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45 Ill. App. 3d 428

359 N.E.2d 888

4 Ill.Dec. 55

People v. Bryant

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided January 25, 1977

Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 1977-01-25

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently November 1988

15 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““By negotiating and entering into a negotiated plea of guilt the defendant agreed that in consideration for the State dismissing certain other criminal charges he would (1) enter a plea of guilt to the remaining criminal charges and (2) accept whatever punishment the court might see fit to impose. In other words for the State’s dismissing the other criminal charges he agreed to two things, and now seeks to be released from the latter leaving only the former stand as consideration for the State’s dismissals. Obviously by failing to negotiate a recommended sentence or a particular sentence or sentences both the State and defendant intended the bargain to include defendant accepting whatever sentence, including probation, that the trial court, had power to, and would see fit to, impose, and the State likewise accepting any such sentence imposed. The State, of course, is bound by the agreement and would remain so bound as to its part of the agreement were defendant allowed to appeal only from the sentence without moving to withdraw his plea, which would result in the People receiving less than they had bargained. Since the People are bound by all the bargains made we see no reason why defendant should not be bound to all the bargains. We would not tolerate the State prosecuting defendant on one of the charges which it had agreed to dismiss without defendant being released from his bargain to plead guilty and accept the sentence imposed. Likewise, we will not allow defendant to br”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 47 Ill. App. 3d 206 - People v. Edwards

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1977-01-25

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN,

¶1dissenting:

¶2I do not believe that Rule 604(d) applies to a defendant who merely wishes to question the excessiveness of his sentence. In my opinion, Rule 604(d) was promulgated in response to the increasing number of appeals from guilty pleas and was designed to compel a defendant to initiate his objections to Rule 402 admonitions in the trial court where errors can be quickly cured. This rationale is of course not applicable to an allegedly excessive sentence.

¶3Where, as in this case, a defendant knows he is guilty, admits he is guilty, enters a plea of guilty and receives what he considers an excessive sentence, I regard it illogical that he must then file a motion to vacate that plea. If he files a motion to vacate the plea and it is subsequently allowed, must he then stand trial even though he knows and admits he is guilty? If the trial judge sets aside his plea and he again pleads guilty, must he file another motion to withdraw‘-his plea if he receives another excessive sentence?

¶4If the sentence which is the only ground for error is technically correct although disproportionate to the offense, defendant could not possibly be successful in his motion to withdraw his plea and vacate judgment for such is not a recognized ground for reversal. If the trial court explicitly complies with all aspects of Rule 402 and no such procedural deficiencies exist, the majority’s interpretation requires an act not legally authorized when no grounds exist for the withdrawal of the plea.

¶5I further disagree with the majority’s concept of consideration given by defendant for the State’s dismissal of certain other charges. It is true that defendant agrees to plead guilty for these dismissals, but he does not agree to “accept whatever punishment the court might see fit to impose.” (Emphasis added.) Rather, he agrees to accept a rational form of punishment reasonably related to the seriousness of the crime he has admittedly committed and to his rehabilitative potential. This expectation is mandated by article I, section 11, of the 1970 Constitution of Illinois.

¶6Under the rationale of the majority, the State is shortchanged in the plea negotiation process when a defendant successfully challenges a sentence imposed on a plea of guilty. I believe such a position is particularly misplaced in a case such as this where there existed no agreement for the recommendation of a sentence to the court. While a prosecutor must of necessity occupy in part the position of an adversary, his ultimate duty is to seek justice on behalf of the people. Yet justice is not served when an excessive sentence is given. Thus, I fail to see how our consideration of an allegedly excessive sentence deprives the prosecution of its bargain. Certainly the pursuit of justice would not abide a disproportionate sentence.

¶7I dissent.

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