proceeds of the trust property, to pay and discharge all just and reasonable expenses of executing the assignment and carrying into effect the trust created, together with all legal and proper compensation and commissions of the assignee for his services in executing the trust.</p>

<p>1. A deed executed by the Governor and Secretary of State, purporting to convey all the right, title and interest the State may have acquired under the provisions of Chap. 4011, acts of 1891, to lands therein described, which the deed recites were embraced in certain tax certificates of lands certified to the State under the provisions of that act, is not prima facie evidence of title in the grantee, nor of the- regularity of the proceedings lor the certification of such lands to the State.</p> <p>2. A motion to exclude from evidence a deed executed by the Governor and Secretary of State, purporting to- convey all the right, title and interest the State may have acquired under the provisions of Chapter 4011, acts of 1891, to lands therein recited as embraced in certain tax certificates of lands certified to- the State under the provisions of that act, made at the conclusion of the evidence of the party introducing it, should he granted, where none of the proceedings upon which the deed was based,, were introduced by tine party claiming under it.</p>

This case was decided by division B. Writ of error to tlie Circuit Court of Marion county., The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided' by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court from Dade County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.</p>

This case wag decided by the court In Banc. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case ivas decided by Division B. Writ of error to the-Circuit Court for DeSoto County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was tried by the Court In Banc. Appeal from the Circuit Court, for Alachua County. The facts in the ease are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>)-■ The owner-of timber upon the laiid is not an “owner of timbered lands,” within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section 1469.</p> <p>The fact that the timber standing upon land constitutes its chief value, does not give equity jurisdiction to enjoin its cutting upon application of one owning only tha timber,</p> <p>fi. A bill alleging that complainant is the owner of the timber upon lands and in the actual possession thereof and that said lands are chiefly.valuable for the timber thereon, and are wild, unimproved and unoccupied, is insufficient- to support an injunction against a trespasser thereon, even ' though the chief value of the land would be destroyed by the removal of said timber.</p> <p>4. 'Upon a heaving for an injunction, proof of the insolvency of the defendant must he direct and positive, and not merely upon information and belief.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the - court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Coorf for Columbia County. The feels in tk- case are stated in the opinion of (he court.

Tisis caw was deckled by Hie court- Id Banc. Writ of error to the. Circuit- Court from Duval County. The facts in the, case are stated-in the opinion of t.lui court.

<p>This case was decided by Division A. •</p> <p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Escambia County. ...</p> <p>•The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court .</p>

This case was decifred by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Madison County. The facts in the case are sfated in the opinion of the Court.

Tins case was decided by, Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Dural County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Marion County. The facts in the case are stated, in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Levy County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by the Court In Banc. Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Hillsborough County- The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>This ease was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Polk County.</p>

This case was decided by Division B . ■ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court' for Putnam County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>'1. Where a married woman owns separate-statutory property, and is permitted by her husband to manage and control such property, and it is apparent that the husband does not exercise- any coercive or improper influence over the wife in the disposition or management of such property, and the wife loans her money to the husband, or a co-partnership in which he is a member, for the purpose of conducting a business in which the wife clearly disclaims all Interest except that of creditor of the husband or firm, and where it is distinctly understood between husband and wife that she does sustain such relation, and the firm executes its notes to her or to a trustee fcr her, for. the money loaned by her, and the wife dies, leaving a will and executor therein named, and after her death the notes are delivered to the executor by the bank in which the wife had deposited them, on a bill filed by the executor claiming the business and property, in which the wife's money had been invested, as her business and her property, and praying that it be decreed to be her business and property, the prayer of such a bill should not be granted, and a decree made to that effect is erroneous.</p> <p>2. While a wife and husband can not at common law make valid contracts with each other, and cannot contract with each’other at law in any other manner than is-permitted by the statute law, yet in equity she may become his creditor, or the creditor of a firm cf which he is a member, and equity will enforce her rights growing out cf such relation.</p> <p>S. Courts of equity recognize the right cf a married woman to make gifts to her husband, and will sustain such gifts when the circumstances show that -there has been no fraud, imposition, oppression, or undue influence practiced upon the wife — no advantage taken of her in obtaining them — and the gifts are such as under the circumstances are fair and reasonable.</p> <p>4. In order to constitute a valid gift from the wife to the husband, the transaction must be consummated by delivery of the thing given, and where the wife has loaned her husband or a firm of which he is a member money, and has taken notes for such loans and has retained possession of them until her death, and has not delivered them to her husband, there has been no gift to the husband of such notes, and they are assets of her estate.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hernando County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. t The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of tile court.

