¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent from the majority. I do not quarrel with the majority’s interpretation of Hodges v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 290, 10 S.E. 2d 723 (1940) as applied to this case. I believe the rule of Hodgesshould be reconsidered. I would hold that a devise of a tract of real estate should not be governed by the same requirement of definiteness of description as a deed or contract to convey. I would hold that the devises of real estate in the first, second, and third items of the will are definite enough to be located from the real estate which was owned by the testator and the will should be enforced. I believe this is the law in the majority of our jurisdictions, Annot. 157 A.L.R. 1129, 1130 (1945) and was the law of this state prior to Hodges v. Stewart, supra. See Harvey v. Harvey, 72 N.C. 570 (1875); Wright v. Harris, 116 N.C. 462, 21 S.E. 914 (1895); Blanton v. Boney, 175 N.C. 211, 95 S.E. 361 (1918); Freeman v. Ramsey, 189 N.C. 790, 128 S.E. 404 (1925). I dissent from the majority in order to give our Supreme Court the opportunity to reconsider Hodges v. Stewart, supra.