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← 45 SO2D 398 - Chavers v. AR Blossman, Inc.

Chavers v. AR Blossman, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

1950

Citation profile

13
cited by 13 later decisions
2
states following
April 1983
most recently cited

13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently April 1983

13 state decisions

801950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cone v. Inter County Telephone Telegraph Co. · Payne v. Georgetown Lumber Co. · Auto Painting Repairing Co., Inc. v. Ware. · Sincer v. Widow & Heirs of Bell · Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. De Jean

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Negligence @~559. The General doctrine of foreseeability ■ is not applicable to the extent of relieving one who sets in motion, through the agency of the negligent act, a chain of circumstances leading to the final resultant injury.” Chavers v. A. R. Blossman, Inc., 45 So.2d 398 , syl. 4.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Not only is the concept of foreseeability itself elastic and capable of expansion, but also it is generally recognized that the particular manner in which the injury is brought about need not be foreseeable by any test. It has been well said, “The fact is, that the consequences of negligence are almost invariably surprises.” This concept is an antidote to the requirement that plaintiff be injured by one of the dangers or risks that made defendant’s conduct negligent. There is often no hard and fast line between the risk or hazard (which must be foreseeable) and the manner in which an accident happens (which need not be). The tendency of these two notions to pull in opposite directions, therefore, both invites the courts to define the risk or hazard broadly, and also gives courts a choice to treat the freak case on an individualized basis.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.