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Lake County. The facts in the ease are stated in the opinion ,;Iie court.

<p>1. A bill for an accounting filed against one holding for coi lection as agent or trustee many notes, the property of another, which have been in part collected in farm produce and stock which he, the agent, was to convert into money, and has disposed of in trade in various ways, and as to which discovery is sought as a necessary incident to the accounting, is not wanting in equity.</p> <p>2. It was not proper in this case at the hearing upon bill and answer to appoint a master to take testimony. The decree of the court should have been in conformity with the case made by the bill and answer alone.</p> <p>3. An amended or further answer filed after exceptions for insufficiency were sustained to the original answer is to be construed in connection, with and as a part of the original answer.</p>

<p>TAXATION — ILLEGALITY OF ASSESSMENTS — REMEDIES OF TAXPAYERS — CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES, GENERAL AND SPECIAL.</p> <p>1. The principles of law announced in the case of Jackson County v. Thornton, decided at the June Term, 1902, of this court (33 South. Rep. 291) are approved and applied to this case.</p> <p>2. Section one (1), Chapter 4516 of the laws of 1897, providing for the levy upon the real and personal property in the counties of the State of three and one-half mills upon the dollar, fcr the current expenses of the -State for each of the years 1897 and 1898, being a part of a general law providing for levying taxes in those years, does not take away the power conferred by section 784 Revised Statutes of levying a special tax of not more than one-half mill for public health purposes in. addition to the three and one-half mills provided for in section 1, Chap. 4516; section 784 being a special law. N'or is it necessary to make a levy legal under the latter section that there should be a further act of appropriation of the money raised thereunder. The language of the section not only authorizes the levy of the tax, but ex proprio vigore is an appropriation of the funds to be raised therefrom to public health purposes.</p> <p>3. Chapter 4520. laws of 1897, providing for the levy of a tax of half a mill, the proceeds to be devoted to the payment of pensions, is a special act, and the rate of three an! one-half miils for the current expenses of the State provided for by section 1, Chapter 4516, laws of 1897, is a general law and does not embrace the half mill pension tax above mentioned,, nor is there any conflict between the two acts.</p> <p>4. Chapter 4526, laws of 1897, is a special act authorizing the' county commissioners of every county to levy a special tax not to exceed two mills upon the real and personal property of their respective counties for the expenses of - criminal -prosecutions, and this rate is not embraced in the five mill rate permitted by section 2, Chapter 4516, laws of 1897, for county purposes, the latter being a general law.</p> <p>5. In the construction of general and special acts the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant” applies, and a general act will not be held to repeal or modify a special one embraced within the general terms of the general act, unless the general act is,a general revision of the whole subject, or unless the two acts are so repugnant and irreconcilable as to indicate a legislative intent that the one should repeal or modify the other.</p> <p>S. Where the board of county commissioners at the Octobei meeting, 1897, after correcting and reviewing the county assessment, did ascertain and determine the rate of taxa tion for each purpose for which taxes were to be levied, and the aggregate amount to be collected for each purpose, and ordered the tax collector to be debited with these several amounts, all of which appears fr.om minutes of said meeting, the requirements of section 2, Chapter 4516, laws of 1897 are substantially complied with.</p>

