45 Wis. 2d 606 - Bethards v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 58 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The state has well observed that the recommendation of La Vigne should not be made a mandatory requirement because (1) it is often difficult to tell in advance of filing the information whether to charge the defendant as the principal or under this section as a party to the crime; (2) the statute itself does not require that a defendant in a position such as the instant defendant, be specifically charged with violation of this section; and finally, (3) that even if it was error for the information not to contain reference to sec. 939.05, Stats., it was harmless error for the defendant could not have been prejudiced by a failure to narrow this complaint down to this specific statutory reference. “In all likelihood, the district attorney knew of the facts surrounding this incident prior to the filing of the information so presumably it was known that defendant could be charged under the party-to-a-erime action. This should have been done. However, failure to do so, in the absence of other circumstances showing a detrimental effect on the defendant, would appear to be harmless error. The defendant knew what he was charged with and there is nothing in the record to indicate that had this statute been specifically referred to in the information, his trial strategy would have been any dif ferent. The state’s burden of proof is still the same in either event.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 61 Wis. 2d 262 - Hardison v. State · 49 Wis. 2d 683 - Nicholas v. State

2. ““. . . Under the complicity theory of sec. 939.05 (2) (b), a person is liable for the substantive crime committed by another if (1) he undertakes conduct (either verbal or overt action) which as a matter of objective fact aids another person in the execution of a crime, and further if (2) he consciously desires, or ‘intends’ that his conduct will yield such assistance. He must consciously direct his conduct toward the realization of the criminal objective. He must have a ‘stake in the outcome.’ “However, it is not necessary that the aider and abettor enter into an agreement with the perpetrator to assist him in consummation of the crime. Nor is it necessary that the perpetrator be aware of the accomplice’s efforts, in ■ order to hold the accomplice liable for the substantive crime. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 55 Wis. 2d 168 - Taylor v. State

3. ““A person is concerned in the commission of the crime if he: “(a) Directly commits the crime; or “(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it, or “(c) Is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit it or advises, hires, counsels or otherwise procures another to commit it. Such a party is also concerned in the commission of any other crime which is committed in pursuance of the intended crime and which under the circumstances is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 60 Wis. 2d 683 - State v. Cydzik