45 Wis. 2d 111 - Rabata v. Dohner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 66 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 201 Wis. 2d 452 - State v. Elm · Krahn v. Pierce

2. ““The type of hypothetical questions just discussed, namely those based on other testimony in the case, satisfy the requirement imposed upon all hypothetical questions, that the facts assumed must be supported by evidence in the case. This requirement is based on the notion that if the answer is founded on premises of fact which the jury, for want of evidence, cannot find to be true, then they are equally disabled from using the answer as the basis for a finding. Direct testimony supporting the fact assumed is not required. It is sufficient if it is fairly inferable from circumstances proved. Moreover, the supporting evidence need not have been already adduced if the interrogating counsel gives assurance that it will be. And of course, it is no ob jection that the supporting evidence is controverted. The proponent is entitled to put his side of the case to the witness for his opinion. “There is a possible danger, however, that by omitting some of the facts, the proponent may present an unfair and inadequate picture to the expert, and that the jury may give undue weight to the answer, without considering its faulty basis. What safeguards should be supplied? Some courts have required that all facts material to the question should be embraced in the hypothesis, but this viewpoint seems undesirable because it is likely to multiply disputes as to the sufficiency of the hypothesis, and may tend to cause counsel, out of abundance of caution, to propound questions so lengthy as to be ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 172 Ind. App. 207 - Walters v. Kellam & Foley, Mussett, Nicholas & Stevenson, Inc.

3. “Of course, it is within the discretion of counsel eliciting the opinion to use a hypothetical question if he so desires; but under the rule which we herein adopt, he will no longer be forced to do so if the use of such question, in his opinion, is likely to dull the effect of the point at issue. The trial judge, however, when he feels that the propounding of the question without a clear statement of the assumptions upon which it is based would confuse rather than aid the jury, may in his discretion insist that a hypothesis be used. He may also, of course, insist that some foundation be put in the record if he believes that the elicitation of an opinion without a foundation is likely to mislead or confuse the jury. In general, however, if the premises upon which the conclusion is reached are to be attacked as being inadequate to support the opinion, even in light of the expert qualifications, it becomes the duty and obligation of opposing counsel to draw out the data on which the expert has arrived at his opinion. . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 65 Wis. 2d 770 - Nelson v. L. & J. PRESS CORP.