<p>1. It is incumbent upon a «ompiainant to allege in his bill ever}' fact clearly and definitely that is necessary to entitle him to relief, and, if he omits essential facts therefrom or states such facts therein as show that he is not entitled to relief in a court of equity, he must suffer che consequences of h's so doing.</p> <p>2. While a general demurrer to a bill, as for v.ant oí equitj, will be overruled if there is any ground of equitable relief stated in the bill, even if there are any number of grounds» of special demurrer, it is also true, in equity as at law, that a pleading is to be construed most strongly against the pleader.</p> <p>S. A vendor’s lien is that lien which in equity is implied, to belong to a vendor for the unpaid purchase pric^- bf land sold by him, where he has not taken any other lien or security for the same, beyond the personal obligatiop of the purchaser. Such lien is not the result of any^ag|eement between vendor and vendee, but is simply an equity raised by the courts for the benefit of the former, by whom it will be enforced or denied between parties, as the exigencies of each particular case may seem to require.</p> <p>t Every unpaid indebtedness for purchase money of real estate does not necessarily give to the grantor a vendbr’s lien, even though he has not taken any other lien oro securitj for the same, beyond the personal obligation of the purchaser. Being created by inference alone and enforceable only in a court of equity, it is for such court to determine in each particular case whether the pleadings and proofs taken in their entirety warrant the court in creating and enforcing.such a lien.</p> <p>5, Such a lie i may be implied in equity to belong to a vendor for the unpaid purchase price, even though such vendor, after having executed a contract of sale to the vendee, continues to remain in possession of the land so sold, such a lien being wholly independent of possession, but such a vendor is not entitled to treat the estate as his own. If he wilfully damages or injures it, he is liable to the purchaser; and more than that, he is liable if he does not take reasonable care of it.</p> <p>6. It is also the duty of the vendor remaining in possession .of lands, after having executed a contract of sale embracing them to the vendee, in addition to taking reasonable care of said lands, to pay all taxes which may be legally imposed ihereon from time to time, unless the vendee has agreed to pay the same.</p> <p>7. Since the adoption of the Revised Statutes, under section 1917 thereof, real estate descends to the heirs and an adminis trator has no right to the possession until an order oi court has been made authorizing him to take possession thereof.</p> <p>8 Where the bill of complaint discloses that the vendor remained in possession of lands, after having executed a contract of sale embracing them, and had not taken reasonable care thereof, but had neglected and failed so t.o do, having permitted the fencing and all other improvements thereon to virtually go to decay and the estate to depreciate in value every year, and had omitted to pay the taxes legally imposed thereon, and where the only relief prayed in such bill is for a decree against the administrator of the decedent, to whom the vendor had executed a contract for the sale of the lands, for the amount which might be found to be due upon said contract,'for the appointment of a re- - ceiver, and for general relief, it must be held that a court of .equity is warranted in refusing to create and enforce a vendor’s lien, at the instance of complainant.</p> <p>9. He who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands, and where the allegations of the bill taken in their entirety show that the complainant has been guilty of laches, as in the bill in this ease, it was well open to attack by a general demurrer and the same should have been sustained. ' 1</p> <p>10. Upon such a showing by complainant of his own negMgenre and omission it was also error to appoint a receiver.</p> <p>11 The rule of procedure in giving deficiency decrees does not belong to a court of equity, unless specifically conferred by statute or- a rule of court. Equity rule 89 provides for the entry of a deficiency decree only in suits for the foreclosure of mortgages, Ijence it was error to enter a deficiency decree in this cai=¡e.</p>

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Holmes County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court. *

<p>DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT — NEGLIGENCE, HOW ALLEGED-DEFENDANTS FOR SUPPORT — STATUTORY PLAINTIFFS.</p> <p>1. The rule established in negligence cases is that it is not necessary for the declaration to set out the facts constituting the negligence, but an allegation of sufficient acts causing the injury, coupled with an averment that they were negligently and carelessly done will be sufficient; and where the negligence is alleged in general terms, and not confined to any specific acts, of negligence, any acts of negligence contrary to the injury may be shown in proof.</p> <p>2. At common law no one had any' right to recover for the neg-_ ligent or wrongful death of another. The right of recovery in such cases is due entirely to the statute giving such right, and it exists only in such persons as the statute gives it to.</p> <p>3. Section 2 of Chapter 3439, laws of 1883, brought forward as section 2343 Revised Statutes,' gives the right to recover for deaths, by wrongful or negligent act (1) to the widow or husband of the deceased’as the case may be; if there is neither widow or husband, then (2) to. the minor child or children of the deceased; and where there is neither widow nor husband nor minor child, then (3) to any person or persons dependent on the person killed for a support; and, where there is neither of the above classes, , then (4) to the executor or administrator of the person killed. The existence of the right of action in any of these named classes of persons, commencing with the second class above, is wholly dependent upon the fact whether there is any person in esse belonging to any of the classes who are given by the statute the precedent right over him to maintain the action.</p> <p>4. In suits for recovery for death by wrongful or negligent act the defendant may show in bar of the plaintiff’s right to recover that there is in esse a person who is given by the statute the precedent right of action over the plaintiff.</p> <p>5. In actions for damages for death by wrongful or negligent act when the question is in issue as to whether a person is a “dependent upon the deceased for support,” and as such entitled to sue, such status can be shown by proofs establishing the following facts: that such person, regardless of any ties of relationship to the deceased, or of strict legal right to such support, was, either from the disability of age or non-age, physical or mental incapacity, coupled with the lack of property means, dependent in fact upon the deceased for a support, and that he or she from the fact of continued past support by the deceased, and not necessarily from any strict legal right thereto, had a reasonable expectancy of a continuation of such support from the deceased had he lived. Such reasonable expectancy, ■ coupled with the other named facts establishing dependency, entitles such party to recover as a dependent for support.</p>

