¶1 After a careful examination of the testimony, I am unable to find any evidence that the defendant ever made *141 tMs alleged contract to sell; that he ever gave any authority to the broker to sell; or that he assented to or ratified the sale after he knew it was made. It is not pretended that there is any oral evidence that he gave such assent; nor is it pretended that he gave to the broker, Cornell, any power to sell, or to make a contract of sale. He only authorized him to receive proposals, and communicate them. The question then, is reduced to the letters of the defendant, introduced by the plaintiff.
¶2 The letters do not show that he was aware, until the last of the correspondence, that the broker had assumed to do more than he was authorized, or certainly not that he had assumed, in writing, to sell, and to sign Hyatt’s name to a contract of sale; the purchaser also signing the same. As soon as a copy of the contract is sent to him, he repudiates it. Until about that time, Hyatt evidently supposed that the alleged purchaser was not bound by what had been done; that he might consummate the proposed purchase, or not, as his interest might dictate. In view of the facts before stated, there is not evidence in the letters (prior to the last one, of the 14th of December), that Hyatt, with knowledge of a written contract, signed by the broker in Hyatt’s name, or by the purchaser, .had ratified or sanctioned it. It is essential that a party should know what contract has been made, and, in a case of this sort, substantially how it was made, before his statement or letter can ratify or affirm it.
¶3 The correspondence in this case, prior to the last letter, in my opinion does not show such knowledge; therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to nonsuit. Judgment reversed, and new trial granted; costs to abide the event.
¶4 Judgment reversed; new trial granted.