45 Ill. App. 3d 763 - Cusick v. Clark’s Empirical Analysis
1977
Citation profile
10 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on 37 Ill. 2d 494 - Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern Railroad · 2 Ill. 2d 511 - Duffy v. Cortesi · 31 Ill. App. 3d 182 - Fopay v. Noveroske · 56 Ill. 2d 457 - Wozniak v. Segal · Illinois Central Railroad v. Read
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In view of the slow speed of defendant’s vehicle and the indications that the plaintiff collided with the rear of defendant’s vehicle, the evidence did not preclude a jury conclusion that the plaintiff entered the crosswalk after the defendant’s car had entered the crosswalk. We, therefore, cannot say as a matter of law, under the Pedrick standard, that the evidence so favored the plaintiff as to entitle her to judgment n.o.v. on this theory asserted by plaintiff as to defendant’s negligence.” (Cusick v. Clark (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 763 , 360 N.E.2d 160,164 .)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[t]he mere occurrence of an automobile accident in which a child is injured does not give rise to an inference of negligence on the part of a motorist. It remains the plaintiff's burden to prove the motorist's negligence and his responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.