This case was decided by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>1. The three months allowed for taking testimony in chancery causes .by Rule 71 of the Rules of Circuit Court in suits in equity mean three calendar months.</p> <p>2. Rule 71 of the Rules of Circuit Court in suits in equity which provides that three months and no more shall be allowed for taking of testimony after the cause is at issue, unless the judge shall, upon special cause shown by either party, enlarge the time * * ■*, allows three calendar months, after the cause is at issue for taking testimony by the parties, complainant and defendant, and in determining when said time has expired, the first day when the cause is at issue — the day of filing the replication — is to be excluded from the calculation.</p> <p>S. Where a chancery cause is set down for a hearing by complainant .on the bill, answer and replication, before the three months allowed by Rule 71 of the “Rules of the Circuit Court in Equity” for taking testimony have expired, and the parties complainant and defendant go to a hearing, and the cause is heard in that state of the pleadings without testimony, and there is no objection made by the defendants, the latter waives the right to take testimony, and in that case the answer of the defendants is evidence, in so far only as the allegations thereof are responsive to the bill.</p> <p>i. Where an answer is confined to such facts as are necessarily required by the bill, and those inseparably connected with them, forming a part of one and the same transaction, the answer is responsive to the bill, as well when it discharges, as when it charges, the defendant.</p> <p>E. Where it appears that A, a corporation, but one not operating under the building and loan association laws of Florida, makes a contract with B, who owns one share of stock in A, whereby A agrees on the 13th of February, 1893, to advance or loan B $7,300 at 7 per cent, interest per annum, and that the interest should be calculated and added to the principal, and the sum thus obtained should be divided into 120 equal monthly payments of $82.13, due on the 11th day of each succeeding month, and that 10 per cent of the whole sum, or $730 should be deducted as a bonus for making the advance, and that, therefore, the real transaction was an advance or loan of $6,570, at 10 per cent, interest per annum; and that under the terms of the contract a penalty of 10 per cent was to be imposed on B if he made default in paying any one of these monthly installments, and that the installment should then also bear interest at 7 per. cent per annum; and that if B made default in the payment'of three consecutive monthly installments “then and in any such event the entire debt shall ipso facto become due, payable and collectible.” with no provision in- the contract for elimenting any part of the unearned interest, contained in the installments, thus precipitated to maturity, such a contract is unlawful and usurious under the second clause of the second section of Chapter 4022, laws of 1891, which makes unlawful and usurious “any contract, contrivance or device whatever, whereby the debtor is required or obligated to pay a greater sum than the actual principal sum received, together with interest at the rate of ten per centum per annum.”</p>

This case was decided by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are státed in the opinion of Die court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Volusia county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>1. Under Rule 48 of the Rulés of the Circuit Co irt in suits in equity, it is proper to strike a plea which is sworn to by the attorney of the defendant, it not appearing that the defendant himself is absent from the State.</p> <p>2. An exception, to an entire answer for insufficiency is not permissible, and should not be sustained, when the answer denies a material allegation of the bill.</p> <p>3. Exceptions to answers in chancery should he framed in accordance with the established rules of equity practice, in the absence of any statute or rule of court changing such established rules.</p>

Tills case was decided by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court from DeSoto county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the</p>

