Flint v. Kimbrough’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It seems appropriate at this point to again glance at our usury statute. “Prior to the 1933 amendment, the penalties were ‘only available defensively and by way of recoupment’ (see Jaffa v. Lopez, 38 N.M. 290 , 31 P.2d 988, 992 ). If they exceed the sum payable according to the contract, they would not support a judgment over for the borrower. Perhaps it was to remedy this situation that the 1933 amendment was adopted. “It seems appropriate to call attention to the difference in results to be obtained by the borrower in the limitation by recoupment, and by affirmative independent action. In any action on the usurious contract, in case the borrower has not paid the interest contracted for, his recoupment will be the amount of the accrued interest contracted for, and he will recover his costs. If the borrower has paid the interest, his recoupment will be twice the amount of the interest paid and the accrued and unpaid interest. It seems that the penalty imposed upon the oppressor incident to contracting to receive usury is doubled when he receives the fruits of the evil design. Since, as we said in Jaffa v. Lopez, supra, under the original statute, ‘the only recovery provided for is by the lender’, in the last mentioned instance the costs would follow the judgment, and the lender would recover such. Under the provisions of the 1933 amendment, the borrower, who has performed his contract, may recover treble the amount of interest he has paid and the costs would follow the recov”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stiff v. Fogerson