¶1This is an original application to this court for a writ prohibiting the board of trustees of the Town of Bingham Canyon from creating and levying a special tax to defray the cost of grading, curbing, paving, and otherwise improving a portion of Main Street in said town.
¶2Defendants demurred to the petition on the ground that “no facts are shown by the said petition or writ sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these defendants or any of them.”
¶3It is admitted that the Town of Bingham Canyon is a municipal corporation incorporated under Comp. Laws 1907, section 299. It is also admitted that petitioner, W: H. Wood-ring, is the owner of certain land abutting on Main Street that will be subject to the special tax about to' be created and levied. Under section 302x11, Sess. Laws- 1911, taxes for general corporation purposes are limited to^ iy2 per cent. It is admitted that the revenue derived from taxes collected for general purposes is wholly insufficient to enable the town to pave the streets or any substantial portion thereof. The case is therefore narrowed to the single question of whether *175incorporated towns are given the power to create, levy, and collect a special tax h> defray the costs of paving or otherwise improving the streets1.
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¶5The statute providing for the incorporation of towns was first enacted in 1884 (see Sess. Laws 1884, p. 42), and, as occasionally amended, has been carried forward in the several revisions and compilations of the General Statutes until the present time. The provisions of sections 302x11, 302x12, and 302x18 are, so far as material here, suhstan-*176tially as they were when first enacted. The paving of the streets is one of the things that an incorporated town may do, and hence is as clearly a' corporation purpose as any other act which a town is, under the statute, authorized to do. There is, however, no provision of the act as originally passed or as amended that empowers a town to- levy and collect a special tax to defray the cost of paving or otherwise improving streets. In 1888 (Laws 1888, c. 48) the Legislature passed a general law providing for the incorporation of cities, in which the powers of the city council are defined and .enumerated. The act provides, among other things, that the city council shall have power:
“3. To levy and collect taxes for general and special purposes on real and personal property. … 8. To lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets. … 12. To provide for the lighting, sprinkling and cleaning of the same. …■ 90. To pass all ordinances and make all regulations … necessary for the carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred by this act.”
¶6Section 1799, vol. 1 (Comp. Laws 1888), p. 644, provided that:
“The city council are authorized and empowered to divide the city into districts for sewerage, paving, or other like purposes, … and … for making therein street improvements and repairs … and for the payment of the costs and expenses thereof, … levy and collect local taxes, in proportion to benefits, upon the property within said districts,” etc.
¶7Salt Lake City, proceeding under the foregoing provisions of the statutes, established sprinkling districts and levied a special tax, or, as it is sometimes designated, a local assessment, to defray the cost of sprinkling streets within the districts. Parties owning property subject to the tax brought-suit to enjoin the city from collecting the same. This court, in a well-considered opinion (Pettit v. Duke, 10 Utah 311; 37 Pac. 568) held that the statute did not authorize -or empower the city to collect a special tax to defray the expense of sprinkling streets, and that the assessments made for that *177purpose were illegal and void. The court, among other things, said:
“The Legislature has expressly conferred, upon the city power ‘to levy and collect taxes for general or special purposes on real estate and personal property’ and ‘for the lighting, sprinkling and cleansing of streets.’ 1 Comp. Laws, p. 621. It has also given the city power to levy taxes by local assessment for ‘sewerage, paving and other like purposes,’ including street improvements and repairs, waterworks, and gas mains. 1 Com.p. Laws, art. 15, pp. 644, 645. But the sprinkling of streets is not included in the enumeration of instances in which local assessments may be levied.”
¶8The powers conferred upon cities to levy and collect taxes for corporation purposes are much broader — more comprehensive — than those granted to incorporated towns along that line. In the ease at bar the statute under which the legality of the special tax in question is defended and sought to be upheld does not authorize the levy and collection of special taxes for any purpose except “to lay out, construct, open and keep in repair canals, water ditches, or water pipes for irrigation, domestic or other use for the inhabitants of such towns (and) for the purpose of protecting the water that is used for culinary and domestic uses from pollution. ’'
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“A due regard for individual rights and the plainest principles of justice requires that taxing statutes shall have only the effect which the Legislature clearly intended; in construing them all reasonable doubts as to such intent should be resolved in favor of the-citizen.”
¶10And again, in the same section, it is said:
“A statute conferring authority to impose taxes must be construed strictly. A tax law cannot he extended by construction to things not named or described .as the subjects of taxation.”
¶11In 2 Dillon’s Mum. Corp. (4th Ed.) section 763, the rule is well illustrated in the following terse and concise language :
*178“It is a principle universally declared and admitted that municipal corporations can levy no taxes, general or special, upon the inhabitants or their property, unless the power he plainly and unmistakably conferred. It has, indeed, often been said that it must be specifically granted in terms; but all courts agree that the authority must be given either in express words or by necessary or unmistakable implication, and that it cannot be collected by doubtful inferences from other powers, or powers relating to other subjects, nor can it be deduced from any consideration of convenience or advantage.” Hamilton’s Law of Special Assessments, Sec. 195; .1 Page & Jones Taxation by Assessment, Sec. 229; 37 Cyc. 966; 25 A. & E. Ency. Law, 1171.
¶12The argument advanced in support of the legality of the tax in question that the power expressly given by statute to incorporated towns to pave and to otherwise improve their streets confers the power to levy and collect special taxes to defray the cost of such improvements is untenable. The law is well settled that the power given to municipal corporations to make public improvements does not of itself confer the power to levy and collect special taxes to defray the cost of such improvements. In 1 Page & Jones Taxation by Assessments, section 231, it is said:
“A grant to a municipal corporation of power to construct a given form of public improvement does not of itself confer power to pay for such improvement by levying special assessments therefor. While a grant of power carries with it, without specific mention thereof, all powers incidental to the main power granted, and reasonably adapted to carry such power into effect, the power of special assessment cannot be regarded as incidental to the power of constructing public improvements, since such improvements may be constructed and paid for out of funds raised by general taxation. Thus a grant of power ‘to grade, macadamize, and pave the sidewalks and to lay out, change, and open new streets,’ does not confer the power of levying a local assessment for such improvements.”
¶13And again, in section 232, same volume, it is said:
“In the absence of some statutory provision expressly granting the power to levy local assessments to pay the cost of such improvements, it will be presumed to be the intention of the Legislature that the cost of such improvement is to be paid for by general taxation exclusively.”
¶14*179In Hamilton’s Law of Special Assessments, section 191, the author says:
“Although a city charter authorizes the corporation to regulate and improve all streets, alleys, and sidewalks, no power is conferred to levy a special assessment, and in the absence of such power the expense of doing the work must he raised hy general taxation.” Gassner v. McCarthy, 160 Cal. 82; 116 Pac. 73; 28 Cyc. 1103.
¶15Defendants also invite attention to Comp. Laws 1907, section 279, as amended by chapter 122, Sess. Laws 1911, which declares that:
“Special or local taxes may be levied … for the purpose of # … maintaining waterworks, reservoirs, canals, … maintaining gas, electric, or other plants for illumination, … constructing, extending and repairing sewers and drains; and for constructing and paving of sidewalks.”
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