<p>1, To the extent of conferring jurisdiction on the court of chancery to enjoin the trespasses mentioned in section 1469 of Rev. Stats, by a mere trespasser without color of right or authority, said section is constitutional and can be enforced; but to the extent of awarding an account for damages for the trespasses mentioned therein and decreeing their payment, the same is uneonsititutional and can not be enforced.</p> <p>2. Independent of Section 1469 Rev. Stats, the court of chancery had no jurisdiction to order an account to be taken of damages for a mere trespass on timbered lands, the same being cognizable at law, and, in so far as said section undertakes to confer such jurisdiction upon the court of chaneery, it impairs the right of trial by jury according to the course of the common law and secured by the constitution.</p> <p>'3. 'Where the court of chancery prior to the adoption of our constitution, had jurisdiction in a case, independently of any statute, for any purpose, it also had authority to decree the taking of an account and the payment of damages in 'such case; but the court of chancery had no inherent jurisdiction to enjoin a mere trespass on timbered lands, and though the legislature may properly confer the power to enjoin in- such cases, yet it can not, along with the delegation of such new power, confer upon the court of chancery jurisdiction to adjudicate damages for such trespasses, and neither can the parties confer such jurisdiction by their silence or consent.</p> <p>4. A jurisdictional matter will be considered by this court, even though the same may .not be questioned by the pleadings or expressly presented.</p>

This case was decided by the Court In Banc. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia county. The 'facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by the Court In Banc. xVppeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County. The facts in the easej are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for A la cima county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Uolk county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by the court In Banc. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Citrus county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county. . The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

Tins case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Alachua county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court. . .

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p>

<p>1. Companies deriving their authority from the legislature and ' invested with the franchise of supplying municipalities and their inhabitants with water through the instru- . mentality of pipes and mains laid in the public streets are, when exercising such functions, performing services of a public nature within the meaning of section 30, Article XVI, constitution of 1885, and their business is affected with a public interest, so as to subject them to regulation by requiring them to charge reasonable rates, and such regulation does not violate the “due process” clause of the Federal constitution. _ ^</p> <p>2. The provisions of Chapter 5070, act approved May 31, 1901, are sufficient to authorize municipalities in this State to pass ordinances fixing reasonable rates to be charged for water supplied by a water company to the municipality and its inhabitants.</p> <p>3. Every charter granted by the Legislature to the persons and corporations mentioned in section 30, Article XVI, constitution of 1885, and every contract made with them by the legislature or by a municipality under its authority, are granted, made and accepted subject to and in contemplation of the possibility of the subsequent exercise of the power which by that section is declared to be vested in the legislature. The section mentioned not only becomes a part of every such charter or contract as much so as if written therein, but by implication it denies the authority of the legislature to estop itself by contract or to authorize a municipality to so bind it not to exercise the power thereby recognized whenever in its wisdom it shall think necessary to do so.</p> <p>4. Section 30, Article XVI, constitution of 1885, reserves to the legislature the power to regulate by its own act, or through the instrumentality of a municipality, the rates to be charged by a water company supplying such municipality and its inhabitants with water so as to require such company to charge reasonable rates only for water supplied, and the exercise of this power does not deprive such company of its property without due process of law, nor does it impair the obligation of a contract between it and the city for higher rates, where such company was created and- such contract was made subsequent to the adoption of the constitution of 1885.</p> <p>5. Section 30, Article XVI, constitution of 1885, is applicable not only to persons and corporations engaged.as common carriers in transporting persons and property, hut also to persons and corporations performing other services of a public nature.</p> <p>fl. To the extent 'that section 30, Article XVI, constitution of 1885, affirms and declares full power in the legislature to do the things therein declared, and to the extent that it by implication deprives the legislature of the power to barter away that power, and to the extent that it becomes a part of every contract-made since the adoption of the Constitution, by the legislature or by a municipality under its authority with the persons and corporations therein mentioned, it is self executing and needs no legislation to enforce it.</p> <p>7. Where the matter presented for adjudication in a second suit arose after the termination of a former suit between the same parties and was in no manner involved in such former suit, the judgment therein is no bar to the seeonü.</p>

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Volusia County. ..The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>' Where there was an .interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer to a. cross-bill and subsequently a final decree dismissing such bill, an appeal thereafter entered from the interlocutory decree alone will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Writ of error to Circuit Court, Putnam county; William A. Hocker, Judge.</p>